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I.

THEISTIC EVOLUTION.

LESLIE STEPHEN somewhere cites a suggestion of Bishop Butler that nations as well as individuals may go mad. However this may be as to other professions, the imputation of aberrancy has for long time lain upon the investigators of nature, and the opinion is widespread that since the appearance of Darwin's famous book the disease has reached an acute stage. To outsiders it is difficult to comprehend why naturalists have abandoned the old scheme of instantaneous creations and catastrophic exterminations of species, which processes were supposed to have been enacted over and over again through long ages; and have rejected the types and archetypes of the comparative anatomists, with their beautiful evidences of design, in favor of a theory which seems to relegate all animated nature to the chapter of accidents.

Some intelligent people find it impossible even to understand what *Evolution* signifies, and start with erroneous definitions, deriving extraordinary conclusions from their own errors. The theory of Evolution does not, for example, teach that a dog, or that a dog's descendant, may be transformed into a cat; or that a dandelion, itself or its posterity, can in any length of time become a rose. Yet how great is the difficulty experienced by some in understanding that it does not break down any of the barriers of actually existing species? Its real effort is to account for the cross-resemblances now found between dog and cat, by the supposition that both have come from some common ancestor, which was neither one nor other. It also declares that "laws of nature" (whatever is understood by this term) and the whole environment

IV.

THE METAPHYSICS OF CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS.

I. Reality.

IT is the purpose of this paper, and of three that may be expected in the next three numbers of this Review, to discuss, and specially to expound and to vindicate, the Metaphysics of Christian Apologetics.

Christian Apologetics is that theological science which sets forth the proofs to the reason that Christianity is the supernatural, the authoritative, the final religion, equally for us and for all men; in a word, the absolute religion.

This science should be distinguished from polemic theology. The difference between the two is in their presuppositions, in their objects, and, above all, in their court of appeal. Polemic theology presupposes belief in Christianity and her Scriptures; it attacks heresies; it appeals in the last resort to the Bible as the Word of God. Luther, in his controversy with the papacy, was a polemic theologian. The question was not as to the truth of Christianity, but as to its requirements. Apologetics, on the other hand, presupposes the denial or the doubt of Christianity; it assails unbelieving systems of the universe; if it appeals to the Bible, it is only as reason has proved the latter to be the Word of God. Justin Martyr was the great apologist of the primitive Church; he defended Christianity against heathenism, and mainly on rational grounds.

Again, apologetics should be distinguished from apology. The latter is a rational vindication of some one element of Christianity; or of Christianity as a whole, but only by some one kind of argument. Thus the *Cur Deus Homo?* is an apology; it proves merely the reasonableness of the doctrine of vicarious satisfaction for sin. So, too, Butler's *Analogy* is an apology; it defends revealed religion against deism, but only by the analogical argument. Apologetics, on the contrary, is the rational vindication of Christianity as a system and on all its fundamental grounds. It is not the science of the defense of a particular fortress, or of the protection of the country by one special arm of the service, as, for example, the

artillery; it is the science of warfare in all its essential branches and applications.

Once more, as has just been implied, apologetics is characteristically positive. It consists in attack as well as in defense, of attack in order to defense. It protects its own territory by carrying the war into the enemy's country. It would refute the claims of rival religions by establishing Christianity as the absolute religion. In a word, it is Christianity's triumphant because complete vindication.

Metaphysics is "the science of first and fundamental truths." These truths are prior to all experience. They are not known on the testimony of others. They are not reached by any process of reasoning, whether deductive or inductive. No sooner does experience begin than we begin to act on them. Thus, though we may be long unconscious of them, we show that we possess them, or rather that they possess us. Neither the child nor the savage has heard or has reasoned out the principle that every effect must have an adequate cause. Yet when the child is hurt he shrinks back, knowing that something must have hurt him; and when the savage finds his dog dead he carefully examines him, knowing that something must have killed him. Neither can be persuaded to do otherwise. No sooner does either act at all than he acts thus. It makes no difference even if the validity of these principles be denied; they are still regarded. Hume set them aside in his philosophy, but admitted that in common life they controlled him. Hence, they are called first truths; they are prior to all experience; it starts out with them, it does not gather them.

Again, they are termed fundamental truths. As we have seen, they do not rest on other truths. They are not derived from other knowledge, however obtained. They are rather the basis because the indispensable condition of this. Science, for example, would be impossible, if investigation might not proceed on the principle of cause and effect. No other than Comte, the father of positivism, admits that if the mind is to observe profitably, it has need of some theory. As Prof. Calderwood has said (*Handbook of Moral Philosophy*, p. 235): "The more deeply we study the procedure of our own intelligent life, the more clearly will it appear that all experience has its meaning determined by reference to transcendent truth, and is held together in the unity of intelligent life only by the recognition of what is either beyond or above experience." Hence, these truths are called fundamental; the knowledge of them conditions all other knowledge; the latter would lack coherence without the former.

Metaphysics, as "the science of these first and fundamental truths," has two references. It is concerned, on the one hand, with the exercise of thought itself, the metaphysical in thought, that is, the process of knowing first and fundamental truths. To this, its epistemological reference, some attention was given in the number of this REVIEW for April, 1895, in an article entitled "The Function of the Reason in Christianity." Metaphysics is concerned, on the other hand, with the objects of metaphysical thought, or transcendent realities. It does not now ask, How do we know the first and fundamental truths? Its inquiry is, Which and what are these truths? It is primarily in this, its ontological reference, that metaphysics is taken in this series of papers.

By the metaphysics of apologetics, consequently, we mean those truths which are first and fundamental with regard to the complete vindication of Christianity as the absolute religion. These are not truths of Christianity. They were not first made known in its revelation. On the contrary, though implied in this, they are independent of it because prior to it; and they are even fundamental to it because it presupposes them, rests on them, and must rest on them. They are to it as the cornerstones on which some great building is reared. Because they have been laid, it does not follow that a glorious and enduring edifice will be erected; but if such an one is to be raised, it can be only on such foundations.

These truths which constitute the metaphysics of apologetics are not the same with first and fundamental truths in general. Of course, the latter are all involved in apologetics, as in every science. For convenience, however, we restrict the metaphysics of apologetics to those truths which, in addition to being transcendent to Christianity, sustain a peculiar relation to it. As other truths are not, they are its cornerstones. Moreover, while these truths do not embrace all first and fundamental truths, so neither are they themselves all such truths in the technical sense. Indeed, they need not be, strictly speaking, metaphysical truths at all. It is enough to constitute them the metaphysics of apologetics, if, besides being independent of the Christian revelation, they are the conditions of it and thus of its absolute vindication.

These truths which, in this special way, are first and fundamental to Christian apologetics, are four, viz.: *Reality*, or the truth that what we call real existence implies substance, and so is not a succession of mere appearances; *Duality*, or the truth that substance is of two essentially different kinds, mind and matter; *Personality*, or the truth of the real existence of mind as intelligent, voluntary, self-conscious entities; and *Immortality*, or the truth that the self-conscious mind or person is fitted for real exist-

ence independent of the body and so for life after death. These truths, as it would seem must be evident, may all be known prior to the Christian revelation, and are all indispensable to the vindication and even to the understanding of it. It does not follow because they are accepted and appreciated that "the truth as it is in Jesus" will be held; but it is the fact that the latter cannot long be held in its purity, unless it be embraced in dependence on the former. Here, as elsewhere, a true metaphysics is not all that is needed, but it is imperatively needed.

This importance of presenting the true metaphysics of apologetics is proved by several considerations:

1. The history of Christian doctrine teaches nothing more clearly. Every student of it knows that philosophy and theology have always exerted a powerful influence the one on the other. Would you have a general example? The grand systems of Plato and Aristotle corrupted "the faith once delivered to the saints." This we may see in Origen, in the Schoolmen, in the pantheistic theologians. The simplicity of the Gospel could not be preserved on a basis so pretentious as that supplied either by the metaphysics of the Academy or by that of the Lyceum. Do you ask for particular instances? "The sensational philosophy has produced a theology which takes no account of the holiness of God." It has done this of necessity, because of what it is itself, in spite of the intention of its founders. Condillac, with whom it may be said to have arisen, was a pious French ecclesiastic. Nothing was farther from his purpose than to lower the view of the divine perfections. Yet this he could not but do. It was the inevitable consequence of his doctrine that all mental action is merely a modification of sensation. The holiness of God must be doubted, the Deity Himself must be ignored, and should consistently be denied, when that only is held to be real which can be seen or heard or touched or tasted or smelled. On a metaphysics so narrow and so shallow, no such edifice as Christianity, or theism even, can rest. If both, or only the latter, be built on it, sure and great will be the fall. Again, the idealistic philosophy has given us an idealistic theology which tends toward pantheism even when it itself is not actual pantheism. This it also has done because of the metaphysics which it has afforded and contrary to the wishes and efforts of its leading expounders. Hegel was trained as a theologian and wrote as a Christian. The Neo-Hegelians, for example the Caird brothers, believe their "Idealism" to furnish the only rational basis of Christianity, and that their system does furnish this basis they regard as its chief excellence. Yet even Edward Caird's *Evolution of Religion* does not give us either the personal

God or the divine Redeemer of the Bible. How could it, when "the eternal self consciousness" in and through which, according to this school as represented by the late Mr. Green of Oxford, all exists and becomes intelligible, is such that neither activity nor act can be predicated of it, such that the system of relations which constitute the world and which it unifies must be eternally complete, such that the individual self seems merged altogether in the universal self? With a philosophy so monistic the essential distinction between God and man which the Scriptures imply and which redemption presupposes becomes impossible. The attempt to base such a theology on such a metaphysics is as irrational as it has been futile. Once more, let it be denied that the human mind is one and indivisible; let it be held that you can carry your religion in one pocket and your philosophy in the other; in a word, let metaphysics be expelled from theology, as Ritschl has done: and ere long we shall have his distinction between a "theoretic" and a "religious" view of the world, between "judgments of truth" and "judgments of value," between what is true and what for the sake of our religious nature it is well to regard as true. Thus "miracle" comes to be considered as the religious name for an event which awakens in us a powerful impression of the help of God, but which is not to be held as interfering with the scientific doctrine of the unbroken connection of nature. Thus, too, the Godhead of Christ is not a fact; it is only a teaching which it is of the highest value to the Christian to look on as setting forth the fact. Indeed, no theology more substantial than this is possible when first and fundamental truths are denied a place in theology. What has nothing on which to rest must at last come to nothing. In the sphere of metaphysics as elsewhere poison must kill. Nor will it make any difference what it may be labeled or how good may be the intention with which it is given.

2. Metaphysical truth cannot be held in its completeness, unless it be clearly discerned and fully appreciated. In the case of public teachers, at least, this must be. Theology affords a striking example in its own sphere. To be saved through the atonement, it is not necessary to have studied it scientifically, and to have embraced one of the many theories with reference to it. The vast majority are saved through faith in the fact of it without any inquiry into its nature. Nevertheless, as Prof. Orr has well said (*The Christian View of God and the World*, p. 340): "I cannot believe that any doctrine of Scripture—least of all the doctrine of atonement, which is represented in Scripture as the revelation of the innermost heart of God to man, the central and supreme

manifestation of His love to the world—was ever meant to lie like a dead weight on our understanding, incapable of being in any way assimilated to our thought. Certain it is that any doctrine which is treated in this way will not long retain its hold on men's convictions, but will sooner or later be swept out of the way as a piece of useless theological lumber." In the case of the atonement this is being done. Visit the congregations of those preachers who cry out against any attempt to explain it and boast of presenting simply the glorious fact of it. What do we find? That the fact itself is beginning to be questioned. In religion, indeed, no more than elsewhere, can men make fools of themselves and not lose even the little truth that they have apprehended. Now if it be thus in theology, it will be much more so in its metaphysics. This is both more profound and less evidently essential. If men do not feel the need ordinarily of a theory of the atonement, they certainly will not even see the need of a sure grasp of those principles by which at least any valid theory of the atonement must be determined. Yet, unless these principles are comprehended and their importance emphasized by those charged with public instruction, they will be first ignored and then denied. Again and again has this been the case. Indifference to metaphysics in teaching has been followed by the repudiation of it. When the methods of what are called the positive sciences have prevailed to the exclusion of metaphysical procedure, it has come to be asserted, for example, as it was affirmed by Mr. Mill, that there may be worlds in which two and two do not make four. That is, those *a priori* truths have been controverted without the assumption of which the very idea of science is an absurdity.

Nor is it a sufficient answer that while first and fundamental truths may be theoretically denied, they cannot be set aside practically. This is true, but it applies only to our lower and less important activities. The sensational philosopher as much as the people to whom he lectures does proceed in his inductions in physics on the validity of the *a priori* principle of cause and effect. Neither he nor they can help doing so. This, however, does not keep him from denying a first and so supernatural cause of the universe, nor them from agreeing with him: and this denial, as foolish as it is impious, does have a mighty and most pernicious influence on practical life. There could be no more solemn and instructive example of the importance of the study of metaphysics, at least by public teachers, than is afforded by the methods and the popularity of Col. Robert G. Ingersoll. He could not utter the inane blasphemies that he does if he himself knew anything of "the first truths;" and his hearers would quickly turn from his utter-

anees in disgust as inane if, through no instruction as shallow and false as his, they had not, in their higher thinking, if not in their every-day action, passed from under the control of these truths. Thus if they are to regulate us as they ought to do, they must be comprehended by those at least who assume to guide us. It is not necessary that all on the ship should be acquainted with the lights that indicate their course; but the pilot must.

3. Indifference to metaphysical inquiry is a characteristic of our time. Perhaps it would be more nearly correct to say that it is one of its chief characteristics. This is the day of facts; it is not the day of examination of the principles which give significance and worth to facts. Especially is this true in theology. Here there would seem to be an increasing disposition, not merely to neglect, but to repudiate first and fundamental truths. No less widely esteemed a religious teacher than Dr. Lyman Abbott, for example, said not long ago in substance that it was reason for profound gratitude that the rules of logic were no more to control us in our religious belief. Such would appear to be the position of not a few of our educational institutions. The writer has in mind a well-equipped college for women, in which a thorough course of instruction in the Bible and with reference to God is given in one department, while in another, by an equally able teacher, the young girls are taught that the senses are the only inlets of knowledge. Nor is this an exception. Even when as much prominence is allowed in education to metaphysics as to physics or to theology, it seems commonly to be held that there is no relation, and least of all a vital relation, between it and them. Foundations are laid which are utterly inconsistent with the science presented or the religion inculcated. As in the college referred to, many of our youths are being exhorted to believe and obey God after they have been shown with great subtlety and unbounded assurance that God could not exist, or at least could not be known, unless He could be seen or heard or touched or tasted or smelled. In view of such a condition, there can be no need of further justification of this series of papers. If Christianity is to be vindicated to the present age as the absolute religion, the metaphysics of its apologetics must, first of all, be determined and expounded. Should it come to be doubted whether there are any fixed rules of warfare, the great desideratum would be the demonstration of the principles of military science.

Let us, then, take up at once that question which in apologetics, as in everything else, is first and most fundamental, viz., the question of Reality.

I. Just what do we mean by it? or, as Turretin would say, "Qui est status questionis?"

1. It is not whether there is existence. All grant this. The idealist may deny the objective reality of the external world, but he admits that it exists or stands out as the idea of the percipient mind. The sensationalist may deny that the mind itself is anything more than "a series of feelings aware of itself," but he admits that it exists or stands out as a series of feelings. The skeptic may deny, with Pyrrho of old, that he knows anything, even that he knows that he knows nothing; but in so doing he admits the existence or standing out of himself at least, as making the denial. Thus the mere raising of the question as to reality implies that it is not a question as to existence. As soon as a question is raised, we have existence.

2. Neither is the question whether existence, or standing out to us, is complete. Probably no thinker would claim that it is. Look through the telescope, and at once hundreds of thousands of stars appear where just before seemed to be only empty space. Look through the microscope, and immediately the drop of transparent water teems with myriads of living creatures. If the extension of one sense thus increases indefinitely what stands out to us and so exists for us, is there not every reason to believe that this would be the case much more were only our senses multiplied? In admitting, therefore, the fact of existence we do not hold that it manifests all that is. Existence does not depend on completeness. It is not questioned that there may be much more than appears to us.

3. Nor again is the question whether existence seems precisely as what stands out to us actually is. No one who reflects would assert that it can. Every phenomenon is related more or less closely to all other phenomena, and so must be modified by them. Even of what can be perceived by us nothing can be perceived by and in itself and so just as it itself is. Besides this, whatever appears to us is of necessity in thus being perceived more or less determined by ourselves. The same thing, or what we take to be the same thing, is bound to look different to any two individuals. Their wishes, their views, their training, their environment, their ancestry, must project themselves on to and into what stands out to them. It is not so much an exaggeration as an emphatic statement when we say, "To the pure all things are pure." Even to this degree is it impossible to eliminate the personal element from our judgment. We have here the great truth of the Kantian philosophy. It is recognized as clearly by natural realism when it discusses and tries to guard against deception by the senses. Indeed, there can be no more question that existence does not precisely reveal the nature of what stands out

to us than there is that it does not manifest its extent completely. Yet in neither way is the fact of existence affected. There is existence, though it is not a complete or a perfect standing out of what is. As to this, probably all thinkers are agreed.

4. Nor once more, is the question whether what exists changes. We must admit that it does. Change seems to go on everywhere. Inorganic matter is constantly undergoing transformations. Even the solid rock wears away. It is not otherwise in the organic world. The vegetable grows, and changes as it grows. We have "first the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear." The animal passes through similar stages of development. Man does the same. This is as true of his soul as of his body. It is as true of his moral character even as of his intellect. No one is to-day just what he was yesterday. If he is not better, he must be worse. Indeed, change is a universal law. All things are in a state of flux. Existence is the standing out of changes. Those who would solve the problem of reality must grant this.

5. Nor, furthermore, is the question whether there is a real substratum underlying all appearance, change, existence; distinct from them, yet causing them to exist or stand out. Of such a substratum, though Sir William Hamilton would seem to hold to it, there is no evidence. It cannot be shown to be a metaphysical necessity, and certainly it is not cognized by the senses. Thus, though introduced in behalf of reality, its effect is to destroy it. It seeks a ground for it, but finds that ground only in a fancy.

6. Nor, once again, is the question whether reality is Kant's "ding an sich" or "thing in itself." Of such a thing, a being absolutely without attributes or properties, we know nothing. Such a thing, indeed, could not be. As Harris has well said (*Philosophical Basis of Theism*, p. 156): "There can be no being without attributes; there can be no being without power of some kind; and this is only saying there cannot be a being that does not exist. If we attempt to think of a being without attributes, a substance stripped of all properties, we have nothing left. Not only is nothing left, but our thought issues in the contradiction that being is the same with nothing. And this is the 'thing in itself' out of all relation to our faculties. It is not an unknowable which we may some time come to know; it is not nothing as the mere denial of being; it is the symbol of a hopeless contradiction at the root of all knowledge." Thus, though himself a believer in reality, it is not a rational and so real reality that Kant gives. We need not, therefore, inquire whether reality is his "thing in itself."

7. Nor, still further, is the question whether what exists is necessary and indestructible. Such reality there may be, but we do not claim that reality must be such. This, indeed, was Descartes' great error. He made substance that which subsists of itself, that which has no need of anything from without in order to its existence; and the result was that Spinoza, proceeding on this definition, labored to show that there was or could be only one substance, God, of which everything is an attribute or mode. By reality, therefore, is not meant absolute being. Existence may be real, though derived and dependent. We may hold to reality, though we see in the independent and absolute "reals" of Herbart the destruction of philosophy.

8. The question, however, is, whether appearances do not manifest in all their changes that which itself persists through all its changes; whether existence is not the standing out of what subsists *in* itself, if not *of* itself; whether, in a word, every phenomenon is not itself substance or reality as we see it.

This is the somewhat recondite question which we are to consider. An illustration may help to a better understanding of it. Your attention is concentrated on a book. You perceive, that it is oblong; that it is green; that on its back are gilt letters, etc. You feel that it is hard. When you open it you smell a musty odor. Now all admit that the book exists: whether real or only ideal, it stands out before you. Beyond controversy, too, you may not conclude that more could not stand out than does appear. Were you keener sighted, the title on the back would be larger and the cover coarser. Nor can you help your idea of the book being influenced both by other things and specially by yourself. It must seem smaller than it would, if it did not lie upon a large volume; it cannot but be more precious in your eyes than in those of others, if it be a rare treatise on your favorite science. Without doubt, also, the book itself is constantly changing. It is more worn than it was. It is mustier than it used to be. It is becoming more worn and mustier every day. Its very teachings are continually being modified. At least, the progress of discovery compels an ever new interpretation to be put upon its statements. The emphasis on them, if not the meaning of them, varies. We do not, however, believe in any real but invisible substratum under all these changes, whether physical or intellectual, which, though distinct from them, is their basis and their indispensable condition. The book that we see and touch and smell and understand is all as to whose reality we would inquire. If there be a reality under it, it is one of which we know nothing and so one of which we must decline to speak. Nor do we distinguish

between the book as we cognize it and the book as it is in itself. It would not be a book, if it were without the qualities which we recognize as those of a book. It would not be a real thing if it existed in itself and so without attributes. Such a contradiction could be only an absurdity, a nonentity. Nor, on the other hand, do you regard the book itself, as perceived and comprehended by you, as itself a self-existent and necessary substance. If it be real in this sense, you know nothing of it and make no assertion with reference to it. What you mean, therefore, when you ask, Is or is not this book real? is simply this: *Has it being of its own?* It stands out to you while your attention is directed towards it: but would it continue where it is and as it is were neither your attention nor that of any other creature directed towards it? To no two persons does it appear the same; yet are not these appearances, though so different, the phenomena of one and the same book? It itself is ever changing; yet is there not that persisting through all these changes which makes them the changes of one identical book? This is the kind of reality that we are seeking. The question is, Has the book, has what we call real as distinguished from imaginary existence, being of its own?

II. That we may consider this question more appreciatively, let us look next at its fundamental importance.

1. In every department of science and, indeed, of life its position is such. Life itself is of worth because it is real. It would not be worth living if it were an illusion. Let the earth be a phantasm; let beauty and love and right be fancies: let experience be but a long varied dream: and human existence ceases to be a good. The proof of this is that the Hindu, who takes just this view of life, craves nothing so passionately as the absorption of his own individuality in Brahm, the only reality. Nor may one reply that it is the belief in reality rather than the fact of it which gives to life its worth. To argue so is to take a position which makes argument irrational and impossible. If there is no practical difference between truth and falsehood, there can no more be a question as to reality or as to anything. So, too, it is reality that furnishes the matter of science. Would it affect the worth of astronomy not at all whether the worlds, the knowledge of which it systematizes, were but spectres? Would it affect the worth of biology not at all, whether the cell which it examines existed only when under the microscope?

2. It is not otherwise in theology, "the queen of the sciences." Unless it deals with realities, it is as empty and profitless as many would like to make it appear. Indeed, it is ordinarily because such persons are not alive to the great realities of theology that

they cry out against it. With but an undeveloped consciousness of their own personality, with no vision of God, with no faith in Christ—what wonder that the fall and redemption and the kingdom of heaven should seem to them as mere speculations, and idle ones at that? If the importance of these is to be appreciated, they must be felt to concern realities as profound and as transcendent as the Christian knows the everlasting God and the divine Christ and himself to be.

3. All this is specially true in apologetics, the foundation of theology. Apologetics is the proof of the reality of theology. It is the scientific demonstration that the existences with which theology has to do are realities; that its doctrines are both true and relate to what has being of its own; that, for example, Christ is not only, as He declared, the Son of God, but that, as the Son of God, He is "before all things and by Him all things consist," and so, of course, He has, and must have, being of His own. More need not be said to justify a brief examination of the theories by which reality in this sense is denied. Such theories, in so far as they are practically accepted, cannot but dissolve apologetics in particular, theology in general, science as a whole, and even life itself. They destroy the substance by which alone these consist. As a matter of fact, not a little of the irreligion, of the indifference to truth, and of the pessimism, of our day is rooted in the doubt whether there be any reality.

III. The theories just referred to fall naturally into two classes, the pantheistic and the positivistic.

1. The Pantheistic.—These, while they need not be and usually are not inconsistent with the belief that there is reality, must all deny it in the sense in which we are considering it. For example, they may admit that the world is as real as God; for it is His form: but they cannot allow that it is real as having being of its own. This is equally true of all kinds of pantheism. Thus Spinoza, the father of modern pantheism, may distinguish between thought and extension, mind and matter, as mutually exclusive; yet even then he makes them only the "attributes" of the one absolute substance. They reveal reality, but they have not reality or being of their own. With Spinoza, individual things are not things: "they are only the modes under which the infinite substance is constantly manifested." Thus Hegel, the typical representative of idealistic pantheism, may hold that the absolute idea develops logically into the individuals of time and sense. These individuals, however, though they have reality, cannot be realities. They are but moments in the evolution of reality; they are not realities or true individuals, for they have not being of

their own. Thus is it even in materialistic pantheism. Let the world of matter be God, as in Strauss' *Old and New Faith*, and at once the individuality and consequent reality of things is lost. They are real as God, but they are not real by themselves; being they have, but it is not being of their own.

Now the fatal objection to one and all of these forms of pantheism is that they contradict consciousness. Every man is conscious of himself as having being of his own. Though he may theoretically, he cannot practically identify himself either with the God above him and within him, or with the world around him. Whatever else he may feel, he at least feels himself to be by himself. Nor is the testimony of consciousness otherwise as to the world. We cognize it as itself a reality and as made up of realities. Whatever may have been its origin, whatever may be its relation to a divine preserver and governor, we know it, if we know it at all, as a reality by itself composed of realities by themselves. We may form other theories with reference to it, but our primitive cognition of it is as having being of its own. The pantheistic doctrine of reality, therefore, can be true only on the supposition that consciousness itself is wrong. We cannot accept the former and not contradict the latter. This is the great objection to the doctrine in question.

2. The Positivistic Theories.—The common characteristic of these is the principle that "all our knowledge comes from experience through the senses." Hence, only what is material is; for only what is material is sensuous. As Prof. Bowen says: "We cannot see, touch, hear, smell or taste either substance, or cause, or self, or God." That is to say, there is no reality; or at least, no knowledge of it can come to us through the only inlets of knowledge. Nor is this an overstatement. "We have no knowledge," says Mr. John Stuart Mill, "of anything but phenomena; and our knowledge of phenomena is relative, not absolute. We know not the essence, nor the real mode of production, of any fact, but only its relation to other facts in the way of succession or similitude." Consequently, body is defined by him, not as a reality, but as the mere "possibility of sensations;" and even from the mind he strives to take reality when he speaks of it as only "a series of feelings aware of itself." Positivism, therefore, goes farther than pantheism in its denial of reality. The latter refuses to grant to things being of their own; the former affirms that of being itself as substance or reality we know and can know nothing.

Now the objection to this theory, as to the pantheistic, is that it contradicts consciousness. It is true, as Mr. Mill says, that all

that the senses make known to us is phenomena or what appears to themselves. It is not, however, true, as he would doubtless claim, that sensation and consciousness are coterminous. We are conscious of more than the senses make known to us. Through them we are conscious of such sensations as sight and touch; but at the same time, in the same act of consciousness, we are conscious of a conviction that there is a real objective substance which is visible and tangible. That this is a true interpretation of consciousness is proved by the conduct of men universally. Let one see a wall just before him suddenly and he will as suddenly cease walking. It will make no difference whether he be a little child with no experience or an old man with the experience of a lifetime. In either case he will show by his spontaneous action that he is conscious of more than the mere visual sensation, that he is conscious also of the belief that the sensation indicates a real object corresponding to it. The positive hypothesis, therefore, is open to the same objection as the pantheistic. Though in different ways, both contradict consciousness.

The question, however, arises, Is this objection a valid one? May it not be that consciousness is untrustworthy? Or if trustworthy as to our sensations, may it not be that it is untrustworthy as to the beliefs which, as we have seen, arise intuitively on the occasion of these sensations? For example, may it not be that Mr. Mill is right when he asserts that our consciousness of our own freedom is an illusion? We seem to ourselves to be free, but are not. That is to say, we are conscious of what appears, but we are not conscious of what is. Consciousness is trustworthy as to the feeling of freedom with which we act, but it is not correct in so far as it is a belief in the real freedom of the act. This, then, is the inquiry of supreme importance. The entire trustworthiness of consciousness must be vindicated, if reality is to be established.

IV. That we may do this, observe:

1. In any event the burden of proof rests on those who maintain the negative. They do not profess to discredit consciousness. On the contrary, they plant themselves firmly on its trustworthiness. They cannot help doing this. It is only by trusting consciousness that they can know that phenomenal and unreal world which they investigate so carefully, doubtless because it is the only world that they allow can be known. Thus Prof. Huxley may reduce the furniture of the mind to sensations, pleasure and pain, and relations between these, but unless he is conscious of these and trusts his consciousness, he cannot develop that physical science whose results he claims to be so positive. For example,

a sensation does not even become a sensation until one is conscious of it. A stone cannot feel it for the reason that a stone is not conscious. The attempt to discredit consciousness is, therefore, absurd. The attempt itself cannot proceed save on the basis of the trustworthiness of consciousness. It is not surprising, consequently, that those who question reality rarely dispute the veracity of consciousness. That would be too glaring and gross a form of intellectual suicide. Even the very few who, like Maudsley, profess to distrust the individual consciousness and find certainty only in what we may call the common sense of mankind, do not prove the exception. Rather do they confirm our position. For what does confidence in that particular element of my own consciousness which is also the consciousness of all men imply but the consciousness that there are persons other than myself and that these persons are trustworthy? Thus Maudsley himself, ultimately if not immediately, falls back on his own consciousness. He, therefore, specially demonstrated that all, even those most antagonistic to reality, must do so.

What right, then, have they to discriminate and hold that consciousness is trustworthy as to sensations and phenomena, but not as to the conviction of reality which accompanies these? For consciousness is indivisible. When you feel a sudden sharp pain at the tip of your finger, you are not only conscious of the pain, you are conscious also, at the same time, in the very same act of consciousness, of the conviction that there is a real something causing that pain. Experience is necessary to teach you what it is or where it is, but experience is not necessary to convince you of its reality. You know that, and every one knows that, as soon as he feels pain. It is involved in the consciousness of pain. You cannot feel pain and not show, either to others or to yourself, that you believe that it has a real cause. You are as conscious of this belief as you are of the sensation; and as you will not have the belief unless you have the sensation, so you cannot have the sensation without the belief. In a word, they are both and equally elements of consciousness. We can distinguish between them on reflection, just as we can distinguish between the different objects taken in by a glance of the eye: but you cannot say that the one is a matter of consciousness while the other is not, any more than you can say that you see a man yet do not see the clothes which he has on. If you see the former, you see the latter; for you see both by the same act of vision: and in like manner, if you feel pain, you are conscious that there is something which causes the pain; for you are conscious of both in the same act of consciousness. One of three courses, therefore,

will be open to you. You must accept the testimony of consciousness in both respects, or you must repudiate it in both respects; or if you accept its sensation of pain, you must show why you should not accept its conviction as to a real cause of the pain. You may not trust it in the former case and not in the latter, unless you can justify your procedure in so doing. When a man speaks the truth up to a certain point, it is to be presumed that he will continue to speak the truth. Nay, when the testimony of a witness has been accepted as a whole, sufficient reasons must be given if anything included in it is set aside.

2. This proof those who question reality cannot give. This is because consciousness is ultimate. The ground of all proof, it itself is beyond proof. The final test of truth, its truth may be either assumed or denied, but can neither be demonstrated nor refuted. The last instrument of investigation, nothing remains with which to investigate it. We do not say that in itself this is against those who dispute reality. It is in itself equally against those who affirm it. On this subject, from the very nature of the case, neither party can occupy a position capable of logical proof. We should frankly admit that reality, if asserted, must be assumed. The argument for reality of such an intellectual giant as Herbert Spencer, for example, is not conclusive, unless he assumes in his premises the reality which he professes to prove. What we do claim, however, is that this inability to prove the untrustworthiness of the intuitive beliefs in consciousness is very much against those who would repudiate these while still basing themselves, as they must, on the veracity of consciousness. In so doing they make a distinction which demands establishment. That, therefore, they cannot establish it, is in their case a peculiar element of weakness. They have put themselves where more must be expected of them than is expected of their opponents. Consequently, though both labor under the same inability, it cannot but count for more in the case of the former. Two men may be equally lacking in logical power, but this need not be in itself a serious disadvantage; it becomes such only when one undertakes what requires demonstration.

3. That the trustworthiness of consciousness cannot be proved any more than its untrustworthiness does not impair its testimony to reality. The reason for this is that, as we have seen, proof at this point is impossible and so may not be expected. Indeed, to admit that the trustworthiness of the testimony of consciousness to reality is but an assumption is to take a step in the right direction and the only one that can be so taken. This follows from the very nature of proof. This consists in showing that what is to

be proved is implicated in acknowledged truth. Hence, to prove truth, we must begin with truth; to establish reality, we must have reality on which to ground it: to demonstrate anything, we must assume something. Otherwise, we shall argue in a circle. Ultimately the thing to be proved will have to be its own proof, and so there will be no proof. If we would establish anything, we must move in a straight line and not in a circle: we must go back to what, because it is at the very beginning, has nothing behind it; to what, therefore, though itself the basis of all proof, cannot itself be proved. This statement may startle many and may shock some, but a moment's reflection should convince all of its truth. The better that we understand the nature of demonstration, the more clearly shall we see that all demonstration must, in the last analysis, have as its first premise the trustworthiness of consciousness, and that, if there is to be demonstration, this premise must be an assumption. Hence, the admission that the testimony of consciousness to reality is only such is at least a step in the right direction. Whether what is assumed be correct or not, that we begin our argument for reality with an assumption rather than with an attempt at demonstration is correct. From the nature of the case it is the only thing to do.

4. Nor may it be said that this method of justifying belief in reality is purely metaphysical and is, consequently, to be viewed with suspicion. On the contrary, it is thoroughly scientific. It is nothing more nor less than "Newtonian induction." This was used by Newton in discovering that the law of gravitation extends to the whole solar system. "He began with the hypothesis"—or assumption—"that gravitation, already known in the fall of bodies to the earth, extended also to the moon; he then deduced what must be the position of the moon if the hypothesis were true; he then verified it by comparing the results of his deduction with the actual positions of the moon given in astronomical tables. The verification failed at first on account of errors in the tables, but was successful when the tables had been corrected by more accurate observation." Now what is this but what we are doing? We start with the hypothesis or assumption that the testimony of consciousness to reality is trustworthy. We then deduce what must be the consequences, if the hypothesis or assumption be true. We conclude, for example, that we shall find reality where we believe that we have seen or touched it. Hence, we stop immediately when we are conscious of beholding or feeling a wall just before us. That is, we act as if consciousness were trustworthy. If, then, verification shows the wall to be before us, which we were conscious of seeing or feeling, should we not regard our

hypothesis or assumption as established? At all events, is it not the very method of Newton that we have followed? And if it is not open to objection as used by him, is it not equally free from objection as employed by us? At least, it may not be discredited on the ground that it is purely metaphysical; for it is preeminently scientific.

It should be remembered, too, in this connection, that all scientific investigation, even "Baconian induction," which argues from understood facts to those which are observed to be like them, rests on an hypothesis or assumption. Facts can be understood only as they have been observed, and they can be profitably observed only as the observer believes in the trustworthiness of his powers of observation. As has been already implied, the scientist must make this hypothesis, he must start with this assumption, or he is powerless to proceed. To assume the trustworthiness of consciousness and so of its testimony to reality is, therefore, not merely, as has just been shown, the only thing to do, it is also what the scientist, whether avowedly or not, is always doing. In a word, it is the scientific method.

5. The hypothesis or assumption of the trustworthiness of the testimony of consciousness to reality differs from most of the hypotheses of science in that it has only to be considered to be seen and felt to be true. The hypotheses of science are at first usually only probable assumptions. Not infrequently they are merely shrewd guesses. Undoubtedly it is in them more than in anything else that the genius of the scientist appears. Even when he does but guess, it is a guess that the ordinary observer would never have made. Yet at best it is an assumption the truth of which is to be verified; rarely, if ever, is it an assumption the meaning of which needs only to be fairly apprehended to be felt to be true.

Now such an hypothesis is the assumption of the trustworthiness of the testimony of consciousness to reality. The proof of this is fourfold:

a. This assumption is self evidently true. It has but to be understood to be accepted. It is the statement of knowledge which is clearer and more convincing in its own light than any other light could make it. As Dr. McCosh has said: "That there is an extended object before me when I look at a table, or a wall, and that I who look at these objects exist—these are truths that are evident on the bare contemplation of the objects, and need no foreign facts, or considerations derived from any other quarter, to establish them." That is to say, though reality cannot be demonstrated, it is known; it reveals itself as real.

b. The hypothesis that we are considering is necessarily true. It is an assumption which cannot be understood and not be granted. This does not mean that the opposite cannot be conceived, but that the opposite cannot be acted on. Hume did try to teach universal skepticism; yet he frankly admitted that in ordinary affairs he proceeded, as others, on the assumption of reality. Though he disputed it in theory, he could not help expressing practically his belief in it. Nor can any. The Hindu says that the world is an illusion, but he lives as though it were real. Now this is not an independent proof. We may not claim that a proposition is true because we must believe it. We hold rather that we must believe it because it is true. Its necessity is the consequence of its truth, or rather of its self-evidence. It distinguishes it as so inherently and conspicuously true that it cannot but be accepted. Thus, while the fact that men must act as if the testimony of consciousness to reality were correct does not of itself prove that it is, it does prove that it is self-evidently correct, it does show that it is an assumption which has but to be apprehended to be granted; it does reveal it to be an hypothesis which as soon as understood is seen and felt to be true. Were it otherwise, this conviction of necessity could not attach to it. The reason why we must believe in the light is that the light is light.

c. The truth of the assumption that we are considering is, as has just been implied, universally admitted. Not only must we act on it, but men everywhere do the same. They never lose sight of it, they never are argued out of the belief in it; for they never cease to be controlled by it. Men are eating and drinking and buying and selling and living and dying as if there were no doubt of reality: and this is so no matter what may be the philosophy by which they swear, and whether they know even what philosophy is. The pantheist, for example, is just as indignant against the man who has robbed him as if he did not profess to believe that every man is only a thought and manifestation of God.

Now this is a valuable confirmation of the test last noticed. The necessity of a conviction may be disputed. It may be said that what I cannot help accepting may not in like manner constrain others. This, however, may not be urged when it is evident that all are thus compelled. The universality of the necessity of the conviction forbids its being an idiosyncrasy. It proves that the necessity is rooted in the relation of man to his environment; that is, in the very nature of things. Only what is necessary on grounds so self-evidently real as this do all men believe.

d. Further confirmation is found in the persistency of the necessity under consideration. Not simply do all men to-day, as has been stated above, judge and act on the basis of reality; they always have done so. From observation, literature, history, especially from the researches of anthropologists, is it made certain that the human race have from the first been realists. As the belief that the objects cognized by us have being of their own is not the idiosyncrasy of a few, but the conviction of the multitude; so it belongs not to one generation or age, but to humanity as such. The race develops, but it never has developed so as to be able to set aside the assumption of reality. Indeed, this is the hypothesis on which all its progress proceeds. May we doubt, then, that the conviction in question is rooted in the very nature of things? Unless it were so grounded, how could it be so persistent as well as universal?

Of course, it may be objected that all this does not prove reality; and the objection is well taken. It should be remembered, however, that what has been said is not given as a proof of reality. All that is claimed is that it does show that the hypothesis of the trustworthiness of the testimony of consciousness to reality is one that is true on its very face. Confidence in this assumption has been so persistent that we are not surprised to find it universal; it is so universal that it cannot but be necessary from the nature of things; it is so necessarily constraining that the assumption itself cannot but be self-evidently true. It is, therefore, not only an hypothesis which must, as we have seen, be made, if there is to be any progress in truth; it is also one which is superior to most, if not all, the hypotheses by which science, whether mental or physical, has advanced the knowledge of the truth. It is true on its face.

6. It is continually verified. Experience confirms the acceptances given to it, practically at least, by the race. The persistence and universality of the belief in the testimony of consciousness to reality just referred to is the evidence of this. They show that the reality assumed is found. They do this negatively. Had reality not been encountered all along, had the hypothesis on which action and life proceeded often failed of justification, the hypothesis itself would ages ago have been abandoned. For example, we should not keep on stopping when we come to a stone wall if it were not actually in being. The mistake of consciousness must ere this have been discovered and corrected. This would be so, unless, indeed, reason be unreason and philosophy absurd. Thus that realism continues the abiding and, perhaps, deepest practical conviction of the race verifies the

hypothesis under consideration. Otherwise, its continuance would be impossible. The hypothesis, moreover, is in this way verified also positively. Experience is neither the ground nor the proof of it. As we have seen, it is prior to experience, and it needs no proof because self-evident. Nevertheless, experience both emphasizes and confirms it. Experience furnishes the occasion for the arising of the conviction or hypothesis of reality, and experience also deepens this. The correspondence between what we find and what we assumed or rather felt that we should find strengthens our belief in reality, by giving us personal acquaintance with it. The first time that the little child is pricked by a pin he shrinks back. He knows as truly then as he ever will that something has hurt him. Who will say, however, that his conviction as to the reality of cause is not confirmed when he has been pricked many times and many times has found the pin that did it? Experience has rendered his belief livelier by enlarging its content. Thus it has positively verified his self-evident hypothesis.

Nor may it be replied that all this would take place on the supposition that the belief in reality, though delusive, simply passed unexposed. Such is not the fact. The hypothesis of the trustworthiness of the testimony of consciousness to reality cannot admit of verification either positively or negatively, by the mere appearance of reality. This hypothesis, as we have seen, concerns not only phenomena, but also substance. It is not simply that there is an appearance: it is specially and characteristically that this is the appearance of *something*. Unless, therefore, the reality believed in be found, not only as the appearance of reality, but also, in addition, as reality itself, the belief in it will not be justified, the hypothesis of it will not be verified. These demand what corresponds to and explains the sensation or perception of which we may be conscious. More is needed, consequently, than that there shall not be found in this what contradicts it. The belief or hypothesis in question is of such a kind that it allows of verification only by what is beyond the sensation or perception that it would explain. Experience could not verify the universal and instinctive hypothesis of reality, as we have seen that it does if it did not find the actually real as well as recognize the apparently real. The conviction of consciousness as to reality, though inseparable from, is yet so distinct from, its apprehension of the appearance of reality that this must be so. Without stultifying consciousness, we cannot hold it to be otherwise. Its testimony as to reality is so distinct and emphatic that it can be established only by what is as distinctly and emphatically real. There must be the unmistakable presence

of it, and not merely appearances which as such seem to be real. Experience must point the distinction between the internal object of consciousness in any given case and the external cause of it.

7. As has just been implied, the denial of the trustworthiness of the testimony of consciousness to reality is suicidal. It is in this instance as in that of all first or true metaphysical principles. They cannot be set aside and the study of mere phenomena only, in a word the most empirical science, not itself be reduced to a series of baseless assumptions. For example, all chemistry depends upon the axiom, at least as old as Leucippus and Democritus, that matter is, relatively to the universe at least, ingenerable and indestructible. If this be denied, the chemist has no ground on which to resolve a compound substance into its elements, or to reconstitute it from them. His science becomes impossible. What, however, is this necessary axiom of chemistry and, indeed, of physical science in general but the reality of material substance; the fact that things have being of their own; the truth that, though imperceptible to sense and inscrutable to analysis, there is in every thing what is permanent, what knows no change, what constitutes its inmost essence and actual being? Hence, to set aside the testimony of consciousness as to reality must be suicidal. It is to make thinking, even with reference to appearances, irrational. Indeed, as Prof. Bowen has well said (*Modern Philosophy*, p. 269): "The empiricists or positivists here commit, in an aggravated form, the very fault which they charge upon their opponents—the fault, namely, of dealing with pure abstractions." Except as such, there are no phenomena divorced from reality. In a word, nescience is the alternative to realism.

8. Were there space, all this could be confirmed by the witness of history. To nothing is its testimony stronger than to the practical importance of belief in reality. The heroes of the ages have been conspicuously men of faith in God and in the reality of his world. Mere idealism, in all its forms, has cut the nerve of progress. The Hindus, perhaps as gifted intellectually as any people on earth, regard existence as an illusion; and they are so lacking in energy that they would perish were it not for the comparatively small but intensely realistic nation that holds them in subjection. Sensationalism in all its phases is degrading. France in the last century lived for the phenomenal and "the reign of terror" was the awful punishment she suffered. Evidently, therefore, this is a real world and ought to be considered such. Its development supports the universal and profound conviction of consciousness that reality is the nature of things.

Of course, it may still be objected that all that has been said

falls short of proof. Yes, it does. Our belief in reality rests ultimately on the testimony of consciousness to it, and the truth of this testimony is at best an assumption. More may not be, as more has not been, claimed for it. It should, however, be remembered that in this case, as has been implied, proof would be as inappropriate as it is impossible. To try to see the light in which we see all things is absurd. It cannot be enlightened only because it is itself the light; and precisely so the testimony of consciousness to reality can be but assumed simply because it is the truth of all truth. As with the light, its self-evidence is clearer than proof.

It should be remembered, too, that phenomenalism, as has also been indicated, in no sense delivers us from the necessity of trusting the testimony of consciousness to reality. Phenomenalism, it should be added, is only agnosticism trying to save itself, and agnosticism is of all contradictions the worst. Its affirmation is its denial. To prove it true is to prove it false. To know that you know nothing is to know some*thing*, and to believe in some*thing*, the ego. Thus phenomenalism, and even the rankest agnosticism, presupposes realism. Thinking, however perverted, involves it. Indeed, one must be practically a realist to commit intellectual suicide.

Nor, finally, is the objection of Mr. Bradley in his profound work, *Appearance and Reality*, valid, namely, "If materialism is to stand, it must somehow get to the existence of primary qualities in a way which avoids their relation to an organ." That is, reality is not disproved because it is cognized, and can be cognized, only by the mind. As Prof. Samuel Harris has well said (*Philosophical Basis of Theism*, p. 13): "When the subjectivity of knowledge is urged against its reality, the absurd objection is flatly propounded that knowledge is impossible if there is an intelligent being who knows."

PRINCETON. WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THE PRESBYTERIAN
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I.

DR. McGIFFERT ON APOSTOLIC CHRISTIANITY.*

WE confess to no little disappointment with this new book of Dr. McGiffert's. The author had previously given us an edition of the *Ecclesiastical History of Eusebius* for which we were justly grateful. The scholarship, acumen, and good sense displayed in that valuable work gave hope of a handling of the phenomena of the apostolic age which would mark a true advance in our knowledge. In his more recent *Inaugural Address* Prof. McGiffert showed that he had come under the influence of the newer Harnackian ideas to an extent which awakened some apprehensions. But we were certainly not prepared for so radical and revolutionary a production as this new volume of "The International Theological Library" proves to be. Dr. McGiffert says in his Preface that his aim throughout "has been positive, not negative, constructive, not destructive." We fully believe it; but his work is destructive all the same—destructive of most received notions on the subjects he is treating of—and his construction is of a sort which will cause many not over-conservative people to shake their heads. Had the work come from the study of one of the German theologians Dr. McGiffert loves so much to quote, there would have been little occasion to marvel at its contents. But the views it propounds are surprising as coming from a sober professor

*A *History of Christianity in the Apostolic Age*, by Arthur Cushman McGiffert, Ph.D., D.D., Washburn Professor of Church History in the Union Theological Seminary, New York. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1897, $2.50 net; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.

IV.

THE METAPHYSICS OF CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS.

II. Duality.

THE first of the fundamental truths of Christian apologetics, as we tried to show in the last number of this Review, is Reality, or the truth that what appears has being of its own. The second of these fundamental truths is Duality, or the truth that there are two distinct kinds of reality: viz., Mind and Matter. Having, as we believe, vindicated Reality, we now proceed to establish Duality.

I. The Status Questionis.—The inquiry is not, on the one hand, whether there are but two kinds of Reality. It is, perhaps, universally allowed that if Reality exists in more than one substance, it does not exist in more than two. Duality is admitted whenever Monism is rejected. Neither is the question whether mind and matter seem to be essentially distinct. The utter difference between their phenomena has always challenged the attention of thinking men, as that this is a real difference has ever been the belief of the mass of mankind. Nor, on the other hand, is the question whether mind and matter, at least as they appear to us, both stand related to and, in this sense, can be resolved into a higher unity. The Absolute may be conceived as the personal God, or as unconscious will, or as thought, or as abstract spirit, or as physical force, or as mere matter, or as an inscrutable something: but posited it must be. We may think of the phenomena of mind and the phenomena of matter as independent, but we cannot think of them as also ultimate. We are compelled to regard them as either forms or creations of that which is above them, and in this way, at any rate, inclusive of them. Monism in this sense is sure to command at last the assent of the philosophic spirit. It would seem, too, to have been the primitive view. "Thus," according to Rawlinson, "dualism proper, or a belief in two uncreated and independent principles, one a principle of good and the other a principle of evil, was no part of the original Zoroastrianism even." Nor, again, is the inquiry whether mind and matter, in addition

to being related, at least as we know them, to a higher unity, act and react on one another. Such interaction, it is universally admitted, there seems to be. It is quite as apparent as is the difference. Nor do the theories on which it was hoped to explain this interaction between mind and matter by virtually denying it commend themselves to the thought of our age. Malebranche's doctrine of occasional causes and Leibnitz's doctrine of preëstablished harmony had their day, but it is over. The question, however, is whether mind and matter, though constantly acting and reacting on one another, as well as being related, at least in the sense already stated, to a higher unity, are still essentially distinct and independent of one another, incapable of being resolved into one another, not to be explained by one another.

II. The importance of this inquiry appears in several spheres.

It is vital to science. This, it is true, concerns itself only with phenomena. To understand the relations of these, however, it must have some theory as to their nature. Mental phenomena, as they are called even by materialists, will yield different results according as they are or are not conceived as following mental laws.

The importance of our question is seen even more clearly in philosophy. The aim of this is to comprehend reality. It is bound, therefore, to take sides for or against duality. One cannot be a philosopher at all unless he does so. The first inquiry that presents itself with reference to reality must be, Is it one or more than one?

Nor is the case less evident in theology. Deny duality by denying mind and theology becomes impossible. It is at once deprived of the Divine Person and the human person, and so is robbed of its subjects. On the other hand, deny duality by denying matter, and theology, while it could exist, would have from its first chapter to be interpreted anew.

It is the same in apologetics. A branch of theology, this must be so. It is conspicuously thus, however, in view of the facts that the rational defense of anything is irrational on the part of one who believes only in matter, and is bound to seem irrational to all save idealists when conducted by one who believes only in mind. In a word, unless duality be granted, apologetics is either usually practically useless or logically inconceivable.

Nor is duality a truth of less importance to actual religion. This cannot but be determined by our position on the subject in question. For example, to cite a singularly acute and impartial witness, no other than James Martineau, "it is needless to say that the *new* book of 'Genesis,' which resorts to Lucretius for its

' first beginnings,' to protoplasm for its fifth day, to ' natural selection ' for its Adam and Eve, and to evolution for all the rest, contradicts the *old* book at every point; and inasmuch as it dissipates the dream of Paradise, and removes the tragedy of the Fall, cancels at once the need and the scheme of redemption, and so leaves the historical churches of Europe crumbling away from their very foundations." The result is scarcely less destructive, if Hegel be substituted for Lucretius. Idealism run mad robs us of the divine Christ and of supernatural salvation as surely as does the baldest materialism. With neither is " the faith which was once for all delivered unto the saints " compatible. It presupposes duality.

So, too, does civilization. Unless it proceeds on a firm belief in the independence and reality of mind and matter, it issues in pessimism like that of much of modern India or in horrors like those of the French Revolution. Let the external world be regarded as but a dream, and existence in it will lose its worth. Let the world of sense be considered as the only real one, and sense and then lust will be enthroned as our rulers. It is not, therefore, a question of merely speculative interest, but one of the highest practical moment, that we propose to discuss. Whether we are or are not dualists is of vital importance to knowledge of all kinds, to religion, even to every-day life.

Nor is there force in the objection that many excellent and useful men have held or do hold erroneous views on this subject. This is true; but it is also true that their theories corrupt their successors, if not themselves. Leibnitz wrote his idealistic philosophy largely as a theodicy. His pious purpose, however, did not keep his system of thought from helping to inspire that line of German thinkers who would really rob us of God by stripping Him of His personality. Locke, Hartley, and Condillac were eminent for their belief in the Deity, and their practical piety. Yet that did not prevent their sensationalism from culminating after their day in atheism and sensuality and even bestiality. Indeed, it is with reference to first and fundamental principles that it is most important to be orthodox. Here as nowhere else is it true that poison, though administered with the best intent, is sure to kill at last.

III. The theories opposed to duality.

1. *Materialism.*—This would explain all facts by matter and material forces. Matter is that form of reality which has extension, which occupies space, which is perceptible by the senses. It is in contrast with spirit, or that form of reality which is without extension, which does not occupy space, which is imperceptible to the senses; but which thinks, feels, and wills, and which is known

by self-consciousness. This distinction materialism admits as apparent only. It refers all phenomena, whether physical, vital, mental, or moral, to the activities of matter. In a word, it identifies mind with matter.

For example, it denies intelligence or design in the constitution and course of the universe. "Nature," says Büchner (*Force and Matter*, p. 94), "does not act from a conscious design, but according to an immanent necessary instinct." Life is but the result of a particular inevitable kind of aggregation of atoms. "The facts of science," writes Büchner (*Force and Matter*, p. 72), "prove, with considerable certainty, that the organic beings which people the earth owe their origin and propagation solely to the conjoined action of natural forces and materials; and that the gradual change and development of the surface of the earth is the sole, or at least the chief, cause of the gradual increase of the living world." Mental phenomena are all of physical origin. "Thought," teaches Moleschott, "is a motion of matter." "The brain," writes Cabanis, "secretes thought, as the liver secretes bile." Even the facts of our moral nature are thus explained away. "A free will," Moleschott affirms, "does not exist;" and morality, according to Darwin, has no absolute worth irrespective of interests and opinions which are of purely physical origin. It goes without saying that, on this theory, man dies as the brute dies. "The only immortality," says Moleschott, "is that when the body is disintegrated, its ammonia, carbonic acid, and lime serve to enrich the earth and to nourish plants, which feed other generations of men." God also, it is evident, must be eliminated from the scheme of things. Indeed, Vogt says, "The idea of a self-conscious, extramundane creator is ridiculous." Thus mere matter, blind and gross though it is, is all and does all. "If," writes Dr. Lange (*Geschichte des Materialismus*, Buch xi, S. 155), "a single cerebral atom could be moved by a thought the millionth part of a millimetre out of the path which it must pursue according to the laws of mechanics, the whole world formula would cease to apply, and would no longer have any meaning. The actions of mankind, however, even those, for instance, of the soldiers destined to plant the cross upon the Mosque of Sophia, of their generals, of the diplomatists who shall have a share in bringing it about, and so on—all these actions, considered from the standpoint of natural science, do not result from 'thoughts' at all, but from movements of the muscles, whether these serve to make a march, to draw a sword or guide a pen, to pronounce a word of command or to fix the glance upon the point of assault. The muscular movements are set free by means of nervous activity; this is produced

by the functions of the brain, and these are completely determined by the structure of the brain, by the sensory conductors, by the atomic movements of molecular changes, and so forth, under the guiding influence of the centripetal nervous activity. We must clearly understand that the law of the conservation of energy can undergo no exception in the interior of the brain without becoming wholly meaningless; and we must therefore raise ourselves to the conclusion, that all the acts and movements of mankind, of individual persons as well as of nations, might go on exactly as they do now, though nothing resembling a thought or sensation were to occur in any one of these individuals."

It must be admitted that this conclusion, shocking though it is, can be supported by arguments which, to say the least, are plausible. It may be urged, for example, that what we call the soul is "the termination of a series of material existences, which rise above each other in orderly gradation, each preparing the way for the other." Thus the lowest form of matter obeys mechanical laws. The next higher form is endowed with chemical properties and is capable of chemical combinations. A third and higher form disposes its particles in crystalline arrangement, according to the laws of a natural geometry. Then come the lowest types of organized existence, of which "the crystal is the mute prophecy." In connection with the more perfectly and delicately organized animal structures, the phenomena of the soul begin to appear, requiring as their condition all the lower forms of nature, the presence and the action of the mechanical, chemical and organic powers and laws." Why, then, should not the human soul be but the result and crown of this long and regular process of development? It evidently depends on this process. Why should it not be explained by it as one with it because of it?

This argument is strengthened by the fact that the powers of the soul are developed along with the powers and capacities of the body. Does not this indicate that what we call the soul is but a name for the capacity to perform certain higher functions which belong to a finely organized and fully developed material organism? Nor is this all. The soul is dependent on matter for much of its knowledge and many of its enjoyments, indeed, for its very energy and activity. We cannot see without the physical eye; we cannot enjoy music without the physical ear. Let the body faint, and the soul sinks into inaction; let the body die, and the soul—where is it?

Beyond even this, is it not only as connected with a body that we know the soul at all? Why, then, should we believe it to be distinct from the body? Must not such a belief be unscientific

because not warranted by the facts of the case? In short, what belief do these facts warrant except that the soul is the highest activity of the body?

Plausible, however, though this argumentation is, it is only plausible. It does prove the dependence of the soul on the body, at least at present; but it does not prove that the soul is an activity of the body. Nor is this a distinction without a difference. No less a materialist than DuBois-Reymond says: "That consciousness is bound up with material conditions" is not the same thing with "Consciousness can be mechanically explained." The impossibility of thus identifying mind with matter is evinced by the following considerations:

Materialism cannot account for the phenomena for which it is bound to account. For example, you cannot get the intelligence manifest in the constitution and course of nature out of mere matter which, *ex hypothesi*, is unintelligent. That the world appears full of the evidences of design, though formerly disputed, is now generally admitted. Even "a vehement advocate of materialism like Büchner speaks of mechanical *contrivances*, and describes nature as achieving results by means; while the works of Darwin abound in similar expressions." Whence, then, these contrivances? To explain them as the result solely of the unintelligent matter of which they are composed is as absurd as it would be to speak of some complicated machine as the product only of the steel of which it was made. To say, as Buchner does, that they are "nothing but the necessary consequence of the combination of natural materials and forces" is simply to deny, as he means to do, that they are contrivances. To answer, with him, that "*our* reflecting reason is the sole cause of this apparent design," is to kick the ground from under your own feet. What justification can there be for the study of matter at all, if we cannot help seeing it quite otherwise than as it is? Thus materialism fails to solve the very first problem that it meets. Even DuBois-Reymond admits that it cannot explain the present form of matter, not to take up so extra-scientific an inquiry as that concerning its origin.

Nor can it account any better for life. Its explanation is that vital force is not a principle, but "a result." "All organic life," says Mulder, "is the result of molecular forces." The proof given of this is that 'experience has shown that all organisms consist of the same atoms as in the organic world, though differently grouped.' For example, the chemical elements of living protoplasm are precisely the same as those of dead protoplasm; just as water, though quite unlike either hydrogen or oxygen, is composed of these and of these only. As, therefore water is not

due to any new principle such as aquosity, but is altogether the result of a certain combination of oxygen and hydrogen; so life is not because of any new force such as vitality, but is the mere result of a certain combination of chemical elements. This reasoning breaks down at two points, to say no more. First, the composition of water from oxygen and hydrogen is constantly observed and can be readily effected by us, but no one ever saw life generated by the mere combination of chemical elements. On the contrary, the dictum, *omne vivum ex vivo*, still holds. If it has been violated, no scientist even has ever observed it. Still less, has he himself violated it. How, then, may science, which professes to be based on observation and experiment, and on these only, claim that life is the result of chemical combinations simply? This is to set aside observation and experiment in favor of a mere analogy. And, secondly, this analogy is not a true one. Water is evidently a result of the same kind with the elements of which it is composed: it has, like them, only a chemical and physical structure. Living protoplasm, however, is as clearly a result of a radically different kind from the elements of which it is made up: it has, not only, like them, a chemical and physical structure, but also, unlike them, an organized or organic structure. Even, therefore, if we could account for the molecular movements or whatever they may be which, like the electric spark in the combination of oxygen and hydrogen as water, causes the elements of lifeless protoplasm to combine anew as living protoplasm, it would amount to nothing. Life is more than a new combination of chemical elements. Its characteristic is of another kind: it is *sui generis*. It is not strange, consequently, that Kant said, "The attempt to explain the world on mechanical principles is wrecked on a caterpillar." Every form of life presents a problem that materialism cannot solve.

Even more is this so as regards consciousness. It cannot be explained as "a motion of matter." Strictly speaking, it cannot be so conceived. "It is absolutely and forever inconceivable," says the distinguished German physiologist and materialist, DuBois-Reymond, "that a number of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen and oxygen atoms should be otherwise than indifferent to their own positions or motions, past, present, or future. It is utterly inconceivable how consciousness should result from their joint action" (lecture on "Die Grenzen des Naturerkennens," Leipzic, 1872). Indeed, the materialistic explanation of consciousness must be abandoned or materialism itself becomes logically impossible. Suppose that ideas could be absolutely identified with matter or with the motions of matter,—not materialism, but idealism, would

result. For example, to quote J. H. Kennedy's *Natural Theology and Modern Thought*, perhaps the freshest as well as ablest treatise on this subject, "if ideas are motions of matter, the converse statement can no longer be resisted, that these same motions of matter are ideas. And if science is right in its belief that all motions of matter are alike manifestations of one and the same force which appears to us under different disguises, then must all the movements of matter be of the nature of ideas." What is this but pure idealism? Thus materialism cannot attempt to explain thought and not destroy itself. It has only to pose as the true theory of the universe to cease to be any theory at all.

Never is this so conspicuous as when it is applied to moral phenomena. The great fact to be explained here is free-agency. Responsibility, good and ill desert, virtue and vice—these all presuppose it. Indeed, to be moral, a being must be self-determining. Self-determination, however, on the materialistic hypothesis becomes an impossibility. Material forces act necessarily and uniformly. This is their chief characteristic. From the nature of the case, therefore, "a spontaneous act," as Prof. Huxley says, "is an absurdity." Thus materialism would explain moral phenomena by explaining them away. But can this be done? Is it enough to fall back on Spinoza, as Büchner does, and say that "human liberty, of which all boast, consists solely in this, that man is conscious of his will, and unconscious of the causes by which it is determined?" Certainly not, and for the reason that there is nothing of which consciousness makes us so sure as that we are self-determining. The sense of responsibility may be denied, but it cannot be destroyed. Conscience may be outraged, but it remains the deepest fact of consciousness. That we are free and so *ought* to be this rather than that must, therefore, be a truth if there is any truth. Consequently, unless materialism takes the extreme agnostic position, it cannot explain away the freedom of the will as a delusion: and materialism cannot take the extreme agnostic position; her distinctive claim is the tremendous one that she *knows* that everything has its origin in matter.

Not only does materialism thus fail to account for all the phenomena for which it is specially bound to account; it itself, as a mere hypothesis, presupposes the mind which it would eliminate. For example, what is force? What are atoms? What is matter? They may have an independent existence; they may have a nature of their own; they may be known to us as they are in themselves and because of what they are in themselves—all this we may grant. The fact to be emphasized, however, is that, in spite of all

this, they would not be anything to us, if they did not become objects of thought: that is, if mind did not know them. Thus, to quote Principal Caird (*Phil. of Rel.*, p. 88), "You cannot start in your investigations with bare, self-identical, objective facts, stript of every ideal element or contribution from thought. The least and lowest fact of outward observation is not an independent entity—fact minus mind, and out of which mind may, somehow or other, be seen to emerge; but it is fact or object as it appears to an observing mind, in the medium of thought, having mind or thought as an inseparable factor of it." Nothing, therefore, could be more illogical than to regard mind as the result of matter. This is the same as to conceive of the stars which the telescope reveals as making the telescope. Nor is this all. Not only is Martineau correct when he asks (*Essays, Reviews and Addresses*, p. 172): "If it takes mind to construe the world, how can the negation of mind suffice to constitute it?" He is also correct when he writes (*ibid.*, p. 171): "The universe as known, being throughout a system of thought-relations, can subsist only in an eternal mind that thinks it." Thus, instead of explaining mind away, materialism even presupposes it.

Specially significant, therefore, is its inherent and inevitable tendency to degrade and destroy it. For example, the hypothesis of a mindless universe at once rules out the ideal. Man himself is the supreme being, and man is no better than the dirt of which he is made. His hopes, his longings, his profoundest convictions, his highest affections, are but delusions. Their objects are really as gross as the food with which the hog gluts himself. They differ not in nature from his appetites. Their actual issue is the same. As Martineau says again: "All that is subjectively noblest turns out to be the objectively hollowest." But can this be? Can that be the true theory of things which must thus crush the mind or that on which alone it itself can rest? Is not this rather a self-contradiction and thus an impossibility?

2. *Idealism.*—We have just seen the untenableness of the hypothesis which would identify mind with matter. We now take up the hypothesis which would identify matter with mind. This in modern times has been held in at least two general forms.

a. Transcendental Idealism.—This is discussed first, not because it is first in order or is less important, but because it may now be dismissed with a few words, inasmuch as it will be considered at some length in the next paper of this series. What this theory is may best be understood if we ask how it has arisen. It had its genesis with Kant. This does not mean that he was an idealist. On the contrary, as against the universal skepticism of Hume,

he strongly affirmed the reality of "the thing in itself." There must be this; it is involved in the phenomena that no one questions. In a word, there could not be appearance if there were not reality. What this reality is, however, or even how it is, we cannot know. We have no faculty with which to grasp it. Moreover, the impressions which "the intuitions of sense" do give us are not known as they are in themselves, but in the subjective forms of space and time by which they are brought to unity, under the categories of the understanding which unify them for it, and in relations imparted to them by the reason. Thus while there must be objective reality, we know of it only what our minds themselves contribute to it. The external world exists, but we see it only in the garments in which we have ourselves invested it.

Then came Fichte. He went a step beyond Kant, and it was a long one. He became a subjective idealist. Kant said that there was an external world, but that we could not know it as it was in itself. Fichte said that there was not any external world to be known. He reduced the universe of existence to one absolute and universal ego, which, that it may arrive at a consciousness of itself, opens out in thought the world that we seem to perceive and the finite and particular ego of which each one of us seems to be conscious. Thus, according to Fichte, the only reality is the universal ego or God. The world is His dream; we are His thoughts. What appears to us as objective reality is but the universal subject's idea.

Fichte was followed by Schelling. He was an objective idealist. In his view, Fichte had done injustice to the objective world. Hence, Schelling put it on the same footing with the universal subject. Both are equally real or equally ideal; for they are both equally manifestations of the absolute, the infinite or unconditioned. According to Schelling, there is objective reality, if there is subjective reality; mind and nature are equated, the one with the other. God and the world are the same. No valid distinction can be made between them.

After Schelling came Hegel. His absolute idealism brought matters to a climax. With Schelling and against Fichte he held "that it is not anything individual, not the ego, that is the *précis* of all reality, but, on the contrary, something universal, a universal which comprehends within it every individual." On the other hand, however, as against Schelling, he conceived this universal, not as doing away with the distinction between God or the universal ego and the world: but as being itself the ground of this distinction, as containing in itself the principle of their difference, as having immanent in itself a "dialectic," or power of

movement, which must develop the entire wealth of the actuality exhibited by the worlds of mind and of matter. Thus, to sum up, according to Fichte, the only reality is the universal subject or God. According to Schelling, the objective or external world and the universal subject or God are equally real or ideal; that is, are identical. According to Hegel, the only reality is the relation between the universal subject and the universal object. This relation or idea, this abstract thought, it is that is absolute and from which, by a purely logical and necessary process, are unfolded, with all their differences, the spiritual and the physical universe. In a word, to use the striking phrase of Schopenhauer, "the world to Hegel is a crystallized syllogism."

It must be admitted that in certain aspects this theory is, to say the least, attractive. It makes prominent the great truth that thought is the *précis* of the world. It seems to find a principle that brings all things into unity, and this philosophy will seek and ought to seek. It falls in with the popular doctrine of evolution. Indeed, it suggests and supplies the most plausible form of it. For these and other reasons it is not strange that it should have been revived and revised, and that Neo-Hegelianism as presented by T. H. Green and the Caird brothers should have many avowed followers even in America, and should be exerting a subtle influence over a still larger number who do not formally accept it,—who, perhaps, do not even know it by name.

In refutation of this phase of idealism it will be sufficient for the present to direct attention to two objections. These, moreover, should be enough, inasmuch as either one of them is fatal. They are, first, the fact that, as Kant puts it, "Without matter categories are empty." Logic cannot reason out being. If the world be only a "crystallized syllogism," there is no world. And secondly, were this not so, logic implies a logician. Categories of the understanding involve a person. Thought without a thinker is an impossibility, a nonentity. Hence, to account for the universe by the self-evolution of the absolute idea is like positing an effect that has no cause. Thus in the last analysis transcendental idealism falls because it admits the necessity of finding an origin for the universe, and then finds this origin in the absolute idea, in that which, according to Dr. Krauth, is "neither mind nor matter, heaven nor earth, God nor man; that is, in nothing."

b. Psychological Idealism.—This is so called because it is based on the psychological or empirical analysis of the act of perception instead of on the endeavor to deduce the universe from a transcendental or *à priori* principle.

It differs from all the forms of the theory just considered in that

it insists on the personality of God and also on that of man. We are not the thoughts of the universal subject, as with Fichte; nor are we mere manifestations of the absolute and unconditioned, as with Schelling: nor yet are we logical developments of the absolute idea, as with Hegel: but we are individual free spirits, and God is the supreme and most free Spirit comprehending us and yet over against us. So, too, the theory of the universe is different. Transcendental idealism, in its extreme form at least, conceives of the world as a "crystallized syllogism." Psychological idealism finds the reality of the world in that it consists of the ideas of God. Thus, while both systems resolve matter into mind, the former is abstract and pantheistic, the latter is concrete and personal.

All this will appear more clearly, if we study the development of psychological idealism by Berkeley, its originator and elaborator. "He was led to doubt the existence of matter by the same train of thought which is expressed in his theory of vision." The conclusion of this theory is, to quote Berkeley's own words, that to a man born blind and afterwards restored to sight, "the sun and stars, the remotest objects as well as the nearest, would all seem to be in his eye, or rather in his mind." That is, the knowledge of distance, etc., apparently obtained from sight directly, is not so obtained: it is, on the contrary, inferential and so gradual. Thus distance, thickness, magnitude and position are not *seen*: they are only inferred and imagined. All that is seen is a colored surface: and this is *seen*, not as an external reality, but merely as an effect in us produced by some occult causes existing out of us. Indeed, all the "secondary qualities" of body, as they are called, such as sounds, tastes, smells, colors, and the many and various sensations of touch proper, are purely subjective—mere feelings or sensations *in* the mind. How, then, do we account for them? They must have a cause. What is that cause? The realist finds it in the world of matter. There is a material universe which corresponds more or less closely with our perceptions and as their object produces them. We do not, it is true, see this world; but it causes and determines the ideas of which we are conscious.

Berkeley gives a radically different explanation. He remarks with justice that nothing in the world can be like a sensation or idea, except another sensation or idea; and in view of this, and in view also of the fact alluded to, that that of which we are conscious is an idea or phantasm, he concludes that there is no external reality. It is, therefore, the idea, and not that of which we take it to be but the idea, that is real to Berkeley. As he himself says, "he is not for changing things into ideas, but rather

ideas into things." He believes in reality as truly as any one, but it is a reality of ideas. He agrees with the materialist that the world is made up of atoms, but these atoms are our own perishable sensations.

Whence, then, comes our belief in the permanence of the world or the uniformity of nature? Such permanence or uniformity there could not be, it would seem, if matter could be resolved into our sensations. The table that you know to be in your study would cease to exist when you left the room and ceased to look at it, or even when, though in the room, your attention became engaged by something else. This difficulty Berkeley meets by what he calls the "suggestion" of virtual by actual sensations. This principle of "suggestion" expresses "our disposition to expect the recurrence of sensations previously connected in perception, when one or more of them has been again perceived." Thus when we see a tree there is suggested the sensation of resistance as so connected with what is seen that we expect to have that sensation as the consequence of walking against the tree. The one sensation or real idea is the suggesting sign of the other. The connection between them illustrates what Berkeley means by "visual language." Symbolism, he holds, pervades our whole sense experience, and above all we are continually translating the language of each sense into the original and fundamental language of touch. Thus every sensation of which we are conscious is significant of other sensations of which we are not at the time conscious, and specially of sensations of touch. The connection between these real and suggested sensations is as arbitrary as that between words and things. There is no abstract reason why the suggested sensations should be what they are, why our belief in the world should be what it is, any more than there is why a certain word should stand for a particular thing. The word and thing have been used together, and that is all that there is in their connection; and just so, sensations of touch have been found to follow sensations of sight, and this is all that there is in their connection. Thus, our belief in natural law is only our belief in an established connection among sensations: this belief gives rise to an expectation of permanence in the relations of succession between actual and expected sensations, and among the clusters of actual and expected sensations called external things; and this expectation explains our conception of the externality and permanence of the world. Though we have only one sensation at a time with reference to it, that one, experience has shown us, is the sign of all the others. Because we are conscious of it, we expect and so believe in them.

All this, however, is but negative. It is the denial of materialism; it is nothing more. 'It affirms only that our consciousness of the external world is not due to its reality. To what, then, is it due? Whence the real and suggested ideas of which it consists? As Fraser, Berkeley's most sympathetic expositor, to whom we have been much indebted, asks, "What is the power which is at work in all this passive sense symbolism?"

Here, says Fraser, whose excellent account we shall give, though with some abridgment, 'Berkeley's theory of intellectual notions comes into play. Besides 'ideas' of sense, I have a 'notion' of the perceiving active being that I call *myself*. I am conscious, too, in my moral experience, of my own voluntary or moral activity: I understand thus what *power* means. I recognize power at least to the extent that I acknowledge moral responsibility for my own volitions. This power, however, the only power that we know, cannot solve the problem before us. We all find ourselves unable at will to produce the sensations or real ideas, of which we are conscious, or essentially to change the sense symbolism to which our suggested expectations refer. Yet in this experience of our own limited power we have an intelligible explanation of the inability. That which is done, but which I am morally conscious has not been done by *me*, must have been done by the only *kind* of power of which rational experience gives me any example. All must be the result of mind or moral power. When we speak of any other sort of power than this, we are involving ourselves in meaningless abstraction.' Mind is the only power that we *know*, the only power of which we can conceive. Mind, therefore, must be, not only the creator of each one of us, but also the cause of the ideas and sensations which make up our world. "This is what we mean by God. We cannot go deeper. Divine or perfect Mind imprints the sensations of which we are conscious—potentially holds and suggests the sensations which we expect." Thus, to sum up, according to psychological idealism, matter is made up of our sensations, the world consists of the ideas suggested on the occasion of these, and the origin, coherence and permanence of these and so of the universe are due to the power and "the constant rational providence of the living God."

That this theory has much to commend it must be allowed. Its practical aim is admirable. It would deliver us from skepticism. It would point us from mere sensationalism to the everlasting and most real God as Him who gives reality to all that truly appears. Again, and in this respect as in that just noticed unlike transcendental idealism, it establishes on a firm foundation the

moral freedom of self-conscious agents. We men are neither creatures of the world, and so under the law of physical necessity; nor are we mere thoughts of God, and so bound by a chain of spiritual necessity: but we are free autonomous spirits. We help to realize God's idea of the world; and though He gives us the ideas of which it consists, our own personality appears in our responsibility for our volitions. Once more, the objection commonly regarded as fatal to this theory admits of a ready explanation on the basis of it. This objection is that our experience and our actions prove the reality of the external world. Dr. Johnson argued in this way against idealism, when, as Boswell tells us, "he struck his foot with mighty force against a large stone till he rebounded from it, saying, 'I refute it thus.'" Berkeley, however, did not deny the idea of solidity, or the uniformity of the occasions on which it is manifested. He did not deny the reality of the world, but only its materiality. He believed that the idea of walking into the fire would be followed inevitably by the idea of burning, and so he shrank back from having the latter unpleasant idea forced upon him. On his theory, the idea of being burnt was just as real and terrible to him as the fact of being burnt is to us on ours. Besides all this, idealism, like materialism, is true in what it affirms. As we do know the world of matter by sense perception, so we do know the world of ideas by self-consciousness. Indeed, there is no doubt which of these philosophies is the stronger. The truth of idealism is at any rate fundamental to the truth of materialism. As we have seen, mind is the logical *prius* of matter. Only the former can know the latter, and thus knowledge of the latter is the demonstration of the former. Moreover, as we have also observed, it is in the active energizing of the mind as will that we get our first conception of power. It is not strange, therefore, that even Hume should say that, while the arguments of the idealists could not convince any one, so neither could they themselves be disproved. This must be granted. The strength of this theory is that it rests on the most certain verities of consciousness, the reality of thought and the fact of will.

It is not so, however, with the negative element in idealism. Its denial of the physical world we may not accept, and for the following reasons at least:

It outrages consciousness. We are conscious of a universe of things not only distinct from, but radically different from ourselves. We know matter as really as we know mind, and we know that matter is utterly unlike mind. Our actions show this. No one walks deliberately into a stone wall. Every one chooses the

bridge, if he would cross the river. It is true, as we have seen, that all this can be explained consistently with idealism. The point to be noted, however, is that this explanation is suggested by the theory to be maintained and not by our consciousness at the time. What we are conscious of is a solid wall in front of us or a solid bridge beneath us. We may come to believe these to be ideas, but it is as external realities that we are conscious of them. If then they are not such, consciousness is delusive. Now consciousness is the foundation of knowledge. Thus in outraging it by denying its testimony, idealism must invalidate itself.

Idealism goes further than the psychological theory of perception on which it is based will warrant. It is true, as Berkeley claimed, that by the senses of taste, smell, hearing, and touch proper, we do not know directly anything that is extra-organic. All that we know directly in these cases is the affected organism itself. If, for example, the odor perceived is strange to us, we cannot tell the object from which it comes. That must be ascertained by experience and inference. All that we have by the sense of smell is a perception of our nostrils as affected. This, however, is much more than the idea in the mind, which is all that Berkeley admits as known. Though the senses in question do not give us knowledge of what is extra-organic, they do give us knowledge of what is extra-mental. The contrast in consciousness between the knowing mind and the affected organism could scarcely be sharper than it is. In knowing our nostrils as affected we know in the very same act that our nostrils, though thus affected, are not ourselves. They belong to the self, but are not the self. They are a reality external to it.

Moreover, two of the senses, sight and the muscular sense, give us immediate knowledge of what is extra-organic as well as extra-mental. It is true, as Berkeley held, that we do not see either distance or solidity. The knowledge of these is inferential. All that we *see* is a colored surface. This surface, however, as McCosh says, "is felt as affecting us" (*Cognitive Powers*, p. 45). Thus the sense of sight marks an advance on smell and the senses like it. In smell we know only the nostrils as affected. In sight we know the eye as affected and also by what it is affected, viz., a colored surface. That is, we know reality external to the body as well as to the mind. So, too, is it with the muscular sense. This makes known immediately an object resisting us and so, of course, outside of us. Nor may we say with Berkeley that this resistance must be due to spiritual energy, since will power is the only kind of force of which we are conscious. That is to beg the question at issue.

The realist claims that we are as truly conscious of matter as exerting energy as we are of mind as exercising it. Indeed, at this point the idealist falls into essentially the same vice as the materialist when he maintains that mind must be explained in terms of matter since it is only of the latter that he is conscious. That is the very thing to be proved.

While, therefore, the true theory of sense perception does warrant the conclusion that there is little resemblance between the visible and the tangible qualities of material objects, between the world as immediately perceived and the world as it really is, it does not warrant the conclusion that there are no material objects. On the contrary, every sense makes known that which is extra-mental, and two senses that which is extra-organic as well; and consciousness assures us directly that what is extra-organic is both the occasion and the determining cause of our organic affections and our mental perceptions. Thus though reality is not as the senses, prior to experience and inference, reveal it to us, its presentation is the occasion of their action, and the real differences in it explain the differences in our knowledge through the senses. Hence, while the mind by its own, usually unconscious, processes itself brings out the ever-changing picture which is always before us, its processes act on reality and in accord with it and so give us a real picture. That is, the mind does not fashion the world out of itself, but a real world outside of the mind determines at least the essential outlines of the picture which the mind develops within itself.

Were it otherwise, the universe would be throughout a lie. What we call the physical world appears to have a reality beyond us and independent of us. If it does not, life is an illusion and "things are not what they seem." Now all our experience goes to show that lies cannot endure and that illusions cannot continue permanently. Thus the great difficulty with idealism at last is that it contradicts experience. It presupposes the durability of a lie.

3. *Idealistic Materialism.*—This is more popular at present than either of the theories already reviewed. It would avoid the defects and combine the excellences of the two. It claims to hold to the reality of both mind and matter, and yet to escape the odious breach that the common view sees between them. Thus, so far from identifying mind with matter or matter with mind, Prof. Clifford says ("Body and Mind," in *Fortnightly Review*, December, 1874): "The two things are on utterly different platforms, the physical facts go along by themselves, and the mental facts go along by themselves." So, too, Prof. Tyndall writes

(*Fragments of Science*, "Scientific Materialism," p. 121): "The passage from the physics of the brain to the corresponding facts of consciousness is unthinkable." On the other hand, however, the objectionable dualism between mind and matter is supposed to be overcome. They are considered, not as the ultimate realities, but as different aspects of the one reality. Thus Strauss declares (*Der alte und der neue Glaube*, p. 212): "I have always tacitly regarded the so loudly proclaimed contrast between materialism and idealism as a mere quarrel about words." At the same time, it would be unjust to represent this theory as simply a fusion of idealism and materialism. It is not this. It is rather an idealistic form of materialism. On the one hand, the functions of mind are attributed to matter. Thus Huxley says (*Lay Sermons*, pp. 157, 374): "What I term legitimate materialism is neither more nor less than a short-hand idealism." So, too, Martineau writes of the holders of this view that "they make matter so extremely clever that it is too modest in its disclaimer of the attributes of mind." On the other hand, idealistic though it may be, this theory is still materialism. Strauss, for example, affirms his agreement with Carl Vogt in his denial of any special spiritual principle, and Huxley says (*On the Physical Basis of Life*, p. 156): "As surely as every future grows out of past and present, so will the physiology of the future extend the realm of matter and law, till it is coëxtensive with knowledge, with feeling, and with action."

Idealistic materialism is supported, in the main, by two arguments. The first is based on the doctrine of the "conservation and correlation of energy." This doctrine is that all physical forces, such as light, heat, chemical affinities, electricity, magnetism, etc., are both convertible and quantitively equivalent. That is, "a given amount of heat will produce an amount of light or of electricity, or of any other force, which, if it could be utilized, would reproduce precisely that amount of heat." Now if this be true of all physical forces, why not of all forces? Why should not mental and physical forces be convertible and quantitively equivalent? And if this be so, must they not be essentially one and the same? In a word, do not the universality and unity of law require us to conceive of mental operations as merely modes of motion just as we observe heat and light to be really modes of motion?

The other argument for idealistic materialism is based on the comparatively new science of physiological psychology. In its extreme and so one-sided form, this is, as Lange says, "Psychology without a soul" (*Geschichte des Materialismus*, Vol. ii, p. 381).

Its method is such that, in the language of Ribot, "the soul and its faculties, the great entity and the little entities, disappear; and we have to do only with internal events—events which, like sensations and images, are translations (so to speak) of physical events, or which, like ideas, movements, volitions, and desires, translate themselves into physical events." This doctrine has lately been expressed with great clearness and force by Dr. Münsterburg, who, according to Prof. Andrew Seth, is "perhaps the ablest and most stirring of the younger generation of physiological psychologists." "He teaches in the most unequivocal fashion that consciousness is simply, as he calls it, a 'Begleiterscheinung,' a concomitant phenomenon, or inactive accompaniment of a series of mechanical changes." "In all so-called action," moreover, "we only seem to act; a sequence of ideas exhausts the phenomena of will" (Seth's *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, p. 94). Thus what seemed to be necessary in view of the doctrine of the correlation and conservation of energy is seen to be actual by the new psychologists. Even the will is regarded from such a standpoint and in such a light that it disappears. In short, nothing is left but "mechanical changes."

The question at once arises, however, May not the standpoint of the new psychology be too one-sided and its method too exclusive, and so its observations and generalizations be incorrect? That they are this, the following reasons, not to mention others, would seem to establish:

As we have remarked also in the case of materialism pure and simple, idealistic materialism is bound logically to result in idealism. If the mental and physical facts be only two different aspects of the same thing, that thing must be ultimately mental rather than physical; for as we have observed, consciousness of the self is clearer and more fundamental than consciousness of the not-self. Thus Huxley, though preferring that all phenomena should be expressed in terms of matter, admits, as has also been noticed, that his system is "short-hand idealism."

The doctrine of the "conservation and correlation of energy," so far from supporting, is directly against idealistic-materialism. In the first place, "even in the sphere of physical events this law is as yet demonstrably true only to a limited extent" (Ladd's *Elements of Physiological Psychology*, p. 657). How, then, may it be claimed that it must be applied also to phenomena so different from physical ones as those of the mind are on this theory allowed to be? It would seem that its universality in the domain of matter must be established first. Were this done, however, the situation would not be altered. Even then the

extension of the law in question to the mental sphere could be inferred only on the supposition that the mental and physical spheres were essentially one. The universality and unity of law are a proof of unity of substance simply because and only in so far as they are a consequence of unity of substance. But the unity of mind and matter is precisely the point at issue. Thus the universality of the law of the "conservation and correlation of energy" is made the basis of the argument for the unity of mind and matter, whereas it is only on the basis of this unity that we are warranted in arguing the application to both mind and matter of the law under consideration. Could there be a worse case of putting the cart before the horse? Yet even this is not all. Were the application of this principle to both mind and matter established, nothing would be gained. Indeed, it is just when we do apply it to mental action that we see most clearly its inadequacy as an explanation of such action. For example, let it be granted that physical forces and thought and feeling are convertible and quantitively equivalent. This means that physical energy passes over into thought just as heat does into light. That is, when a change takes place in the matter of the brain, accompanied by a fact of sensation or a thought, the physical energy used up in the change, or at least some of it, disappears from the physical sphere and passes into the mental as sensation or thought. This, however, is precisely what does not take place. The physical energy is *all* accounted for in the physical changes. Hence, there has been no withdrawal of any portion of it, even temporarily, to account for the conscious phenomenon. Therefore, the latter cannot be explained by the former. In the words even of one so much inclined to materialism as DuBois-Reymond (*Ueber die Grenzen des Naturerkennens*, p. 28), "the mechanical cause expends itself entirely in mechanical operations. Thus the intellectual occurrences which accompany the material occurrences in the brain are without an adequate cause as contemplated by our understanding. They stand outside the law of causality, and therefore are as incomprehensible as a *mobile perpetuum* would be."

Physiological psychology does but demonstrate the existence and even the necessity of the mind that, as we have seen, it has been described as trying to do without. We cannot explain consciousness, as Münsterburg would do, as "a concomitant phenomenon or inactive accompaniment of a series of mechanical changes." In the first place, consciousness transcends the series of mechanical changes. While mental action is manifestly and manifoldly correlated with brain action, it is far from being a mere "concomitant phenomenon." It acts not only in connection with

brain action; it acts also above and beyond it, and in so far forth independently of it. Thus so high an authority as Prof. H. Calderwood writes (*The Relations of Mind and Brain*, p. 317): "Mind transcends all the sensibilities of our organism. The whole range of our thoughts—as we interpret events under the law of causality, form conceptions of rectitude, and represent to ourselves a scheme of the universe as a whole—transcends all the functions of the nerve system. Known facts are in accordance with this duality; paralysis of a cerebral hemisphere may leave intelligence unaffected; though high intellectual life involves good brain development, high brain development does not necessarily involve a distinguished intellectual life; but the more highly educated a man is, so much the more does his life transcend what his bodily functions can accomplish." It cannot be, therefore, that mental action is merely a "concomitant phenomenon" of nervous action. It would seem that those who claim it to be only this have studied nerves so exclusively as to have lost discernment of all else.

Again, mental action determines nervous action. Instead of being an "inactive accompaniment of it," it is even regulative of it. Ideas, feelings, and acts of will arising in the consciousness are true causes of nervous action. Even the most purely vegetative of the processes of the human body are dependent for their character upon the states of the human mind. "Thus if abnormal digestion produces melancholy, it is equally true that melancholy causes bad digestion." Of the same import is the entire class of phenomena which we call "voluntary." "These show" (to cite Prof. Ladd, whom we have just quoted) "that the condition of the bodily organs is made dependent, through the nervous elements of the brain, upon the states of the mind." That is, mental action not only, as we have just seen, transcends nervous action: it also influences and even directs it. According to so eminent a physiological psychologist as Prof. Baldwin, "the mind does not alter the mechanism of the nervous system, and it does not alter its energy; but it does alter its conditions, inasmuch as consciousness itself is the essential condition of all voluntary activity" (PRESBYTERIAN AND REFORMED REVIEW, Vol. i, p. 361). Once more, if consciousness be reduced to a mere "inactive accompaniment of a series of mechanical changes," if "a sequence of ideas exhausts the phenomena of will"—in a word, if the automatism of the extreme physiological psychologists be established, reality itself is explained away. As Prof. Andrew Seth says (*Man's Place in the Cosmos*, p. 125), "with the elimination of real causality from the course of things, the world is emptied of real meaning; it is reduced to a spectacular sequence of happen-

ings, which have no *raison d'être*, seeing that all is absolutely predetermined from the outset. There is no life or reality in the show which passes before us; for the nerve of reality is furnished solely by the conviction of our own activity, our own real causality." That is, psychology must grant the reality of the will at least or become simply the study of an illusion.

Nay, more. Unless there be an independent self-conscious as well as self-acting principle, we cannot study even such an illusion as we have just seen that, on this hypothesis, a mere "series of mechanical changes" becomes. If the mind were simply these changes, it could not know them, much less examine them. One must be outside of the stream and independent of it, if he is to see it. Beyond this, he must be self-conscious, if, as is the case, he knows that he knows it. As Lotze puts it (*Microcosmus*, p. 157), "what a being appears to itself to be is not the important point; if it can appear anyhow to itself, or other things to it, it must be capable of unifying manifold phenomena in an absolute indivisibility of its nature." It is not, therefore, strange that Prof. Ladd should sum up his *Elements of Physiological Psychology*, the most exhaustive treatise on the subject in English, as follows: "The assumption that the mind is a real being, which can be acted upon by the brain, and which can act on the body through the brain, is the only one compatible with all the facts of experience;" or that he should conclude his discussion of "Dualism" in the *Philosophy of Knowledge*, his latest and most elaborate book, by saying, "The moment that the ego's conscious life of cognition is identified with the chemico-physical changes in the cerebral substance, the whole field of psycho-physics is withdrawn from the view of the scientific mind." Even in such a *reductio ad absurdum* of idealistic materialism must any scientific physiological psychology result. The reality of the soul is the condition of science.

IV. Having now examined the chief theories opposed to duality, it only remains for us to close with a brief connected statement, though it may involve some repetition, of the considerations which favor and, as we believe, establish it.

The supposition that mind and matter are distinct and independent substances is in no wise inconsistent with their proved interaction. We do not know what kinds of being can act on each other. Neither do we understand how any kind of being can act on any other kind. Physical science is quite unable to say, prior to experience, whether molecules of iron can act on other molecules of iron under the laws of cohesion; and even after experience it cannot explain the real nature of the force which binds them

together. The whole subject of the interaction of beings is a mystery. This is so, as we have just seen, in the case even of beings which, like iron, are admitted to be of the same substance. The question, therefore, is not one with reference to which we may reason *à priori*. Our only safe, as it is our only rational course, is to confine ourselves strictly to the facts that may from time to time be established. That is, from the proved interaction of mind and matter we may not infer anything as to their being one substance or different substances. If that can be settled at all, it can be only by other facts; and so far as the admitted interaction of mind and matter is concerned, it leaves the question open to be settled either way. In a word, the antecedent objection that mind and matter cannot be different substances because they act on one another is an unwarranted *à priori* assumption.

Nor may any objection to the independence of mind and matter be based on such a fact, for example, as that a blow on the head produces unconsciousness. This, it is true, may indicate the identity of mind and brain. Put the latter to sleep and the evidence of the former disappears; hence, they are one. Such, however, need not be the conclusion. There is another theory with which the facts referred to are compatible, and that is that mind and brain are independent realities, but connected and correlated for the time. Because many a cavalryman is practically put out of the combat as soon as he is unhorsed, it does not follow that man and horse are one. The fact is not this, but that the man has become so accustomed to fighting on the horse that at first, at least, he is unable to fight when dismounted. In a word, the facts as to unconsciousness, etc., being equally consistent with the theory that mind and brain are identical, and with the theory that they are independent though temporarily connected and correlated —these facts in themselves prove nothing whatever in regard to the validity of either theory, as to final choice between them. Indeed, these facts and all others like them leave the question precisely where it was and as it was before they came under consideration. If the question is to be decided, we must look further.

The facts which seem to indicate that mind and matter are independent substances are both numerous and striking. We do not here emphasize the recorded cases of persons who on recovering consciousness have had a distinct recollection of mental process or experience during the swoon. These may be regarded as too exceptional to afford a basis for argument, though it should be observed that they prove at least the possibility of mental action when the brain is paralyzed. This must be so; for they are instances of such action under such circumstances. Neither do

we lay stress on the phenomena of hypnotism, mind-reading, telepathy, etc. These may be too little understood for us to build a scientific theory on them, though we may venture the opinion that much light is likely to come from this quarter. That these phenomena are facts to be investigated rather than fancies to be set aside is established. That they are also facts which concern directly the question under consideration is certain. The facts to which we would refer are both so common and so well understood that no objection can be taken to them. For example, the ordinary act of sense perception reveals mind as distinct from matter. Thus "when we look up at night, we become conscious, not of a current passing along the optic nerve in the vicinity of the brain, nor of the last of the undulations of the ether which was the immediate cause that set that nerve-current in motion; but what we are conscious of perceiving is, it may be, the disk of a planet." Again, "we listen to a page of Herodotus; and the objects which we become conscious of are not the nerve currents passing through the chamber of our brain, nor yet the aërial waves beating against the tympanum of the ear outside; these objects do not, as we listen, enter our field of experience at all. What do enter there are the thoughts of an author who died more than two thousand years ago, the scenes of a vanished civilization, and the words and acts of a people who have long passed away." Now, how can we account for this startling discrepancy between what we should from a purely materialistic standpoint have expected the limits of our experience to be, and the actual scope of our knowledge? Can we account for it in any way except that this is a universe of mind as well as of matter; a universe which mind has planned, which mind governs, throughout which mind expresses itself, and which, therefore, in each of its parts must be full of significance to mind? We see and hear as we do only because even such things as nerve currents and undulations of ether are real symbols that real minds use and understand, though it be unconsciously to themselves. Thus so simple an act as one of sense perception seems to imply duality. Indeed, it would appear almost inexplicable on any hypothesis but this.

We are bound, therefore, to weigh the claims of duality with a decided prepossession in its favor. It seems to explain the facts to be explained. Moreover, the other hypotheses—materialism, idealism in both its forms, idealistic-materialism—these we believe that the considerations adduced in this paper have shown to be untenable. Duality is thus the only hypothesis remaining. By the law of parsimony, consequently, we are shut up to it. We should examine it, expecting to prove it. We ought to regard it as at least *provisionally* true, if we may so speak.

That it is really true is rendered highly probable at once by the fact that duality has been and is the working hypothesis of the race. Men generally are neither materialists nor idealists, but dualists. They believe practically in the independent reality of mind and matter and in their mutual interaction. Jevons has shown in his masterly *Introduction to the History of Religion* (p. 22, *et seq.*), that primitive man divided all objects into active and inactive; that all active objects he regarded as animated by a life and will like his own; and that this life and will we might just as well express by the one word spirit. That is, animism or the belief in spirits, though neither religious nor the source of religion, was a universal primitive belief. It is as prevalent now, though, of course, among civilized peoples it has been stripped of many of its crudities. The ordinary American does not to-day regard the wind as a spirit, but he is just as sure that he himself is one as ever the early savage was. He cannot be made to think that he is of the same substance with the food that he eats or the air that he breathes, or even with the body that he breathes and eats to support. He may claim to be a materialist or an idealist, though only a few do: but the convictions with which he acts give the lie to his claim. The world of sense appeals to his consciousness as real even when his theory says that it is not; and though he would make the subjective merely the product of the objective, of nothing is he so profoundly and often painfully aware as of a world of self-consciousness which, while related to that of sense, cannot be explained by it. In a word, the common sense of mankind is strongly and always on the side of duality. This, indeed, is the only theory of the universe that it will accept. Now the common sense of mankind is not all that either philosophy or science needs for its true development, but woe is to the philosophy or science that fails to reckon with it. If common sense does not guide us as far as we need to go, it does indicate the roads that lead only to delusion or contradiction. It is, therefore, greatly in favor of duality that mankind seems incapable of believing in any theory except it. This verdict of common sense renders it at any rate *presumptively* true.

This presumption is much strengthened when we consider its inherent reasonableness. Duality is the only theory of reality that gives to life and even to existence any true significance. To the idealist the external world is an illusion. It is real, but merely as a dream or a phantasm. The essential fact as to the idealist's assumed relation to it is that he has been so constituted as to take it to be what it is not, and the great truth as to the universe is that "things are not what they seem." Nor is it otherwise on

the materialistic hypothesis. This regards man as only a "conscious automaton." Indeed, Prof. Huxley so speaks of him. That is, man is merely a machine. The whole course of his life is but a mechanical process. He thinks and plans and wills and hopes and fears; and he is conscious of himself as thus thinking, planning, willing, hoping and fearing, as a profound reality: but this is all illusion. Consciousness is to the body only what the whistle is to the locomotive, a mere collateral and powerless product of its working. Thus personality becomes a mockery; and life, instead of being real and earnest, is simply the sizzle of an engine letting off steam. What wonder that men generally should reject these hypotheses that we have been considering and should adopt that one which assumes both the world of mind and the world of matter to be full of real meaning. Other things being equal, that is not a reasonable hypothesis which explains away what it is framed to explain. The presumption is always that phenomena mean something. Even Mr. Bradley admits that where there are appearances there must be reality. To hold otherwise we are forced to impugn the validity of the causal judgment. Hence, the inherent reasonableness of such an hypothesis as that of duality. It does not deny the significance of the phenomena of either class. On the contrary, it brings it out in the case of both. It is, therefore, *apparently* true.

The argument is rendered conclusive by the scientific character of the dualistic hypothesis. It is objective rather than subjective. It is derived from the things to be explained rather than from the theories of the explainer. For example, we believe mind and matter to be distinct though interacting substances for the following reasons:

They are known by means of different organs. We know matter by the senses. We know mind by self-consciousness. Moreover, we can know either one only by the organ appropriate to it. No man ever saw a thought, touched an emotion, or heard a volition. Nor are we conscious within the thinking mind of space occupied, or of hardness, or of color.

We know mind and matter as possessing properties, not only different, but so essentially different as to be exclusive. Thus we know mind as capable of judgment, purpose, and affection; whereas we know matter as occupying space and as exerting certain attractive powers. And these properties of mind and matter are so radically unlike that we can conceive of them only in relation to their respective substances. We cannot think of judgment, purpose, or affection in connection with a stone, a board, or a vapor. Just as little can we think of our musings, our ambitions, our resolutions, as solid, elastic, or porous.

We have never known mind and matter to be transmuted the one into the other. The idealist does not convert matter into mind as heat may be changed into motion. He denies the existence of matter. The materialist does not convert mind into matter. He aspires to do it, but he has never been observed to do it.

That mind and matter are independent substances is, therefore, an hypothesis based on facts. The properties of what we call mind and the properties of what we call matter are known only by totally different organs; they are known as mutually exclusive; they are not known ever to have been transmuted. Hence, what we call mind and what we call matter are independent substances. This is as valid an inference as is the law of gravitation. As really as it, the hypothesis of duality is a generalization from facts and the most comprehensive one of which the facts permit. Consequently, it is not a mere hypothesis; it is itself a proved fact. Or if we prefer still to refer to it as an hypothesis, we must admit that it is *actually* true.

Nor is this all. On the realistic basis established in our last paper and assumed throughout this, we may even reach demonstration. Thus idealism is inconsistent with reality. It holds, indeed, to a real mind, but it cannot justify its right to do so. If it denies the existence of matter, why should it believe in mind?—for both are known intuitively, though by different organs. It is much as if a man were to receive as true what he saw with one eye and were to reject as false what he saw with the other. Nor may it be replied that the testimony of self-consciousness is more fundamental than that of sense perception. Grant that it is: it is not more immediate; and this is what in this case is essential. The question is, May we trust what we know directly? If we may, we must accept both the knowledge given by self-consciousness and that given by sense-perception. If either one may not be received as true, then neither may be so received. It makes no difference as to reality, whether we see a thing before or after another thing. In a word, idealism, because it denies the validity of one kind of immediate knowledge, denies all. Consciousness is not divisible. All its immediate objects, therefore, must be alike real or unreal.

Even more inconsistent with reality is the materialistic hypothesis both in its pure and in its idealistic forms. In either, of course, it is open to the objection just noticed in the case of idealism. If we may not trust self-consciousness and deny sense perception, certainly we may not trust sense perception and deny self-consciousness. But this is not all. Let it be assumed that the phenomena of consciousness have no real subject in the mind.

They must, then, be attributed to the peculiarly constituted and mutually interacting molecules of the brain. These supreme physical beings, however, so far as they are the objects of knowledge, are preëminently mental creations. We do not cognize them by the senses. Indeed, as Prof. Ladd says, "it is only because of certain irresistible convictions or assumptions of mind that we believe in their extra-mental reality." How, then, as we must do on the materialistic hypothesis, may we make their real being the account of the mental phenomena and thus deny the real being of a subject of the mental phenomena? As Prof. Ladd adds (*Elements of Physiological Psychology*, p. 677), "This is not only to explain what is most direct and certain by what is most indirect and uncertain; it even involves the wonderful paradox, that the one being in whose active energizing all conceptions of all real being arise, feels justified in denying its own reality in the supposed favor of certain of its most remote and doubtful conceptions." Need more be said to show that the hypothesis which we have been considering is *necessarily* true? If a consistent realist, one must be a dualist.

PRINCETON. W. BRENTON GREENE, JR.

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I.

THE PLACE OF THE WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY IN MODERN HISTORY.*

THE work done by the Westminster Assembly of Divines, in one aspect of it, is "the ablest and ripest product" of the Reformation of the sixteenth century. But, in another view, it is the starting point of that splendid religious and political development of the English-speaking peoples, which, on its religious side, is marked by the evangelical revival and the modern Christian propaganda at home and abroad; and, on its political side, is marked by the enfranchisement of the peoples of the United Kingdom, the building up of autonomous colonies within the British empire, and the planting of the continental republic of the United States. Of course, every work done by man, just because it has place in the organic historical movement, has roots in the past and bears fruit in the future. Of the most of these works, we are entitled to say that each of them is one of a vast number of equally important steps which men are always taking in the march of humanity to its predestined goal.

But we shall fall into a grave historical error if we assign to the finished work of the Westminster Assembly a function in the history of the English-speaking peoples of any other than the highest and most critical import. The waters of the great Lakes move continuously through the St. Lawrence basin to the Atlantic Ocean. At no point is the movement uninteresting or without

* An address delivered at the celebration, by Princeton Theological Seminary, of the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the adoption of the Westminster Standards.

V.

THE METAPHYSICS OF CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS.

III. Personality.

WE have now expounded and, as we believe, established Reality, or the truth that what we call real existence is not a succession of mere appearances, but is substance and so has being of its own. We have also discussed and, as we think, vindicated Duality, or the truth that substance is of two kinds, which are essentially different and even mutually exclusive, mind and matter. Our next task, consequently, is to consider in the same way Personality, or the truth that the substance mind exists as self-conscious entities that we designate persons.

The question, then, does not concern mere individuality. Every person is and must be an individual; that is, is and must be distinct from other persons and things: but every individual is not a person. Otherwise, beasts, even stones, all things with character of their own, would be persons. Thus the inquiry as to mere individuality is altogether aside from the one before us. Moreover, it is not one as to which there really is any question. The most monistic philosophy, so far from raising it, finds in it its occasion. Pantheism itself is an attempt, not to destroy the many, but to embrace them in and to explain them by the Absolute. Instead of intending to deny individual distinctions, it holds that God comes to Himself in them and develops Himself by means of them. Beyond this, the point is one which the readers of this series of papers may be assumed to have settled. In establishing reality we prove individuality, too; for what is real and so "has being of its own" must be an individual, and that also in an even stricter sense than the pantheistic one.

Nor, again, is the question as to the fact of self-consciousness. In this, it is true, is the essence of personality. "Self-consciousness and personality," says Henry B. Smith (*Introduction to Christian Theology*, p. 119), "are nearly synonymous." But, then, no one disputes that self-consciousness is a fact. The most opposite philosophies base themselves on it. The absolute school makes self-consciousness the ultimate category, and the empiricist Mill

can give no simpler description of the mind than that it is "a series of feelings aware of itself."

Nor, once more, is the question whether the self appears to be what we call an identical unit; that is, a unit which, in so far as it is a unit, is the same that it was and that it will be. Such is the conviction of men generally. They do not regard themselves as mere bunches of attributes and faculties. On the contrary, when one says, I did so and so, or, I will do so and so, he seems, at least to himself, to be single. He is, it is true, conscious of different attributes and faculties; but he is conscious at the same time and yet more profoundly that these attributes and faculties express an indivisible unit or ego. They are not the elements which compose it; they are rather the functions which it exercises; it itself is simple. So, too, men believe themselves to be essentially the identical men that they were and that they will be. So strong is this belief in personal identity and so ineradicable that, whatever theories we may espouse, we cannot rid ourselves of it. A proof of this is that we cannot help looking forward to the future, which would be utterly absurd but for the belief that the self of to-day will be the self of to-morrow. Philosophy, moreover, admits that such is the way in which the self appears. This is shown, as we shall see presently, in the fact that the effort of the various schools which deny personality is, not to prove that the self does not seem to be an identical unit, but to explain how it can seem to be one without being one. Indeed, as to what we may call the phenomena of the self there is practically no more difference of opinion among philosophers than there is among men generally. Even Mr. Mill speaks of the mind as "a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future." Probably all would agree that self-consciousness *seems* to be the experience of unity in diversity and the belief in identity in change.

Is this experience of unity, however, real or only apparent? Is this belief in the identity of the self a true belief or merely one that we take to be true? Is the self whose unity we seem to experience and in whose identity we believe an actual self, or simply a phenomenal one? In a word, is the soul a reality or not? Has it being of its own or does it but appear to have it? This is the particular and the profound question that we are to discuss.

No inquiry could be more important. It is so in apologetics. This, as we have seen, is the science of the proofs of Christianity. Proof, however, whether *à priori* or *à posteriori*, necessarily involves reasoning. Now reasoning presupposes personality and is irrational without it. Reasoning is a mental process to a single

definite conclusion. Hence, one's self, or whatever it may be that is brought to this conclusion, must be a unit. Otherwise, there would be no unity of impression. A series of mental states could never come to a conclusion. At best there could be only a succession of similar conclusions. Beyond this, no real conclusion at all could be reached, if the reasoner were not an identical unit. For reasoning, though of the simplest kind, is, as has been said, essentially a mental process to a single definite result. It consists in passing from one judgment to another, or in comparing two judgments in order to a conclusion from them. Unless, therefore, the mind were an identical unit, there would be no reason in reasoning. The process essential to it would be impossible. There could be no passing from one judgment to another implied in it. There could be no comparison of judgments with a view to a conclusion based on such comparison. These operations necessitate identity of subject. If he who draws the conclusion be not the same with him who formed the judgments from the comparison of which the conclusion results, how can there be any conclusion? We believe it to be valid, and we can believe it to be valid, only because we believe in personal identity. To suppose otherwise would be the same as to suppose that a man could review his past and anticipate his future, if he were not the identical individual that was and that will be. In such a case he who would try to take the survey would have neither past nor future to survey. To deny personality is, therefore, to reduce apologetics to an absurdity. Indeed, proof of every kind becomes a farce, for reasoning is made an illusion.

The inquiry as to personality is of equal importance to dogmatic theology. This, as generally understood, is the science of the Divine Person and of human persons in their relations to Him. God is conceived as a real, intelligent, voluntary, self-conscious Being who freely created all things and who "doeth according to His will in the army of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth;" and man is represented as a finite image and likeness of Him. If, therefore, personality be repudiated, theology, at least as commonly regarded, is emptied of all real content. Its subjects become mere illusions. Their essential characteristic is just this, that they are not what they seem to be. They are not persons, though every affirmation made of them presupposes, as that which is most fundamental, their personality.

The truth that we are considering is not less vital to morality. This is so based on personality as to be impossible logically without it. Morality consists in self-determined conformity to the rule

of right. This, however, implies at least the power of choice, knowledge of the distinction between right and wrong, and ability to compare one's conduct, one's purposes, and one's disposition with the standard of right. Hence, a molecule cannot be moral; for it cannot choose at all, it is under the law of physical necessity. Neither can a beast be moral: for though it can choose, it can not do so in the light of moral distinctions; it can decide as it pleases, but it cannot decide as it ought. Nor yet would even a man be moral, did the power of choice and the discernment of the difference between right and wrong exist together apart from self-consciousness: for such a man, though he could choose and could discern moral distinctions, could not determine *himself* in the light of them; he could feel that those around him ought to do and to be so and so, but he could not feel this with reference to himself. In short, only a *person* is so constituted as to be able to fulfill the conditions of moral action. But this is not all. As has been seen, morality implies a law as well as an agent. There must be that which binds no less than one who determines to bind himself by it. A moral law, however, is inconceivable without a moral law giver. As Prof. H. B. Smith has said (*Introduction to Christian Theology*, p. 122), "The universal moral order must inhere in a conscious mind." For this reason, therefore, as well as for that just noticed, morality cannot but imply personality. Indeed, the conception of the former without the latter is absurd.

It is not otherwise in the case of social progress in general. This depends on personal distinctions. It is even directly in proportion to the development of the consciousness of these. If this be doubted, let it be asked, What kind of a society would that be in which the difference between mine and thine was not recognized? Let it be remembered, too, that since self-consciousness is *the* characteristic of man, a society made up of men can approach perfection only as the self-consciousness, the personality, of its members is defined and appreciated. It could no more be otherwise than a living body could thrive if the individual life of its constituent molecules were to become impaired.

Nor may it be replied that all this, though logical, need not be actual. The appalling fact is that the logical of to-day will be the actual of to-morrow. Philosophy is the prophecy of history. Clearly can this be seen in the case under consideration. The consequences of the denial of personality have evidently been what it has been shown that they should be. The agnosticism of the hour can be traced directly to the positivistic teaching of yesterday. Comte repudiated the self. Mill tried to do so. And now Spencer,

though differing as widely from these as they did from one another, is enough under the influence common to them both to discredit the deeper intuitions and the higher exercises of the self. Hence, God is declared to be unknowable and the proof of a revelation from Him only more impossible than such a revelation itself. It is the same in the sphere of morals. Where personality has been dishonored the sense of obligation has been weakened until at last, with the degradation of the right into the useful and even the merely pleasurable, it has been destroyed. Hence, the prevalence of utilitarian and hedonistic views of life. That duty counts for so little in much of modern society is the actual, as one could have seen that it would be the logical, result of the positivistic repudiation of personality. The effect of this is even more conspicuous in social movements. Nothing is so significant in the anarchistic and nihilistic outbreaks which in parts of Europe are threatening the very existence of the body politic, as the fact that these revolutionists are, in almost all cases, the pupils of teachers who, at least indirectly, deny personality and so obligation and responsibility. Surely more need not be said to show the importance even of a right theory on this subject. If any do not appreciate this, it can be, it would seem, only because they are blinded by their own views. Even philosophers, Berkeley tells us, "are often indebted to their own preconceptions for being ignorant of what everybody else knows perfectly well."

I. Let us, then, examine the various ways in which it is attempted to explain the admitted phenomena of personality on another basis than the reality of personality.

1. *The Associationist Theory.*—Locke paved the way for this when he suggested that the same substance might have two successive consciousnesses, or that the same consciousness might be supported by more than one substance. His point was that the *important* unity of the self was its verifiable or felt unity. If we seemed to ourselves to be persons, it was of little consequence whether we really were so or not. Indeed, a metaphysical or absolute unity would be of no account, so long as a consciousness of diversity might be there. Hume showed how great the consciousness of diversity actually was. In the famous chapter on Personal Identity in his *Treatise on Human Nature*, he writes as follows: "But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind that they are *nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions*, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. Our eyes cannot turn in their sockets without varying our perceptions. Our thought is still more variable than our sight;

and all our other senses and faculties contribute to this change; nor is there any single power of the soul which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment. The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, repass, glide away and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. *There is properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in different;* whatever natural propension we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity. The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only that constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the place where these scenes are represented, nor of the material of which it is composed." Thus Hume takes a position, not only more advanced than Locke's, but radically different. He does not merely depreciate the importance of insisting on the identical unity and so the reality of the soul; he clearly and most emphatically denies its unity, identity, and consequent reality. In a word, he chops up personality into what Prof. James calls a "chain of distinct existences." This gives rise to the Associationist Philosophy. The phenomena of personality remain; men still seem to themselves to be identical units: the fact of personality, however, has been repudiated; a person is only "a chain of distinct existences." How, then, is this apparent contradiction to be reconciled? How are we to account for our "natural propension" to "imagine the simplicity and identity of the soul"?

The explanation of the Associationist school may be summarized as follows: Experience is the source of all knowledge. The simplest element in experience is sensation. The representation, copy, or recollection of a sensation is an idea. The connecting or combining of ideas in the mind is association. Association proceeds according to four laws or relations. The first of these is the law of similarity. That is, "like phenomena tend to be thought of together." The second of these is the law of contiguity. That is, "phenomena which have either been experienced or conceived in close contiguity to one another tend to be thought of together." The third of these is the law of repetition. That is, "associations produced by contiguity become more certain and rapid by repetition;" and when the repetition has been frequent there is produced what is called inseparable association, by which is meant that, unless dissolved by some new experience or process of thought, this particular association is irresistible. The last of these laws is the law of persistence. That is, "when an association has acquired this character of inseparability, not only does the idea called up by association become in our consciousness

inseparable from the idea which suggested it, but the facts of phenomena answering to these ideas come at last to seem inseparable in existence." Now it is to these laws of association that our "natural propension to imagine" our simplicity and identity is due. In the words of Hume (*Treatise on Human Nature*, p. 541), "as the very essence of these relations consists in their producing an easy transition of ideas, it follows that our notions of personal identity proceed entirely from the smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought along a train of connected ideas, according to the principles above explained." On this theory, therefore, personality is a mere illusion. We seem to be persons only because we think so rapidly and easily that the real breaks in the chain of thought are lost sight of. We travel, as it were, so fast that we cannot distinguish between the objects passed: and so we think of ourselves, not as the chain of independent sensations which we are, but as one identical sensation, that is, a self.

This theory, however, is, in the first place, inadequate. It has not enabled even its most pronounced advocates to dispense with personality. They cannot argue against it without at least seeming to imply it. For example, Hume himself cannot speak of the mind as a mere series of independent impressions even when he is trying to prove that this is all that it is. The best that he can do is to say that "the mind is a kind of theatre where several perceptions successively make their appearance." Nor do his qualifications of this statement help matters. They render them worse. "The comparison of the theatre," he says, "must not mislead us." But why make it, if it is so likely to do this? It can be only because he feels that he could not be understood without it. Though he is insisting that it is "the successive perceptions only that constitute the mind," he knows that the idea of successive perceptions by itself is inconceivable; and so, as he is arguing against a self that conceives them, he virtually personifies them and introduces a theatre where they act. Nor is this theatre a mere figure of speech. He says that it is, but he does not think so. He concludes by adding that "we have not the most distant notion where it is or of what it is composed." But why write thus of the theatre of the mind, if it be only a figure intended to help thought? Indeed, were it but this, to speak thus would be absurd. That which is somewhere and which is composed of something must itself be a real thing. In like manner, Bain, when he would assassinate the self, introduces it to assist, as it were, in its own assassination. Thus, "the sense of difference," he tells us, "is the most rudimentary property of our intellectual being." But why use the phrase,

"intellectual being," when that is precisely what he is arguing against? Is it not because he is aware that he could not be understood were he to speak otherwise? because he finds even himself unable to speak otherwise? So, too, the concessions of Mr. John S. Mill, the ablest as well as the fairest of modern Associationists, may be regarded, in the words of Prof. James, as "the definitive bankruptcy of the Associationist description of the consciousness of self." Thus (*Exam. of Hamilton*, fourth ed., p. 263), "We are forced to apprehend every part of the series" (the "series of feelings aware of itself," which is his account of the mind) "as linked with the other parts by *something in common* which is not the feelings themselves, any more than the succession of the feelings is the feelings themselves; and as that which is the same in the first as in the second, in the second as in the third, in the third as in the fourth, and so on, must be the same in the first and in the fiftieth, this common element is a permanent element." Could there be a more signal exhibition of the inadequacy of the theory that we are considering? Even its most zealous advocate it can not restrain from practically repudiating it.

This exhibition should amount to demonstration when we look at the reasons for this inadequacy. These may be reduced to two. One is that the association of ideas presupposes the self that it is assumed to account for. This may easily be shown. The laws of association are laws of memory. As Herbert Spencer has said (*Principles of Psychology*, i, p. 251), "Associability and revivability go together." Now remembrance is inconceivable without a continuous subject, an identical unit, to remember. Suppose that I remember that yesterday I was reading Mill's *Logic*. Then, to cite the admirable analysis of Prof. Momerie (*Personality*, p. 41), "the remembrance involves an idea of myself reading that particular book. But this is not all; for I can frame an idea of myself reading the book to-morrow; and the latter idea would not have the same certainty. In remembering that I read it yesterday, I am aware that my idea represents a real fact, and that the same I, who am now apprehending the 'idea' of that fact, yesterday apprehended the 'impression,' and, *by reason of having apprehended both*, am competent to judge as to their agreement." That is, only a permanent self or identical unit can remember. Nor is this a strained conclusion. It is an irresistible one. Mr. J. S. Mill grants it, fatal though it is to his theory. "The supposition of mental permanence," he tells us, "would admit of the same explanation as the permanence of the external world, and mind might be regarded as a mere series of feelings, with a background of possibility of feeling, *were it not for memory and expectation*.

They are in themselves present feelings, but they involve a belief in more than their own existence. They cannot be adequately expressed without saying that I myself had or shall have them." So far, then, from the laws of association explaining personal identity, their operation is impossible without it.

There is, however, another reason for the weakness of the theory under review. Mere sensation, the very beginning of knowledge, equally with the laws of association, presupposes the self or soul. This, too, is readily shown. In the first place, consciousness is a condition of sensation. Doubtless, it is on the occasion of a sensation that consciousness comes into exercise: there must be a feeling, if there is to be the knowledge of a feeling. This, however, does not mean that the feeling produces the knowledge; it means rather that the sensation is possible because of the capacity for knowing it. A stone cannot feel a sensation just for the reason that it is not conscious; and if it is to have a sensation, it must first be made conscious. Indeed, as Calderwood says (*Handbook of Moral Philosophy*, p. 100), "There is no sensation without consciousness." In the second place, consciousness of sensation in the case of men is always a knowledge of personal existence as affected by sensory apparatus. To quote again from the page of Calderwood just mentioned, "Our consciousness is knowledge of self and knowledge of a particular feeling. It is smell consciousness and self-consciousness; in every case a double knowledge. It cannot be less for there is knowledge of *object*, in contrast with *subject*." Hume may think that he has annihilated the self by the assertion (*Hum. Nat.*, B. i, Pt. iv, Sec. 6), "I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception." He forgets, however, that, as Prof. Momerie justly remarks (*Personality*, p. 45), "if a man catches himself with one, there must be a self to catch." In the third place, sensation and self-consciousness cannot be identified as if the terms were synonymous. The attempt has often been made, but it has always failed. I feel is not the same as, and cannot be made the same as, I know that I feel. I feel, as we have seen, depends on I know that I feel. The former, the sensation, is a concomitant of the latter, the self-consciousness, and is impossible without it. This, however, so far from identifying them, does but emphasize the reality of the latter. What is the necessary condition of the discernment of universally admitted existence must itself be real. That you cannot see without an eye proves, if you do see, that you have an eye. In the fourth place, the reality of self-consciousness involves the truth of personality. If, in the last analysis, you are conscious of a single definite self, it is because you are able to gather up, and do gather up, into one

definite representation the several characteristics of your intelligence as these are necessarily brought to unity in your life. From the necessity of the case, however, only an identical unit, a person, can do this. Indeed, as Lotze has said (*Microcosmus*, Tr. i, 157), "If a being can appear anyhow to itself, it must be capable of unifying manifold phenomena in an absolute indivisibility of its nature." Mere sensation is, therefore, in the case of men, an evidence of personality; for in their case it depends on that the exercise of which involves personality. It is not that the self or person is something under and independent of the sensations and feelings; it is, as McCosh has said (*Defense of Fundamental Truth*, p. 92), that "personality is the self of which we are conscious in every sensation or feeling. It does not point to some unknown essence. It simply designates an essential, an abiding element of the sensation or feeling." The latter would be impossible were it not the sensation or feeling of a real self-conscious being or person.

2. *The Stream Theory.*—The most prominent advocate of this is, perhaps, Prof. James, of Harvard University. He agrees with the Associationists in that he denies personal identity and so personality. He does not, it is true, claim that the non-existence of the soul has been established. All that he insists has been proved is its "superfluity for scientific purposes." The phenomena of personality can be explained, at least as well, without it; and, therefore, it is a violation of the law of parsimony to posit it. On the other hand, he differs radically from the Associationists in that he holds strenuously to the unity of the phenomena of personality. The fundamental error of Hume, he says (*Psychology*, i, p. 352), was that he saw in consciousness "nothing but diversity, diversity abstract and absolute." In opposition to him and his school, Prof. James postulates "the present passing thought as a psychic integer, with its knowledge of so much that has gone before." What this "present passing thought" is and how with it belief in personal identity should be explained, we will now try to show.

"The present passing or judging thought" is "that section of consciousness or pulse of thought which is the vehicle of the judgment of identity." We would say that it is the self judging that it itself is an identical self. This present judging thought or self is an integer or unit. That is, it is a single and undivided state of consciousness. Its object may be most complex; it may have an indefinite number of utterly disconnected objects; it itself, however, as a thought is one; its objects, many and diverse though they may be, "are thought from the outset in a unity, in

a single pulse of subjectivity, a single psychosis, feeling or state of mind." The Associationist psychology supposes that whenever an object of thought contains many elements, the thought itself must be made up of just as many ideas, one idea for each element, and all fused together in appearance, but really separate. This psychology, on the contrary, tolerates only one idea at a time, though that one may be most complex. It refuses to liken the course of consciousness to "a chain" composed of separate links which seem to be one merely because the passage from one to another of them is so quick and easy. It insists on "a stream" of thought or of consciousness which really is one, and that section of the stream which at any given moment is conscious of this stream of thought and grasps its unity is what it calls the "passing or present judging thought."

This "thought" accounts for our belief in our personal identity in the following way. Consciousness of self is, in the last analysis, a consciousness of warmth and intimacy. "We feel the whole cubic mass of our body all the while, and it gives us an unceasing sense of personal existence. Equally do we feel the 'inner nucleus of the spiritual self,' either in the shape of von faint physiological adjustments, or in that of the pure activity of our thought taking place as such." One or the other or both of these things impart to the present self its character of warmth and intimacy. In a word, self means the peculiar feeling of warmth and intimacy which arises in the manner just described.

This peculiar feeling, however, does not belong only to the present self. It belonged equally to the self at any and at every moment of the past. There was then, there has been continuously, warmth and intimacy like those now experienced, and for the same reasons. "A uniform feeling of warmth of bodily existence (or an equally uniform feeling of pure psychic energy), pervades all the past selves and the present self." That is, they are all similar and continuous. Hence personal identity. "Resemblance among the parts of a continuum of feelings (especially bodily feelings) experienced along with feelings widely different in all other regards thus constitutes the real and verifiable 'personal identity' which we feel" (see James' *Psychology*, Vol. i, p. 336). We believe in one identical self because in the "stream" of consciousness we recognize a stream of similar selves. We conclude that these are one because they are all warm and because there is no break in their succession. Yes, you say: but in order to this conclusion there must be a self outside of the stream of consciousness. Otherwise, the continuum of resembling selves within it could not be recognized, and still

less could it be felt as belonging to and, in this sense at least, as identical with the present self. This need Prof. James admits and provides for. The medium required he finds in "the real, present, onlooking, remembering 'judging thought,' or identifying 'section' of the stream" which we have already described. This is what "collects—'owns' some of the past facts which it surveys, and disowns the rest—and so makes a unity that is actualized and anchored and does not merely float in the blue air of possibility."

At this point, however, a difficulty appears. The particular "judging thought" or "identifying section" of the stream passes with the stream. Though there is always an identifying section, this is never the same; just as there is always water at the point where the power of the river is applied to the mill, but it is never the same water. We seem, then, to have only a succession of judgments of identity. At each instant of consciousness the present self identifies itself with all the past selves in the stream of consciousness; but as there is a new present self with each pulse of consciousness, how can there be any real identity? Here is the explanation, says Prof. James. Each "judging thought," each "identifying section," in the stream of consciousness, appropriates or adopts as its own all the stream of identifying sections or judging thoughts that went before it. Such is personal identity. Though the self or "present judging thought" is never identical with those that went before it, it seems to be so because it takes up as belonging to it all the past selves or judging thoughts. Thus there is no identical personality demanded. This may be a mere illusion: it would be accounted for by "the trick which the nascent thought has of immediately taking up and adopting" as its own, and so as one with it, "the expiring thought." Indeed, personal identity as a psychologic fact can be "fully described without supposing any other agent than a succession of perishing thoughts, endowed with the function of appropriation and rejection, and of which some can know and appropriate or reject objects already known, appropriated or rejected by the rest" (*Psychology*, Vol. i, p. 342).

To this decidedly influential theory we would offer the following and, as it seems to us, fatal objections:

First, the account given of the self is most untrue and most unworthy. It is most untrue; for it is not the fact "that I and we are at bottom only names of emphasis" (*Psychology*, Vol. i, p. 341). Consciousness of self, doubtless, is characterized by a sense of peculiar warmth and intimacy. To resolve the self, however, of which we are conscious into mere warmth and intimacy; that is, to differentiate the thought of self from the thought of other

things only as being more emphatic—this is as irrational as to say that the vision of the sun differs from the vision of the moon merely in being dazzling. In both cases, and in both equally, the result of consciousness is put in the place of the object of consciousness; and so the effect is mistaken for the cause. Nor is this all. The theory of the self under consideration is as unworthy as it is untrue. Instead of explaining, it would explain away what Prof. James, as every serious man, regards as the mystery, nay, the profound reality, of his being. It would degrade that which is ultimate in man as well as his distinctive characteristic into a mere feeling of warmth, a mere matter of emphasis. Its final equation is man—animal written in italics. Verily, the Associationist Hume did better than this. Even when he tried hardest to assassinate the self, he did not thus insult it.

Secondly, "resemblances among the parts of a continuum of feelings (especially bodily feelings) experienced along with things widely different in all other regards" is not an adequate description of "the real and verifiable personal identity which we feel." This identity does express itself in what we may call a continuous *feeling*, but it is not the whole truth to say that this feeling is continuous because its objects, the different selves, resemble each other in having, all of them, the warmth of bodily existence or of pure psychic energy, and thus possess "a generic unity or are all of the same kind." On the contrary, the fact is quite otherwise. That of which we are conscious is not generic unity, but identical unity; not a stream of like selves, but one permanent self-same self. You do not feel that your present consciousness is of the same sort with that of yesterday; what you do feel is that, however different its objects may be now from what they were yesterday, it is the very same consciousness with that of yesterday. This may not be so. The facts may be just as Prof. James has indicated. It may be that the identity which we seem to ourselves to perceive when we compare the self of to-day with the self of yesterday is not real, and is the result of mistaking for identity a mere continuous resemblance. Still, the point to be noted is that it appears to be real and so has to be reckoned with *as such*. If it is to be shown to be an illusion, it is as an illusion of identity that we must turn the light on it. Otherwise, though we may dissipate some mist, it will not be the mist which envelops that at which we are looking. Thus, not only does Prof. James, as we have seen, misrepresent and degrade the self of which we are conscious; he misconceives utterly its apparent identity. Even, therefore, if his explanation of this would work, it would be worthless. The problem that he would solve would not be the problem to be solved.

Thirdly, his explanation will not work, and this for two reasons. One is, that it is a mere process. It is an "onlooking, a remembering, a judging and identifying." It is a "pulse of thought." It is "the present mental state." No subject of the state, no thinker of the thought, no agent who looks on, remembers, judges and identifies, is posited. Indeed, this is just what may not be posited. With anything so metaphysical as a subject, a thinker, an agent, the true psychologist, Prof. James holds, will have nothing to do. Nay, more; the superfluity of a thinking, acting soul and so the sufficiency of the "present passing thought" is precisely what Prof. James claims that his psychological analysis has established. He does not simply relegate the question of personality to metaphysics. He pronounces it an unnecessary question. Perhaps there may be a soul, but we need not inquire. "The passing thought" seems to be the thinker, and is all the thinker that is demanded (*Psychology*, Vol. i, p. 342). This, however, is precisely what we must protest against. A process without an agent, even the "present passing thought" without a thinker, is a pure abstraction. It does not exist; and it cannot be conceived as existing, still less as operating. To separate thinking from a thinker is as impossible in fact and as impossible of conception as a fact as it is, even with instantaneous photography, to represent the motion of a horse without the horse. Moreover, if it could be done, it would not help matters. Deep in the mind and ineradicable would still be the conviction that the representation was an unreal one. An effect may sometimes be studied by itself; but the more that this is done, the more is the effect felt to demand a cause. And in like manner, if a thinking process could be considered as merely a thinking process, this way of viewing it would come to be regarded, at least practically, as contrary to fact. The necessity of a subject or cause of the process would be appreciated, even though not admitted. That it is felt by Prof. James seems evident. Otherwise, why does he write the "present judging Thought" with a capital T? (*Psychology*, Vol. i, p. 338). Is it not because "the present mental state," which he would have it represent, even he cannot help thinking of as the state of a self or person, indeed, as itself a self or person? The other reason why his explanation collapses is that, in addition to being a mere process, it is a purely imaginary one. Though its value as an explanation is affirmed to lie in its exact portrayal of what is observed to happen, it really portrays only what Prof. James and his disciples suppose must have happened. It is not "a patent fact of consciousness" (*Psychology*, Vol. i, p. 339), that the title of a collective self is passed from one thought to another in some

way analogous to that of "bequest." "This trick which the nascent thought has of immediately taking up the expiring thought and adopting it" is a trick the performance of which no psychologist has ever witnessed. The best that can be said of it with any show of reason is that it or something equivalent to it seems to be presupposed in the phenomena of personality. This, however, is to relegate it at once to the domain of metaphysics: and this is the destruction of a theory whose great claim is that, in the respect under consideration at least, it does not need metaphysics. But this is not all. Not only is Prof. James' explanation of personality thoroughly metaphysical; it is imaginary metaphysics. It is not demanded or even suggested by the facts to be explained. It is necessitated only by its inventor's theory of "the superfluity of the soul." It is introduced only to explain that for which the soul would account. The truth, however, is that the most immediate and direct of all our knowledge appears to be knowledge of self as a self-conscious identical unit or person. What, then, could be farther-fetched than the "Stream" theory of personal identity? Its explanation of this is as imaginary as it is impracticable, and most imaginary of all would seem to be the need of it.

3. *The Transcendental Theory.*—It secures the unity and identity of the self by the sacrifice of its true individuality. That we may understand this, let us trace the development of what is called the transcendental self or ego. We begin, of course, with Kant. In opposition to the Associationists, he distinguishes sharply between the transcendental ego and the empirical ego. By the latter he means "the matter of the internal sense in its form of time." That is "it is the succession of mental states—the thoughts, feelings and actions—upon which man may look back as constituting the record of his experience, his life." As Kant himself says, "it is the object treated by empirical psychology." In the language of recent psychology, "the empirical Self is a complex presentation to consciousness;" it is "continuously, but at no one moment completely, presented" (Ward, article "Psychology," ninth ed., *Encyclopædia Britannica*). In a word, the empirical self is the self of which every one is directly and individually conscious. By the transcendental Ego, on the contrary, Kant would indicate that the "identical Self," what we call the person, is "deduced or proved solely with reference to experience, as a necessary condition of knowledge." That is, it is demanded by the facts and is to be believed in because of the facts, that the empirical self is known; that it is serial; and that a series, if it is to be known as such, implies, as appeared in our discussion of the

Associationist theory, a consciousness present to each of its members, and self-identical throughout their change. While, however, the transcendental ego is thus necessary to experience, out of reference to experience it has no meaning; and, consequently, no assertions can be made concerning it. That there is a soul we know; for it is only on the basis of such a unity that we can account for the phenomena of self-consciousness: but what the soul is, or how it is, we cannot know; for we cannot transcend self-consciousness. In brief, the transcendental ego is what unifies the empirical consciousness. This is all that can be said regarding it. To cite again Prof. Seth, to whose *Hegelianism and Personality* we have been much indebted, the transcendental ego can no more be conceived apart from the empirical ego than "one end of a stick could be supposed to exist apart from the other end." The transcendental ego is the necessary and inseparable, but utterly indefinite condition of self-consciousness. Thus Kant's view of the self differs from Prof. James' theory as well as from that of the Associationists. If, as we have seen, it distinguishes sharply between the transcendental ego and the empirical ego, it also regards them necessary the one to the other.

Next came Fichte. Kant's work had been mainly critical; his was preeminently constructive. "It is a construction to explain the duality of sense and reason which Kant," as we have just observed, "had left standing as an ultimate fact." So far as personality is concerned, the problem for Fichte was to reduce to a single principle the empirical ego and the transcendental ego, the self of sense and the self of reason. This he did by making the former the product of the latter. The self of which one is conscious is the creation, the thought, of the self that really is. Thus in the most profound meaning every one thinks and so makes himself. Of course, it is not the self of which he is conscious, the concrete personality of the individual, that does this; it is the transcendental ego, the pure consciousness, the act "which lies at the basis of all consciousness and alone makes consciousness possible" (*Werke*, i, 91). So far Fichte, while he advances greatly on Kant, does not depart radically from him. He has given to Kant's transcendental ego a creative function, but he has not changed its essential nature. This, however, he proceeds to do. He conceives of the transcendental ego as the absolute Ego. He identifies the single active self-conscious principle which any and every individual self presupposes as its cause with the central creative thought of the universe, the universal or divine self-consciousness. "Instead of being, as with Kant, the function of human thought which generates the form, and the form only, of a phenomenal

world, the transcendental ego has become for Fichte the absolute Creator of an absolute world." Thus the individual self, personality as known to us, is with him one of the divine Person's thoughts.

Schelling took another step in advance. Indeed, Fichte himself did in the latter part of his career. In the *Destiny of Man*, speaking of the absolute Ego as identity of subject and object, he defines it as "that which is neither subject nor object, but the ground of both, and that out of which both come into being;" and immediately afterwards he refers to "the incomprehensible One" which "separates itself into these two" (*Werke*, ii, 225). Soon after this he drops the term absolute Ego, and adopts the more general designation of "the Absolute." In like manner, Schelling defines the Absolute as the indifference point of subject and object—"pure identity in which nothing is distinguishable." Thus the personality of the absolute ego, as well as the reality of the empirical ego, is denied. All that is left to us is an unknown and unknowable metaphysical ground or source of the whole world. This ground is nothing when separated from the individual consciousness whose unity it is; and that is nothing, for it is only its manifestation.

Schelling's successor Hegel returns to Fichte's earlier position. Hegel cannot be satisfied with a philosophy whose Absolute is described as "total indifference" or "pure identity in which nothing is distinguishable." "Such an Absolute," he says, "is no better than the night in which all cows are black." The "truth" or ultimate reality of the universe cannot, he holds, be a pure "original" or "immediate" identity; it must be an identity that mediates or restores itself—in other words, an identity which is realized through difference. Hence, Hegel makes "everything in philosophy depend on the insight that the Absolute is to be apprehended not as substance, but as subject." He finds the type of the "identity," which is the ground and source of all things in the self-conscious life. In a word, he reëmphasizes the central principle of idealism. In doing so, however, he changes its form. He brings it into more vital connection with the notion of development; and, in particular, he connects the development of the subject with the facts of nature and history. He does not, as it were, stuff all the facts of the universe into the subject as into a ready-made form. On the contrary, he views the development of the world as the process of the development or "becoming" of Spirit. He would draw all the facts of nature and history within this process and exhibit them as stages or elements in the self-development of Spirit or the absolute Idea. This idea, more-

over, is not Fichte's absolute Ego. Hegel's "Absolute" is "Self-conscious Spirit only as He returns to himself from his objectification in nature and attains to self-consciousness in the consciousness of man." In a word, the human self-consciousness is not the thought or creation of the Absolute: the Absolute and it are "identical quantities." To sum up, then, the Transcendental theory of the self differs from the Stream theory and the Associationist theory in that it holds and guarantees both the unity and the identity of the self. The theory makes the self in every case the coming to self-consciousness and so the manifestation in its true nature of the "Absolute Idea." It differs from the two theories just named in that it fails to secure the individuality of the empirical self. This is an identical unit just because its individuality is given up, it and the Absolute Idea being regarded as "identical quantities."

This explanation of the self, which, though more or less modified, is still held in its essentials by the not uninfluential Neo-Hegelian school, is exposed to the following and, as it would seem, insuperable objections:

It will not work. Granting that it does give a just account of the necessary unity and identity of the self, it breaks down when it encounters its individuality. The reality of this it denies. As we have seen, it identifies the human and the divine self-consciousness. Because the self-consciousness of men reveals a similarity of type, the Hegelian infers unity of substance. This, however, is as much a *non-sequitur* as though one were to argue that all oak trees were one because they were all alike. Nay, it is a much more glaring *non-sequitur;* for the distinguishing characteristic of every self-consciousness is consciousness of itself as an individual. In the words of Prof. Seth (*Hegelianism and Personality*, p. 216), "though selfhood involves a duality in unity, and is describable as subject-object, it is none the less true that each self is a unique existence, which is perfectly *impervious*, if I may so speak, to other selves—impervious in a fashion of which the impenetrability of matter is a faint analogue. The Self, accordingly, resists invasion; in its character of self it refuses to admit another self within itself, and thus be made, as it were, a mere retainer of something else. The unity of things (which is not denied) cannot be properly expressed by making it depend upon a unity of the Self in all thinkers; for the very characteristic of a self is this exclusiveness." Moreover, this fact is one with which a Hegelian especially is bound to reckon, because with Hegel self-consciousness is the ultimate category. How, then, may he deny that exclusiveness, that individuality, which, as we have seen, is the essence of self-consciousness? Surely, no theory can work which

thus repudiates the innermost content of that for which it assumes to account. It is not, therefore, too much to say that "the radical error of Hegelianism is the unification of consciousness in a single Self." Though it gave a valid explanation of self-consciousness in other respects, its breakdown in this would be fatal; for this is fundamental.

Its explanation, however, is invalid throughout. Even if it might explain away the individuality of the self, it would have to be set aside on other grounds, chief among them the following:

The Transcendental theory of the self puts man in the place of God. This it does by making, as we have seen, the human self-consciousness and the Absolute "identical quantities." "God or the Absolute is represented in the system as the last term of a development into which we have a perfect insight: we ourselves, indeed, as absolute philosophers, are equally the last term of the development." Thus in the philosophy of law, of history, of æsthetics, and in the history of philosophy itself, the Absolute is attained, being simply man's record and ultimate achievement along these lines. Specially is this so in the "philosophy of religion," where we should naturally expect to meet it least. The self-existence of God seems to disappear; He is begotten, and has His only reality in the consciousness of the worshiping community. "God is not a Spirit beyond the stars," says Hegel; "He is Spirit in all spirits:" but this means, if not certainly to the "Master" himself, at least to many of his disciples, that anything like a separate personality or self-consciousness in the divine Being is renounced. In a word, we are put in the place of God. Can any such explanation of the human self be valid? It contradicts that which is scarcely less fundamental in our consciousness than the sense of individuality, and that is the feeling of dependence on the Supernatural. As Bacon has well said, "Man looks up to God as naturally as the dog does to his master:" but this he could never do, were there no God save "his own great self."

2. Again, the Transcendental theory deprives man as well as God of real existence. After putting the former in the place of the latter, it proceeds to destroy him also. This it does by dividing and so, of course, killing him. His one concrete self is split into two. Of these that one of which each of us is conscious is the man: and the other, that which, according to Kant, unifies the former, and, according to Fichte, thinks it, and, according to Schelling, is the ground of it, and, according to Hegel, attains to self-consciousness, and so truly manifests itself, in it, is the Absolute or God. This division, however, does not more truly, as we

have seen, undeify God by practically identifying Him with the human self consciousness than it dehumanizes man. Man is not the empirical self; or rather, the latter is only half the man, only the objective side of his consciousness. It is a half, too, that cannot exist, that cannot even be conceived, alone. If these are merely to be states of consciousness, there must be a subjective self to which they can be the states of consciousness. Nor does it help matters that the place of this subjective self is taken by what may be called the divine Self—a self identical in all men, a self, as we have seen, identical with man. As Prof. Seth has well said, "The individual seems thus to become no more than an object of the divine Self, a series of phenomena threaded together and reviewed by it—an office which it performs in precisely the same manner for any number of such so-called individuals." Surely this is to destroy man with a vengeance. Such a representation wipes out his self-hood and independence with a completeness which few systems of Pantheism can rival. Man is made the mere object of an undeified God. Nothing in himself, he can be conceived to exist only in virtue of what cannot itself be regarded as self-conscious save in him and as far as he. As Prof. Seth well puts it (*Hegelianism and Personality*, p. 190), "human persons are, as it were, the foci in which the impersonal life of thought momentarily concentrates itself, in order to take stock of its own contents. These foci appear only to disappear in the perpetual process of this realization."

Thus, as must now be evident, the Transcendental theory hypostatizes a pure abstraction. "The impersonal life of thought," which is admitted to constitute the subjective side of human consciousness, is, of course, such. Apart from a person, without a thinker, thought cannot exist, it cannot really be conceived as actually existing; it is like an effect without a cause, it is an effect without a cause. But the empirical self, the phenomenal aspect of consciousness, is by itself equally an abstraction. States of consciousness presuppose and necessarily involve a subject of those states. As well think of qualities as existing save as the qualities of some substance. Nor will it help matters in the least to take "the impersonal life of thought," as the Hegelian does, as the ground of the individual self-consciousness. The combination of two abstractions will not make one concrete reality any more than zero plus zero will make unity. Hence, Prof. Seth is correct when he says of the Transcendental theory (*Hegelianism and Personality*, p. 29): "It takes the notion of knowledge as equivalent to a real knower; and, the form of knowledge being one, it leaps to the conclusion that what we have before us is the

One Subject who sustains the world, and is the real Knower in all finite intelligences. It seems a hard thing to say, but to do this is neither more nor less than to hypostatize an abstraction." Now to do this is, in plain English, to make something of nothing.

But this is not the worst. Having so deceived itself as to suppose that it has succeeded in working up mere abstractions into a real agent, the Transcendental theory goes on to ascribe to its absolute Nothing, an absolutely impossible achievement. This is the creation as it were of reality. Though the Absolute is but an idea, though it is merely abstract thought, the logical unfolding of its categories is regarded as giving the whole actual world of nature and spirit. As Schopenhauer puts it, "the universe to Hegel is a crystallized syllogism." This, however, cannot be. "There is no evolution possible of a fact from a conception." Logic can develop the meaning of nature, but it cannot originate it. "It cannot make the real, it can only describe what it finds." Indeed, it itself presupposes nature or reality; and without it, it is, as we have already observed, as powerless as it is empty. What absurdity, then, can be greater than that of positing a mere nonentity like the "absolute Idea" as the creator of such realities as the physical realm and even the human soul? No theory of the self can be tenable which brings us to a result so irrational as this. Even were the theory consistent with itself, as we have seen that it is not, no other conclusion would be justifiable.

II. We pass, therefore, to the proof of Personality, or the vindication of what we believe to be the true doctrine of the self. This differs from the theory just considered in holding to the real individuality of the self; it regards the self as a distinct entity. It differs from the Stream theory in holding to the identity of this entity; it takes it to be essentially the same that it was and that it will be. It differs from the Associationist theory in holding to the unity as well as in holding to the identity of the self; it affirms that the self's consciousness is a single state, however complex may be its objects, and that it must be the consciousness of a single being. It concentrates attention neither on the empirical ego nor on the transcendental ego. It separates them in thought no more than it does in fact. As Dr. McCosh puts it (*Defense of Fundamental Truth*, pp. 92, 94), "Personality is the self of which we are conscious in every mental act. Personal identity is the sameness of the conscious self as perceived at different times. The phrases do not point to some unknown essence, apart from or behind the known thing. They simply designate an essential, abiding element of the thing known. . . . . We do not refer mental states to the Self, we know it in a particular state. We do not figure Self as

remaining the same, we judge or decide the conscious Self of to-day to be the same as the conscious Self of yesterday remembered by us. It does not reveal itself through feelings, we know it as feeling, the one being as immediate as the other." In short, the distinct identical unit that self-consciousness seems to reveal to each one is real. The empirical self is personality itself in exercise. The truth of this position is established by the following considerations among others:

1. The burden of proof rests on those who would deny personality. The doctrine of Personality as it has been expounded meets the necessities of the case. It is admitted that, if it were true, it would explain the phenomena of self-consciousness which most demand explanation. That is, if each one of us be a real person, it is easy to see why each one is conscious of himself as an identical unit. It is just as easy as to understand why, if a real tree be before you, you behold a tree. In both cases, and in both equally, the knowledge is, according to the hypothesis, "the reflex of reality." You perceive the tree because there is a tree to be perceived, and you are conscious of the phenomena of personality because that of which you are conscious is a person. Thus, this explanation, if true, would be satisfactory. Moreover, it is the only one that is so. We have carefully examined the other theories of the soul, and we have found them to be inadequate as well as inconsistent with themselves and unjust to the phenomena for which they would account. Surely, then, it devolves on the advocates of these theories to show why the doctrine of Personality is not the true one. When an hypothesis seems to explain the facts in question and when there is no other hypothesis at hand that is either valid or sufficient, the presumption is always in favor of the former. The law of parsimony so requires.

2. The objections to personality have only to be examined to be seen to be at least empty. Take, for example, the criticism which Prof. James says has never been "made so beautifully" as by Lotze (Lotze's *Metaphysics*, p. 431); namely, that the common doctrine of personality involves the "utterly inconceivable position that we must look for the what of a thing in something else than in what the thing is and does." This, however, is not the view that we have expounded and would defend. It is nothing more nor less than Kant's famous theory of "the thing in itself," the untenable agnosticism of which was sufficiently exposed in the first paper of this series. What we have all along insisted on is that we know the thing itself "in what it is and does" and that we cannot know it otherwise. We do not believe that there is a self and that it is an identical unit merely because the phenomena

of self-consciousness seem to imply this, but chiefly because in the phenomena of self-consciousness it is precisely this self that we behold. We do not know mental states and exercises as such: if we do sometimes reason about them in themselves, it is only as the result of a process of abstraction. What each one of us does know is a person in mental states and exercises. These do not simply presuppose personality; they express it. There is no personality apart from them. We do not claim that an identical unit must underlie them: we do claim that they are the thoughts and exercises of an identical unit. It and they are as truly one as are life and its necessary activities. The objection, therefore, is empty. There is nothing in it but misconception.

Take, again, the objection that the doctrine of personality is contradicted by many of the more striking mental phenomena. Thus it is claimed that thought-transference, mesmeric influences, and spirit-control are fatal to rational belief in the absolute unity or strict insulation of the self. They indicate that at least some personal consciousnesses are not closed individuals. It should be remembered, however, that observations of these phenomena have scarcely yet been sufficiently numerous, even if sufficiently attested, to be the basis for trustworthy induction. It may well be questioned, too, whether these cases would, in any event, prove more than the influence of souls on each other. But this is not disputed. It is not pretended that personality is "impervious" in any such sense as this. Here also, therefore, the objection has nothing in it save misconception. So, too, it is often asserted that the unconsciousness of sleep, swoons, etc., is inconsistent with personal identity. The self, it is said, cannot continue the same: for there is no consciousness at all of self when one is asleep or is in a faint. This objection, however, confounds two things that are radically different, the identity of the self and the consciousness of that identity. It infers that there cannot be the former without the latter, whereas it should inquire whether there is not evidence that the former continues even when the latter is suspended. Any other course is as absurd as if one were to conclude that a tree ceased to exist when he ceased to look at it. Now the evidence just referred to is not only at hand, but is entirely satisfactory. Indeed, it is precisely in the case of sleep and of swoons that the identity of the self appears most clearly. Why is it that on awakening from sleep or on coming out of a swoon one feels himself to be the very same self that went to sleep or that fell into a swoon? It is because, and it could be only because, he is the very same person. You must be the same, considered as the object of consciousness, or you could not recognize yourself as such: just as

you would not and could not judge in the morning that the furniture in your room was the same if it had been changed during the night: and you must continue the same, considered now as the subject of consciousness, or you could not regard yourself as such; for only a subject that has remained identical with itself can compare itself with itself and so come to the judgment of identity. Thus the interruption of the consciousness of personal identity by sleep or by a swoon is the demonstration of its reality. If we did not continue the same, we could not return to consciousness as the same.

Once more, take the objection raised by Prof. James (*Psychology*, i, p. 347), that "the soul is an outbirth of that sort of philosophizing whose great maxim, according to Dr. Hodgson, is: 'Whatever you are *totally* ignorant of, assert to be the explanation of everything else.'" In what sense, however, are we ignorant of the soul? We cannot, it is true, resolve it into simpler elements. We cannot define it in terms of matter. But this is only what we should expect, if personality be ultimate, if the soul be, as we have all along claimed, a pure manifestation of mind. The difficulty is not that we do not know personality. We do know it as thinking, as feeling, as willing; as conscious of itself; as conscious of itself as an identical unit. We know it itself, as we shall see presently, more directly and surely than we know anything else. The so-called difficulty, however, is that we know personality as that which must be irresolvable and indefinable, because there is nothing simpler into which to resolve it or by which to define it. But what is this, if not the demonstration of the fitness of personality to be the explanation of mental phenomena at least? Thus the objection in question, by calling attention to the ultimate character of personality, confirms in no small measure the position of this paper. An explanation to be adequate must be by means of what is ultimate.

3. This position is positively affirmed by the great body of reputable philosophers and also by mankind in general. It was held, at any rate in its essence, by Plato and Aristotle. "It received its completely formal elaboration in the Middle Ages." It was believed by Descartes, Locke, Leibnitz, Wolf, Berkeley. "Kant adhered to it while denying its fruitfulness as a premise for deducing consequences verifiable here below." By no one in ancient or modern times has it been more clearly and forcibly expounded than by McCosh, and by no one has it been so happily stated as by him. It is now defended by the entire dualistic or spiritualistic or common-sense school. Beyond this, "we meet," says Lotze (*Metaphysics*, p. 238), "with the word soul in the languages

of all civilized peoples; and this proves that the imagination of man must have had reasons of weight for its supposition, that there is an existence of some special nature underlying the phenomena of the inner life as their subject or cause." Even those who would deny personality cannot speak without implying it. Of course, this universal consent does not of itself demonstrate it. Errors have been believed by the whole world, and false theories have been advocated by the greatest philosophers. Still, as Illingworth has said, "whatever we may think of the 'argument from universal consent,' taken by itself, it must distinctly be allowed weight when it corroborates and is corroborated by philosophical analysis." Now it is thus with Personality. That it has received assent for so long and so widely, as well as from minds so acute and so profound, is a strong argument for it because there are the best of reasons why it should be thus assented to. In the first place, the other theories, as we have seen, are not tenable. In the second place, this theory is practically unavoidable. As we observed at the outset, its denial would involve impossible results. It would mean, that all the social distinctions on which social progress depends were unreal; that the whole moral sphere was, as the Hindu pantheist holds that it is, an illusion; that theology was robbed of its subjects and religion, consequently, of its life; and that reasoning itself was absurd just in proportion as it was logical. These positions, however, we cannot accept. We may try to do so and we may even believe that we do so, but our actions will belie us. We cannot practically deny personality any more than we can practically deny reality or duality. Just as we are constrained, whatever may be our theories, to live as if we were in a real world and as if the distinction between mind and matter were real; so, whatever may be our views, we cannot help acting as if we stood in relation to persons. To do otherwise is impossible; for it would be to go against the ultimate self-evident reality of things. As well might the open eye pretend not to see when in the light. The necessity of vision under such circumstances evinces as self-evident the fact of vision. Now it is precisely at this point that the force of the "argument from universal consent" is felt. It proves that the necessity of our belief in personality is not due to a mere idiosyncrasy, but is a real necessity. Otherwise, why should the great body of philosophers, though differing much in other respects among themselves, formally hold this belief? and especially, why should men the world over, irrespective of their theoretical views, always act as though they were real persons and be unable to act as though they were not? A belief which is thus universally necessary must be a really

necessary belief; and, as we saw in the first paper of this series, real necessity in the case of a belief can be explained only on the ground that it is self-evident. When we see a precipice immediately before us, we cannot, if in our senses, help stopping, just because it is self-evident that it is before us. Thus, as the case is, the truth of personality could scarcely receive stronger confirmation than it does from this "argument from general consent." It testifies to the real necessity of the belief in personality and so implies the self-evidence of its truth.

4. This self-evidence of the truth of personality may be clearly manifested. Indeed, it is clearly manifested to all who will see it. Every one knows what we call self. When we feel pain, we are conscious of ourselves as feeling it. We feel that it is *our* pain. When we perceive the approach of danger, we are conscious of its relation to us. We perceive it as danger to *ourselves*. When we reason we are conscious of *ourselves* as reasoning. It is *our* argument. In a word, self is something from which no man can really escape. Let him but think, and he cannot help becoming conscious of the self that thinks. This is not disputed. Even Mr. Mill, the ablest champion of the Associationist theory, defines the mind as "a series of feelings aware of itself."

Now this consciousness of self is consciousness of a person. The very essence of the consciousness is individuality, unity, identity. We feel that we are not the pain that we feel. There is a sharp distinction between it and us. We feel that we are not the tree that we perceive. There is a sharp distinction between it and us. We feel that we are not the thought that we think. There is a sharp distinction between it and us. More than this, we are conscious of self as distinguished from its organs or instruments. Consciousness refuses to identify it with the nerve-cells and brain currents by means of which it may be proved to express itself. Though we learn that the material of these is constantly changing so that we do not have the same nerves or cells or brain currents that we did have or shall have, we know, too, and it is the one thing that we cannot bring ourselves practically to deny, that our self is the same self that was and that will be; that though everything is changing about ourselves and in ourselves, our identity remains; and that, consequently, the self of which ultimately we are conscious is an individuality distinct from all else, even from the cells or vesicles of its own brain, that is to say, is a spirit. If to some this may seem to be enlarging on the testimony of self-consciousness, the answer is that it is not enlarging on it; it is only formulating and unfolding it. Every one is practically conscious, we had almost said is specially conscious, of the distinc-

tion between himself and his own body. But this is not all on which self-consciousness insists. We are conscious of personality with reference to spirit as well as with reference to matter. Perhaps it is of personality in this respect that we have the most lively consciousness. We feel that we are peculiarly distinct from all other men, from all other spirits. We never lose our personal identity, however large may become our circle of acquaintances. We sometimes wish that we could. In the case of those who love one another profoundly the consciousness of personality with its implied individuality and identity is frequently painful. Persons may be so intensely one in heart as to chafe that they cannot also be one in essence. Indeed, it is when the consciousness of self is strongest because most painful that the sense of personality is keenest. Specially is this so in relation to God. It is usually when we strive the hardest to lose ourselves in Him that our own personality stands out the most clearly.

And how, even ordinarily, it does stand out! As Prof. Ladd says (*Philosophy of Knowledge*, p. 199), "An immediateness of knowledge which surpasses that with which I know myself as here and now existent, cannot be gained by any sharpening or spurring of the mental faculties. Nor can any truer and surer envisagement of reality be made even an object of imagination. Indeed, all that I conceive of as 'intuitive,' as doing away with all barriers between knowing subject and reality known, is conceived of after the type of my experience with myself. How can angels, or even God, know anything more indubitably and transparently given, object to subject, in the unity of the embrace of cognition than is my here-and-now existence to my here-and-now existent-self?" How, then, may the reality of personality be denied? To do so is to contradict precisely that testimony of consciousness which, as Prof. Ladd elsewhere remarks in substance, is clearest and strongest. In a word, not to accept personality as being the distinct identical entity that it seems to us to be in our consciousness of self is to set aside of all realities the most self-evident.

5. But even this is not all. It is to set aside that reality which, as it were, gives form to all other realities, which, indeed, gives us the very idea of reality. As Prof. Ladd says in the quotation made above from him, "all that I can conceive of as 'intuitive' . . . . is conceived of after the type of my experience with myself." As Illingworth has written (*Personality Human and Divine*, p. 32), "There can be no question whatever that our whole idea of substance, as the permanent substratum which underlies and connects a variety of attributes into that unity

which we call a 'thing,' is derived exclusively from our own experience of a permanent self, underlying (or understanding) all our affections and manifestations," and, as I would add, revealing its very self to them. In like manner, it is from our own consciousness of self as willing and so energizing that we derive our idea of power. And our belief in God—is it not rooted in and determined by our sense of personal dependence on a being who, though infinite, must still be a person? Surely, then, if we are realists, we are bound to hold to personality as well as to duality. Personality is not only the most self-evident of all realities; it is also, in the profound sense just considered, the reality of reality.

PRINCETON. W. BRENTON GREENE, JR.

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I.

DR. ABRAHAM KUYPER.*

I.

IT goes without saying that the following pages do not contain everything that might well be said about Dr. Kuyper. What

* [We depart from our ordinary custom of publishing only fresh articles written expressly for the REVIEW, in order to give our readers a translation of this, no doubt somewhat inadequate, account of Dr. Kuyper's life up to 1888 by Jhr. Mr. Witsius H. de Savornin Lohman. In Dutch it forms one of the issues of a series of booklets published by H. D. Tjeenk Willink at Haarlem, under the editorship of Dr. E. D. Pijzel, and designed to describe the *Mannen van Beteekenis in Onze Dagen;* and it appeared as long ago as 1889. This early date, of course, detracts seriously from the completeness of the sketch: for so far from Dr. Kuyper having been idle during the last decade, this is precisely the period of his greatest activity and of his greatest achievements in Church and State—including his breach with the State Church and his successful leading of a large body of "Doleerenden" (as his followers were suggestively called) out of its bondage and finally into union with the "Christian Reformed Churches," so forming the strong existing body of free churches known as the "Gereformeerde Kerken." Mr. Witsius Lohman has, however, given a fair account of Dr. Kuyper's teachings during the earlier years of his public activity, and the facts that the stress of the sketch is laid rather on Dr. Kuyper's political program than on his theological work and that it is written distinctly for a Dutch audience, we are persuaded, constitute an apparent rather than real drawback to its usefulness. For Dr. Kuyper is about to make himself known to the American public in his work as a theologian—not only in the course of "Stone Lectures" on *Calvinism* which he will deliver before the Theological Seminary at Princeton this autumn, but in the translation of a portion of his *Encyclopædia of Sacred Theology* just now appearing from the press of Charles Scribner's Sons: and there may be some danger that we should not realize that he has long been as significant a figure in the political life of present-day Holland as in its theological thought. This essay may be taken, therefore, as supplying in some sort a preliminary preparation for the knowledge of the man which we shall derive from his

IV.

THE METAPHYSICS OF CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS.

IV. Morality.

WE have now discussed the first three of the fundamental truths of Christian apologetics. We have, as we think, established Reality, or the truth that what we term substance is not mere appearance, but has being of its own; Duality, or the truth that substance is of two kinds, essentially different and mutually exclusive, mind and matter; and Personality, or the truth that mind, in one of its forms at least, exists as self-conscious entities that we call persons. Thus far, then, we have confined ourselves to the sphere of the actual. The questions that we have asked have been: Is there Reality? Of how many sorts is it? What are the characteristics of these? In every case our inquiry has been as to what *is*, and only as to what is. In taking up the fourth of the fundamental truths of Christian apologetics, however, we enter a radically different sphere. In simply mentioning Morality, we pass at once from the actual to the ideal. The question immediately concerns, not what is, but what *ought* to be. Duty, not fact, engages our attention.

But what is meant by duty, which the word ought is felt by all to express? This needs to be clearly determined; for, as has just been implied, morality is rooted in the idea of oughtness and grows through the practical recognition of the particular duties in which oughtness unfolds itself. No definition, however, may be attempted. Like all words designating knowledge given directly in intuition, ought cannot be analytically defined. As in the case of being or reality, there is nothing simpler into which to resolve it and by which to explain it. Yet while this is so, it does not follow that it cannot be discerned. On the contrary, it is known intuitively, and it is thus known as certainly as reality is. In short, the idea of oughtness, as that of reality, is so simple that, if no definition is possible, so none is required. Moreover, though the idea of oughtness cannot be defined, it can be described. We cannot classify it by referring it to any genus, but we can point out

the features characteristic of all the species, so to speak, which it itself embraces. These features are three. First, oughtness necessarily calls attention to an ideal. It points, not to the actual, but to what is presented as a standard for the actual. When I say, You are honest, I affirm honesty to be a trait of your character. When I say, You ought to be honest, I affirm honesty to be an essential of the standard for your character. I refer, not to what you are, but to that which sustains such a relation to what you are as to be to you an obligatory ideal: and it is the fact of this relationship, and so the objectivity, as well as the binding force, of the particular ideal to which it relates you, that my use of the word ought indicates. Secondly, oughtness implies free-agency. You may say, Thou oughtest only to a free-agent. An ideal is possible only for a self-determining being. Thus one who has been mesmerized is not blameworthy, even though he does what in his case before he was mesmerized would have been a grievous sin. The reason is, not that he has not violated what was his true ideal, but that it is an ideal for him no longer. Just so soon as his will passed under the control of the mesmerizer he became incapable of having an ideal. Thou oughtest might be said to him no more than to a stone. With the loss of self-determination he left at once the sphere of morality. Free-agency, however, is not so much a further characteristic of the moral as it is the other side of it. If, on the one hand, ought, as we have seen, by expressing the relation between ourselves and our ideal, affirms its existence and binding force for each one of us; on the other hand, by bringing us thus into relation to an ideal, it declares our power of self-determination. It would not, therefore, be incorrect to say that morality in its objective reference points to an obligatory ideal, and that in its subjective reference it emphasizes free-agency; or, as Pres. Patton has put it (*The Pres. Rev.*, Vol. vii, No. xxv, p. 134), "in the idea of oughtness there is involved, not only an obligatory Ideal, but a Free-Agent." Thirdly, morality always supposes personality. Only to a self-conscious being, a person, may Thou oughtest be said. This is so because the obligatory ideal implied in Thou oughtest becomes meaningless except in the case of one who, in addition to being by nature able to recognize it as an ideal and particularly as an ideal binding on himself, can also compare himself with it and then try to bring himself up to it, and so make it the practical ideal that he has already felt it to be. For this reason a beast's life must be non-moral. Though he determines himself, he can do so only as he pleases; he cannot do so as he ought. An obligatory ideal is impossible for him, inasmuch as he is not self-

conscious. Since he cannot compare himself with it, it could have no force, and so has no existence, in his case. Such, then, are the three essential features of what we may call the sphere of oughtness as distinguished from that of actuality. Whenever they are combined we may and must say, Thou oughtest. Let even one of them, however, be absent, and ought cannot be used without nonsense. Of these three features the third, Personality, has been discussed, and its truth vindicated, as we believe, in the paper immediately preceding this in this series. In order to the establishment of the basis of morality two questions, therefore, remain for consideration; viz., the inquiry as to an objective obligatory ideal and the inquiry as to free-agency. These, then, must now claim our attention.

I. Their supreme importance appears, first of all, in their relation to apologetics. They form the very foundation of that one of the arguments for God which most philosophers have regarded as the strongest, and which Kant pronounced the only valid one. Could it be shown that there is no ideal obligatory on us; that ought meant originally no more than what is best for us, and that ought not meant only dread of punishment; in a word, that Bain's or Spencer's account of the genesis of these ideas is true—could this be established, the Moral Argument for God, at least in its common form, would fall. The idea of oughtness, on which it is built, the categorical imperative on which it rests, would not be entitled to much respect, and certainly could not be the ground for our belief in a righteous Law-giver and Governor of the universe, if we were obliged to admit that in reality they were only the last counsel of a "take care of number one" policy. Hence, the necessity of vindicating the intuitional character of oughtness. Deny the moral law which it emphasizes, and men will at once begin to ask, Why should we, nay, how can we, believe in a Moral Ruler of the world? Do away with duty, and you will seem to do away with God.

The importance of the questions under consideration is seen quite as clearly in dogmatics. Not only does this everywhere proceed on the great facts of an objective obligatory ideal for men and of their free-agency, but it is in its relation to morality that it finds its explanation. Thus the historic events of which its doctrines are the interpretation were all in order to holiness, to the complete realization of that which ought to be. For example, Christ came from heaven to earth, "not to destroy, but to fulfill the law," our obligatory ideal. He died that we might become "holy and without blemish before Him in love." We are justified on the ground of His sacrificial blood that we may be sancti-

fied by the inworking of His Spirit. The redemption which is in Christ is, therefore, fundamentally and throughout moral, the doing what, in view of our sin, ought to be done by God, if He would express His love for us by enabling us to become what, in view of our relation to Him, we ought to be. According to what we believe to be the Word of God, it could not be otherwise. God is invariably represented as essentially moral, as always and in all respects all that He ought to be, as thus the absolute ideal. Undermine morality, consequently, by denying what we have seen to be its basal facts, and Christian theology is left without its reason or end, nay, its very substance is evaporated. It is nothing, if it be not the theology of morality, and it is preëminently *the* moral theology. It is rooted in oughtness, it grows only in the atmosphere of oughtness, its fruit is the perfection of oughtness. The love of Christ is essentially righteous.

Again, the importance of the inquiries that we are prosecuting appears in their relation to human destiny. The immortality of the soul could scarcely have been imagined save from the moral standpoint; and certainly its defense will be most feeble if conducted on any other than the moral basis. It is only when we regard ourselves as self-determining beings, so created that we may realize the divine ideal for us—it is not until then that the opportunities of the life that now is, for our moral development, for our reward, for our punishment, become so self-evidently insufficient that it is felt that reason itself demands the life everlasting. In a word, let a man deny that he is self-determining, and that he is under law to determine himself according to law, and he can hardly help admitting that he is to die as the dog dies. Even thus is our hope for the future a moral one. It can find little nourishment outside the moral sphere.

This suggests the immense importance of the questions under discussion even to the most practical interests of the present life. Our attitude toward this depends very largely on our belief with respect to the future. Hence, the Epicurean maxim, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." Nothing so certainly robs life here of its value as the thought that there will be no life hereafter. And so it is that the foundations of morality, inasmuch as they are also the natural foundations of the hope of immortality, are the necessary bases of individual and social prosperity and happiness. This is so, indeed, directly, as well as because of the relation of morality to our views concerning the future. What, for example, would be the effect on us, did we really believe, that we had lost the power of self-determination; that we were mere creatures of circumstance; that we were swept along irresistibly by the forces

up the stream of our descent? All stimulus to effort would at once be destroyed. Unable even to influence our development, why should we strive to be other than we are? Why should we endeavor to realize our ideal, to make the most of ourselves, to bring in the kingdom of God? There could be no ideal obligatory on us, no law for us, no goal for our attainment. Life would be absolutely devoid of interest. It would mean no more for us than it does for the stone. Nor would it be materially different, though the power of self-determination were preserved. It is the obligatory ideal that gives to this power its worth and, to a high degree, its value. Suppose that we had no other basis of choice than our present likes and dislikes. Suppose that we had no conception of a law above us and a corresponding ideal within us demanding our obedience and devotion. Suppose that we had never heard and could not hear the solemn but majestic imperative, Thou oughtest. How would our self-determination differ essentially from that of the hog turning himself from his rooting to the garbage that he craves? How would our life be nobler than that of the beast that perishes? How would human progress be possible? How would civilization be even conceivable? They are, therefore, no questions of merely theoretical interest that come before us when we undertake the vindication of the bases of morality. On the contrary, they are inquiries on the answer to which depend the validity of much of Christian apologetics, the existence of Christian dogmatics, the natural hope of immortality, even the present well-being of man and the very continuance of human society.

Nor here in the moral sphere any more than elsewhere may it be urged that practice is independent of belief and that, consequently, it is of no great importance what views are held on the questions that we are considering. Indeed, it is in the moral sphere as nowhere else that mistakes in thinking issue in disease, death, and corruption. This is the explanation of the pessimism of India. Life has lost all value to its millions because it has lost all dignity, and its glory has thus departed because of the pantheism in which for centuries the Hindus have been trained. They have ceased to regard themselves self-determining. So, too, the sensational philosophy issued in sensualism. Even had human freedom not been denied, men could not long have continued to strive toward a supersensible ideal when they were taught that the senses were the only inlets of knowledge. Let us therefore take up at once these two questions with reference to which it is of such supreme practical moment that the truth should be exactly ascertained and resolutely held.

II. The first of these relates to the *objective Obligatory Ideal.*

That we may confine the discussion within the narrow limits permitted, we will consider:

1. The Status Questionis.—Our inquiry, then, is not concerned with the genesis of the sense of oughtness. When and how this sense emerges, when and how the child first becomes conscious of the difference between I want and I ought, when and how he rises from the intuition of this distinction in individual cases to the conception of the general law which they reveal—this it would be interesting and useful to determine; but it is aside from our purpose. It is a psychological rather than a metaphysical study. Nor is the question as to the efficient cause of the sense of oughtness, and of the law and ideal which it implies. We know that these point to God as their author. Conscience is not His voice, but it calls attention to His "law written on the heart." This, however, though a truth which is second to none in importance, is not so fundamental as that which is before us. It is theological rather than metaphysical. Nor, again, does the inquiry refer to the ground of the obligatory ideal. What is that which makes it what it is? What is the ultimate test of right? Why ought we to do this? Why ought we not to do that? This ground of duty, this test of right, we find in the divine nature as expressed in the divine will for us. We ought to do what God has commanded, and, in our sphere and measure, to be what He is; and we ought thus to be holy because He is holy. Yet these truths, profound though they are, may not claim vindication at our hands. They belong to ethics, not to metaphysics. Nor, once more, does the question relate to the end or purpose of the obligatory ideal. Clearly its design is that we may become like the God who has given it to us and whose nature is its ground. But this truth, while of the highest practical worth, we may not develop. It is religious; it is not metaphysical. In opposition to all these inquiries, psychological, theological, ethical, and religious, the one to which we must now address ourselves is metaphysical. It underlies and conditions all the questions just named. It is simply this, *Is there an objective obligatory ideal?* There seems to be. Conscience calls attention to it. Consciousness testifies to nothing more clearly than to its imperative. Is this testimony, however, trustworthy? Is there really a law above us and a corresponding ideal within us that we ought to obey in spite of consequences; or can this idea of duty be so explained that what is unique in it, its oughtness and the implied objective law and ideal, will be explained away?

2. There are those who claim that it can be. They may be divided, speaking generally, into the following three schools, the

first two of which, at least at present, usually to a greater or less extent, combine their methods:

The Associationists.—These would get rid of an obligatory ideal by resolving the idea of duty into the idea of happiness, and they would identify the former idea with the latter by means of the principle of association. This class of moralists, though foreshadowed by Hobbes, had its real beginning, at any rate in modern times, with John Locke. He opened the way for it in his well-known denial of what he conceived to be the doctrine of innate ideas. This he applied to ethics as well as to psychology. "Moral principles," says he (i, 3), "are even further removed than intellectual ones from any title to be innate." His successor Hartley rejected the intellectual side of his philosophy and developed a materialistic psychology. Indeed, he affirms (i, 360) that "all our most complex ideas arise from sensation, and reflection is not a distinct source, as Mr. Locke makes it." According to Hartley, therefore, "there exists no morality founded on the eternal reasons and relations of things, but all notions of right and wrong proceed from association alone, from clusters of ideas which are only modified sensations—all affection as well as all reasoning being the mere result of association" (i, 499). That is, believing with Locke that happiness was the principle of morals, whatever experience showed to be conducive to pleasurable feelings he regarded as obligatory, and he explained how the idea of duty came to appear original and independent on the ground that the idea which forms the link of association may be forgotten though the association itself continues. Thus the idea of honesty is associated with the idea of pleasure by being the best, the most pleasure-producing policy. This fact, however, may be lost sight of but the association remain; and then honesty will be practiced, and will seem to be considered obligatory, for itself; because it is a duty, and not because it is expedient. It is as in the case of the miser and his money. To others and to himself he appears to love it for itself. Yet really he began to love it for the conveniences which it supplied. The chain of association holds, though the link of utility is no longer perceived. By Hartley, then, the obligatory ideal is resolved into such conduct as we have found associated with pleasurable sensations. This empirical and arbitrary view of obligation was buttressed by Hume. In his celebrated doctrine of causation he denied all connection between cause and effect except a merely customary one. A virtuous act he regarded as such, not because it was fitted to arouse a feeling of satisfaction in us, but simply because experience showed that the latter generally followed the former. Thus to Hume's mind

honesty was right only for the reason that it usually turned out to be best. It was neither right in itself nor in itself adapted, so far as we cold say, to promote prosperity. It was found to do so: hence it became a duty. Should dishonesty appear to have the same result, it would be equally a duty. This travesty of duty Paley tried to spiritualize by substituting for individual sensations of pleasure or feelings of approbation the everlasting happiness of heaven. He defined virtue as "the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, for the sake of everlasting happiness." In the final analysis, therefore, he made the oughtness of a state or action to depend on its association with, or rather its tendency toward, the individual's eternal glory; and according to him, the only essential difference between the saint and the sinner was that the former was wise and the latter foolish. Paley's contemporary Bentham developed this school of morals along quite different lines. On the one hand, he went back and affirmed the Epicurean doctrine that pleasure was the chief good. On the other hand, he went forward and made the true principle of morals to be, not even the everlasting happiness of the individual, but what he called "the greatest good of the greatest number." A further and scarcely consistent step was taken by John Stuart Mill. "Departing from the original idea of his predecessor, that pleasure is the only good, and that pleasures differ from one another only in intensity, he interpolated into the general idea of quantity of happiness the discriminating idea of quality." Regard for the highest happiness rather than for the greatest amount of pleasure he made the spring of moral action. He even allowed as a psychological fact that virtue may become "a good in itself, without looking to any end beyond it," and that the mind is not in a right state unless it love virtue "as a thing desirable in itself." Yet that, though speaking thus, he continued an associationist appears in this, that he sought to account for the phenomena referred to by his famous principle of the chemistry of the association of ideas. "The only color for representing our moral judgments as the result of a peculiar part of our nature, is that our feelings of moral approbation and disapprobation are really peculiar feelings. But is it not notorious that peculiar feelings, unlike any others we have experience of, are created by association every day?" (*Dis.*, pp. 139, 140). That is, while admitting that the idea of duty is now distinct from the idea of happiness, he, too, claims that it *was* identical with it. Whatever resulted in the highest happiness was duty. This was the explanation of oughtness. The doing of duty has come to be regarded as a part of happiness and so as in itself an end and thus to be

done for its own sake, only because of its invariable association with the highest happiness. In this manner is it attempted to explain away our obligatory ideal. The categorical imperative seems to refer to an objective and absolute law, but it is merely for the reason that we mistake for this the desire for the happiness which results from obedience to it. In reality, right is only the highest expediency; the sense of duty is only the sense of prudence; the moral law is only the rule of wisdom. What ought I to do? is only the polite way of asking, What will pay? There is no objective obligatory ideal. The idea of oughtness originates in our feelings of pleasure and pain.

To this widely prevalent theory the following objections, if appreciated, would seem to be fatal. The distinction between high and low pleasures which Mr. Mill introduces and which makes him the most attractive and plausible of associationists is suicidal to him and to his school. To see this it is necessary simply to remember that the essential difference in the quality of high and low pleasures is not a matter to be ascertained by any experience, but, as Blackie says (*Four Phases of Morals*, p. 348), "springs directly out of the intellectual and emotional nature of man, asserting its own innate superiority precisely as light asserts itself over darkness, and order over confusion." That is, the reason why there are high and low pleasures is that there are beings such that we may speak of them as in themselves high or low. Thus intellectual pleasures are not pleasures at all to a pig, because a pig is incapable of them, and a bad man can see nothing desirable in virtue by itself because he is incapable of such delight. It is the fact that a pig is a pig, which makes us say that his pleasures are and must be low. It is the fact that a man is a man which makes us say that his pleasures, if appropriate to him, are high and that all his pleasures should be so. It is the fact that a good man is good which makes us say that his pleasures are the highest of all. To regard, therefore, with Mr. Mill, the highest happiness as the *sole* principle of morals is to contradict yourself. Not as a principle or otherwise can the highest happiness be even conceived by itself. It necessarily presupposes another and independent principle by conformity with which it is seen to be the highest. That there is innate in man an ideal—this it is that renders his pleasure higher than that of the creatures below him and enables us to discriminate between the happiness of different men as higher and lower.

Moreover, this distinction must be introduced. By introducing it Mr. Mill contradicted his theory, but by not introducing it his predecessors contradicted common sense. The distinction as to the quality of pleasures is so real, so palpable, that to ignore it

argues imbecility or willful perversity or both. It is absurd to say that the only difference between the happiness of the London roué and the happiness of Mr. Gladstone was that the latter had more of it. It is equally absurd, as Blackie writes, to regard "a Joseph Mazzini consecrating his whole life with the most intense enthusiasm to the ideal of a possible Italian republic as being as much an Epicurean as David Hume sneering at all enthusiasm, and pleasing his soul with the delicate flatteries of fair dames in a Parisian saloon. This is to confound all things, and to reduce the whole affair to a fence of words rather than to a battle of principle." In short, this qualitative distinction must be recognized, and that it cannot be recognized without invalidating the theory that we are considering is certainly fatal to the theory.

Were this not so, however, its refutation would be easy on other grounds. Its instrument is the association of ideas, and this cannot do what is required. For example, what is demanded on this theory is that the sensation of pleasure shall be changed into the idea of oughtness. This is what the associationist claims has taken place. We come to regard as obligatory what we at first looked on as desirable only. Now can the mere association of ideas effect this wonderful transformation of a feeling into an idea so radically different from it? We claim that it cannot. Give us mere sensations of pleasure, and no reproduction of them, even through association, will make of them more than ideas of pleasure. Things are not altered by uniting them, and no more are ideas and feelings by associating them. An apple and an orange will be only an apple and an orange when looked at together, and the idea of honesty and the idea of pleasure will be only the idea of honesty and the idea of pleasure when thought of together. The laws of association can explain why they come to be thought of together, but that is all. Nor does Mr. Mill help matters when he represents the association of ideas as "a process of a similar kind to chemical operations" (*Logic*, B. vi, c. iv, § 3). The comparison is not justified by the facts. See what is implied in the production of a new body by chemical composition. There is one element, oxygen, for example, with its properties, and another element, hydrogen, with its properties, a mutual action in which there is potential energy expended, and a new product with its properties; and it is this mutual action, which we name chemical affinity and whose laws we try to determine, that causes the new element. In the association of ideas, however, it is quite different. We have two ideas, the idea, we will say, of honesty, and the idea of prosperity; and because these two ideas are found to follow one another, we are told that there results the third and dissimilar

idea of the obligation to honesty. But this is a *non-sequitur*. Ideas are not elements with properties. Above all, the mutual action of the combined elements, involving the operation of electricity, or of some one of the correlated forces of the universe, is not observable in the case of the association of ideas. That is, what makes the new product when chemical elements are properly combined appears to be absent even when ideas are rightly associated. At the very point that is essential, therefore, the comparison breaks down. It follows, consequently, that the instrument of this theory is not what it is cracked up to be. Indeed, it is quite ineffective. It can explain how it is that ideas rise together in thought: but it cannot give the new idea which it must originate, if the theory is to hold. It can tell us why it is easy for us to think of certain things as obligatory, but it cannot tell us how the idea of oughtness came to be in our minds.

Were even this not so, however, the situation would be practically the same. Let association do all that is asked of it, still the associationists could not save themselves. The cornerstone of their system is that "pleasure is the chief good," and that all our desires may be reduced to the desire for happiness. But is this so? Does not the claim that it is rest on a false psychology? What is the meaning of the conflict which every one experiences and which more than all else distinguishes human life from other life, the conflict between duty and pleasure, between what we feel that we ought to do and what we would like to do? This conflict is either real or unreal. If it be real, it implies two distinct and, in the case at issue, antagonistic principles. If it be unreal, then human life is but a farce. That in it which gives to it its dignity and meaning is a delusion.

Finally, the cornerstone of the theory under review rests on a foundation that is no foundation. This is sensationalism. As we noticed at the outset, associationists would find the origin of moral distinctions, as of all distinctions, in the feelings. This, however, is to put the cart before the horse. "A feeling presupposes some reality present to consciousness or contemplated in thought." Thus sugar is not saccharine because it is agreeable to the taste; it is agreeable to the taste because it is saccharine. In like manner, moral feelings presuppose the knowledge and so the independent existence of moral distinctions. Thus virtue is not right because it gives satisfaction; it gives satisfaction because it is right. In short, the sense of oughtness, so far from being capable of resolution into some other feeling, itself, as a feeling, presupposes the knowledge of an objective obligatory ideal. That is, the associationist would explain away the idea of duty by what itself involves it.

The Social Evolutionists.—According to this school, man becomes social by development, and as he does so he becomes moral. Evolution, not association, as in the theory just discussed, plays the chief part, sympathy takes the place of selfishness, and, above all, it is our ancestral experience, and not merely our experience as individuals, that is considered. The sense of oughtness is not due to the association of certain kinds of conduct with the gratification of our own selfish feelings: it is rather the result of ages of social evolution under the influence mainly of sympathy with others. The process of this evolution is variously set forth. It may be studied in such writers as Darwin, Wallace, Spencer, and Fiske. The exposition of the last-named is so concise, so lucid, and so representative, that an epitome of it is all that we shall attempt.

On this theory, then, as on that just noticed, there is no objective obligatory ideal. The moral sense, which seems to us to imply it, is not inherent in man. It does not pertain to him as man. In his first estate he lived for his own pleasure only; he had no moral sense. On the contrary, this is "the last and noblest product of evolution which we can ever know" (*Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, Vol. ii, p. 324). It is a mistake to regard it as an ultimate fact, "incapable of being analyzed into simpler emotional elements;" because, "though ultimate for each individual" at the present time, it is "derivative and . . . . has been built up out of slowly organized experiences of pleasures and pains" (*ibid.*, p. 327). These experiences are its "emotional antecedents," "as exhibited in ancestral types of psychical life" (*ibid.*, p. 327). So far this theory is like that just examined: both get the idea of duty from feelings of pleasure and pain. At this point, however, the difference between the two methods appears. That now under review accounts for the organization of the above-mentioned feelings into the idea of duty by the emergence and growth of sociality. With it arises the germ of the moral sense. Before man became a social being his feelings were wholly selfish or egoistic. As soon as he is a social being, however, his feelings become ego-altruistic. That is, while he still lives for his own happiness, he seeks it now in the manner in which the family, the tribe, the nation, in a word, society, regards him. The complete development of "the germ of a moral sense" which the savage thus acquires as the result of his entrance on social life has been accomplished by "the enormous expansion of sympathy due to the continued integration of communities." That is to say, the multiplication and perfection of the relationships of society increase and diversify our sympathy; and this, though, as "the

power of ideally reproducing in ourselves the pains of another," it is a kind of self-pleasing, inasmuch as what it impels us to do is to remove that which it is painful for us to see—this sympathy gradually loses this character, because it ceases to be "the power of reproducing in one's self the pain of another," and becomes the power of "representing feelings detached from the incidents of particular cases," from which power there comes the "instinctive abhorrence of actions which the organically registered experience of mankind has associated with pain or evil," a power that, "as the sympathetic feelings are extended over wider and wider areas," becomes stronger and stronger, until at last it generates "an abstract moral sense, so free from the element of personality that to grosser minds it is unintelligible" (*ibid.*, pp. 355, 356). The final stage in this process is the development of what are called the self-regarding virtues. This is reached when "ethical conceptions begin to be reflected back upon the conduct of the individual where it concerns chiefly or only himself." Hence, for example, the conviction that it is wicked to neglect one's own health or culture. Thus moral growth and perfection are the result of the sympathy which social relations stimulate.

The question, however, arises at this point, How did man become a social being and thus acquire "the germ of the moral sense"? Granted that its development has been explained, we still need to account for its origin. There is yet to be bridged the tremendous chasm between man when, according to Mr. Fiske, he was only a gregarious creature moved merely by feelings of pleasure and pain, and man when he had become a social being under the control of ideas of right and wrong, though as yet but in germ. How will even the social evolutionist make this passage? "By the threefold bridge of sympathy, remorse, and mythology." Sympathy, as has been implied, is "the power of reproducing in one's self the pleasures and pains of another person." This power is "manifested in a rudimentary form by all gregarious animals of a moderate intelligence," and it will be "strengthened and further developed when a number of individuals are brought into closer and more enduring relationships." "Given this rudimentary capacity of sympathy, we can see how family integration must alter and complicate the emotional incentives to action" (*ibid.*, p. 346). "This sympathy will affect conduct within the family or clan;" and it will affect it there because "a curb" is put upon the exercise of "brutelike predatory instincts" by "a nascent public opinion, which lauds actions beneficial to the clan and frowns upon actions detrimental to it," and which is the product of "a sense of collective pleasure or

pain." Thus "the mere animal incentives comprised in personal pleasures and pains" must be often overruled. "The good of the individual must begin to yield to the good of the community" (*ibid.*, pp. 347, 348). This process is greatly aided by remorse. It is caused by the contrast between past and weaker because selfish impressions and the ever-enduring social instincts. "The incentives to actions beneficial to the community are always steadily in operation," while "the purely selfish impulses" are "accompanied by pleasures that are brief in duration and leave behind memories of comparatively slight vividness." "Consequently, when one of the latter has been gratified, the fact that the impression which remains is weak compared with that which would have remained if one of the former had been obeyed, occasions dissatisfaction with conduct" (*ibid.*, p. 348). Thus, again, disinterested action is promoted. At the point at which some curiosity is felt concerning the causes of phenomena mythology emerges in the form of fetichism, and furnishes incentives of a mysterious and supernatural character. "The object of worship that it presents is reckoned the tutelary deity of the tribe, and is supposed to punish actions condemned by the community" (*ibid.*, p. 340). Thus is man developed out of a state of gregariousness into a state of sociality; and thus, consequently, he acquires "the germ of a moral sense." Involved in sociality, it is really the product of the sympathy, the remorse, and the mythology to which sociality itself is due.

At this point another question suggests itself. How does it happen that man is the only animal that becomes social? He is not the only gregarious animal by any means. He is not the only sympathetic gregarious animal. Here, however, is the reason. The vital difference in development just referred to is the result of the fact that when we reach man the maximum of dependence of children on their parents is reached, and so through the long continuance of this relationship of dependence the family becomes permanently organized. Then out of it arises the tribe; out of it, the nation; and out of it, society; and with it, in the men composing it, "the germ of the moral sense." Thus would the social evolutionists explain away our obligatory ideal. It is neither independent nor inherent in us. Our moral sense is nothing but "the experience of utility organized and consolidated through all past generations," and we have now the idea of duty only because our childhood is so long and so dependent.

That this theory will not accomplish its end would seem to be sufficiently evinced by the following among many considerations: It cannot account for the development of "the germ of a moral

sense." "The enormous expansion of sympathy," to whatever this may be due, is inadequate. The expansion of an idea does not alter its essential significance. If sympathy be egoistic at the start, even infinite expansion will only make it an infinite display of egoism. In a word, multiplication or expansion effects a change of quantity simply. It is, however, a change of quality which is demanded. The development of the moral sense does not, according to the hypothesis, consist in the increase of the egoistic or even of the ego-altruistic feelings. The former of these are altogether non-moral and the latter largely so. The essence of the development in question is the conversion of egoism into altruism, of regard for one's own pleasure into devotion to duty in the abstract, of hedonism into morality. In short, "the development of the germ of a moral sense," is the substitution for one thing of its contrary, if not its contradictory; and there must be more than expansion to do that. Nor is the argument affected by any amount of "generalization and detachment" from the incidents of particular cases. If sympathy were at first, as we have seen that Mr. Fiske admits it to have been, individualistic and self-regarding, it will be individualistic and self-regarding, however general and abstract it may become. To quote Mr. Kidd (*Religion and Morality*, p. 97), "the only difference between 'the pain occasioned by the sight of another's suffering' and 'the generalized and detached idea of that suffering,' is that, in the one case, we are moved by a painful sight and, in the other, by a painful imagination; and these, so far as their aim is concerned, are one and the same. They are distinctly personal in their bearing, and it is impossible to extract from either of them a moral sense that is 'free from the element of personality.' The truth is that the element of personality is the only thing that they can yield. They begin with that which is personal, and they must end with it; for nothing intervenes that can affect it." That is, the quality of a feeling is not changed by considering it apart from its occasion. Now it is precisely a change of quality which the exigencies of this theory demand. Hence, its inadequacy. But this is not all. Were it adequate, it would be fatal to itself. If it could, through the expansion and generalization of sympathy, transform individualistic egoism into abstract altruism, and so leave utterly behind all self-regarding feelings, how should we ever get the self-regarding virtues? These are impossible without self-regarding feelings. Thus social evolution breaks down in its first effort. It cannot account even for the development of the moral sense.

Again, though it could do this, it could not explain the genesis of the moral sense. The chasm between gregariousness and sociality,

and, therefore, between the hedonism and the morality which these respectively imply, cannot be bridged by sympathy, remorse, and mythology, either singly or combined. Mythology cannot do it; for this, according to the hypothesis, assumes that the gods "punish actions condemned by the community," which itself presupposes the sociality that it is introduced to explain. Remorse cannot do it: for this springs out of the contrast of past and weaker because selfish impressions with the ever-enduring social instincts, a contrast that brings retribution; and not even in the present highly developed state of society do we find that "the incentives to actions beneficial to the community are always steadily in operation" and that "the purely selfish impulses" are "accompanied by pleasures that are brief in duration and leave behind memories of comparatively slight vividness." On the contrary, we observe that men are naturally selfish and that ordinarily indulgence in selfish pleasures only stimulates the desire for them. Mr. Darwin, whom Mr. Fiske follows, has evidently studied other species of animals more accurately than he has his own. As Miss Cobbe well remarks (*Darwinism in Morals*, p. 23), "he has overlooked the vast class of intelligences which lie between baboons and philosophers." Indeed, his account of remorse does more than presuppose sociality; it is without basis on any known condition of human nature. Nor can sympathy bridge the chasm that must be crossed, if egoistic feelings are to be transformed even into ego-altruistic feelings. That it does not do this of itself is admitted; for we are told that "this power is manifested in a rudimentary form by all gregarious animals of a moderate intelligence." That sympathy is as ineffective even when developed and transformed should be as evident; for the first factor in its upward movement is "a nascent public opinion." This, however, was based on, and was organized by, "the sense of collective pleasure or pain;" it lauded "actions beneficial to the clan, and frowned on actions detrimental to it;" in a word, it was "fundamentally hedonistic, individual, and self-regarding;" it was simply the aggregate of the selfish desires of the community. What effect could it have on sympathy, but to make it even more hedonistic, individual, and self-regarding than this theory insists that it was at first? Yet were this not so, there would still have to be reckoned with the objection that we have already noticed. Does not even a nascent public opinion itself imply sociality, that is, the very thing to be accounted for? It would seem, then, that if the chasm separating gregariousness from sociality, hedonism from the germ of morality, has been crossed, it has been, as Mr. Kidd well says, "on the wings of imagination, and not by the

solid bridge of fact and proof." The bridge on which we suppose ourselves to have gone over, is made of materials which, even were they sufficiently strong, are to be found either nowhere or only on the farther brink. That is, to get sociality and its implied germ of the moral sense, social evolution must have sociality and "the germ of the moral sense." With its hedonistic starting-point it can explain sociality and the germ of the moral sense only by sociality and the germ of the moral sense.

Let all that has been said, however, go for naught. Grant, if you will, that social evolution can account both for the development and for the genesis of the germ of the moral sense, the theory will still collapse when we raise the question, Why is it that of all gregarious and sympathetic animals man is the only one to become social and moral? His long and dependent childhood cannot explain this. Childhood in the case of most animals is at first a relationship of dependence, and the mere lengthening of the term of relationship does not alter the nature of the relationship. For example, the relationship of master to servant is essentially the same after forty years that it was after ten years. It is as truly as ever a relationship of superiority and authority. In like manner, if, as is claimed on this theory, the relationship of childhood was, in the case of man as in that of other animals, a gregarious relationship, it would be gregarious and only gregarious no matter how prolonged the childhood might be made. Nor may it be replied that it is sympathy which transforms man from a gregarious to a social animal, and that our extended childhood gives to this a unique opportunity for operation. This is true, but of what avail would be this opportunity? The fact is not that sympathy transforms man from a gregarious animal into a social one. The fact is, according to Mr. Fiske, that what we may call gregarious sympathy is itself transformed into social sympathy. Time, however, as we have just seen, could effect this, only if sociality were merely a higher and purer form of gregariousness. But it is really, and on this theory avowedly, something as radically different from it as altruism is from egoism. Yet this is not all. This change in the duration of childhood of which so much is made not only could not render man a social being: it is itself because he is a social being. As Mr. Kidd says (*Morality and Religion*, p. 88), "Men do not become social because brought into certain unions, but they form these unions because they are social. Social evolution confounds cause with effect: and because it does this, it cannot account for the existence of morality, or for the presence and operation of a moral ideal and a moral sense." In short, the fatal defect of this whole scheme is that if it is to work at all, it

must start with what it is devised to explain away. It must begin with a social and moral being, if it would justify its development of sociality and morality. It must admit what implies an objective obligatory ideal, if it is not to contradict its account of the evolution of the idea of right and wrong.

The Transcendentalists.—This school is a decided advance on that of social evolution. As the latter aims, by means of social evolution, to supply what is lacking in the associationist theory taken by itself; viz., the reason why the association of ideas has a social and thus moral issue: so the transcendental philosophy tries to avoid the rocks which, as we have seen, obstruct the course of social evolution, by regarding this as dialectic rather than as biological or psychological. It is clearly recognized that any scheme of evolution which depends wholly on the forces of nature must encounter serious difficulties. Higher orders of being cannot be explained, it is felt, simply by reference to lower orders. To do so involves, to go no further, the fundamental fallacy that you can get out of a thing what is not in it; that, for example, as we have already observed, sociality can be evolved from gregariousness, though differing from it, not in degree, but in kind. This, and some other snags, dialectic evolution clears. It regards "all existence as a manifestation of the one Absolute Being, the Universal Intelligence;" and it conceives of the inherent power of this Absolute Idea as the sole agency at work in all transformations. Dialectic evolution, therefore, is not an evolving of one thing out of another and different thing; it is the progressive unfolding of the real meaning of the universal thing or rather idea. In a word, it is not so much a scheme for the construction of the world as it is a scheme for the interpretation of the world. It is not its first aim to show the development of matter into mind: it tries rather to set forth the successive steps in the self-revelation of the Absolute Idea; and the logical process whereby this is being accomplished, whereby matter and then mind are generated, is itself both the Absolute and the world, the Idea and reality. That is, whatever is real is rational, and whatever is rational is real: and the rational and real is neither more nor less than this process itself of dialectic evolution. Thus the dialectic evolutionist would identify God and the world in a universal syllogism; he would explain what is by what should be; he would read facts in the light of logic alone. As we remarked when, in the second paper of this series, we were tracing the development of the realism of Kant into the transcendental idealism of Hegel, dialectic evolution conceives of the Absolute Idea, and is so named because it so conceives of the Absolute Idea, "as con-

taining in itself the principle of difference, as having immanent in itself a 'dialectic,' or power of movement, which must develop the entire wealth of the actuality exhibited by the worlds of mind and of matter." In a word, not only is reason the prius of all things, but in their essence all things are reasonable: events correspond with logic; to be understood, what is must be read as illuminated by its rational conclusion. This is *the* truth of being.

It is also the principle of morality. This, as in the theory last considered, has its root in feeling or desire. Desire, however, has a deeper meaning. Real, it must, like all else, have the potency, if not the appearance, of the rational. Hence, the Hegelian theorem is, "Human desire is the personal in the evolution of existence." This Calderwood (*Handbook of Moral Philosophy*, p. 141), interprets thus, "The intelligent agent desires, not a thing outside himself, but self-satisfaction, that is, enlargement of being—'self-realization' in a richer experience—so reaching the end of his existence." That is, human desire, absurd though itself may often seem, is, in its essence, a demand for the fulfillment of the self or subject of the desire. It is as the premises in the syllogism, which necessitate their conclusion because they involve it and which involve it because they necessitate it. In like manner must human desire be understood. It is a demand for the rational; and this, of course, will be the realization of its unique and supreme since self-conscious subject.

The passage from mere animal desire to this consciousness of self-realization as an objective obligatory ideal is described by T. H. Green, in his *Prolegomena to Ethics* (Bk. ii, chap. i), somewhat as follows: We have "wants," and we have "impulses for the satisfaction of those wants." The rational system to which man belongs is distinguished from the animal system by "the transition from mere want to consciousness of a wanted object." This implies "the presence of the want to a subject which distinguishes itself from it, and is constant throughout successive stages of the want." In the direction of the activity of this subject under these conditions a reflective process may be discerned. "At the same time as the reflecting subject traverses the series of wants, which it distinguishes from itself, while it presents their filling as its object, there arises the idea of a satisfaction on the whole—an idea never realizable, but forever striving to realize itself in the attainment of a greater command over means to the satisfaction of particular wants." Now "it is this consciousness which yields, in the most elementary form, the conception of something that *should be*, as distinct from that which is." Thus the dialectic evolutionist would explain away the objective obligatory

ideal, of which, as he himself admits, we seem to be conscious, by resolving it into the demand involved in because rational for the desire of a person, the demand that he should be a person with all that this implies. In a word, he would show that the idea of duty is really the desire for self-realization.

This view, attractive and lofty though it is, is open at least to the following and, as it seems to us, insuperable objections. Our limits forbid more than the barest mention of them.

As we saw in the preceding paper of this series, the transcendental scheme now under consideration is hopelessly embarrassed by "the host of difficulties starting in our path when all that is commonly attributed to man is referred to the direct agency of the Absolute One." Though an imposing, it is an utterly unworkable theory of the universe. Notwithstanding that it sets out to explain all facts, it continually butts against facts, and these the most significant, which contradict it. It could not fail to do this. *À priori* speculation cannot construct even the frame of reality. As Weber remarks in his admirable criticism of Hegel (*History of Philosophy*, p. 584), "Thought is a *mode* of the creative activity of things: it is not their *principle*. It follows that the *knowledge of things* does not come from pure thought, but from thought supported and governed by experience."

This appears most clearly when we consider the fundamental principle of dialectic evolution. It is not true that whatever is real is rational, and that whatever is rational is real. It would be hard to show that all that is rational is real, but it would be harder to show that all that is real is rational. Are there not irrational desires? Do we not observe large masses of men, not only degraded, but degrading themselves? Is not oppression frequent? Is not tyranny common? Do we not meet evil everywhere? May we say that these things are not real? Yet on the other hand, may we pretend that they are rational, and that they would be felt to be so did we comprehend them? Doubtless, they are found in a rational system and will be overruled to a rational end, but they are not themselves rational; and to claim that they are is to make it illogical to admit the other and less evident distinctions in being, and to do this is practically to annihilate it.

The falsity of this fundamental principle of dialectic evolution is seen also very conspicuously in the assumed development of the ethical consciousness. It is not the fact that the issue of human desire is always the desire for self-realization. It is true that if the real were invariably rational, this would be so. It is true that desire is always for an end that has some relation to the self. As, however, Mr. Kidd has shown conclusively (*Morality and Religion*,

p. 40), desire may be for self-gratification as well as for self-realization; and while self-realization consists in the satisfaction of self as determining the desire, self-gratification consists in the satisfaction of desire to which the self has been subjected. That is, human desire may be either rational or irrational, self-realizing or self-enslaving, in its issue and cannot, therefore, be necessarily rational in its essence.

Even though self-realization were the real meaning of all human desire, dialectic evolution could not justify itself. The idea of self-realization is not equivalent to the idea of duty. As Calderwood puts it (*Handbook of Moral Philosophy*, p. 149), "The idea of self-realization, being concerned with our life as a whole, is equivalent to 'our good on the whole,' including all forms of self-interest and all forms of suitable effort. Hence, it cannot be identified with the 'should be'" (we would better say, ought to be), "of ethics. Duty is a distinct imperative of conduct; our 'Good' on the whole is an indefinite and variable conception."

Were this not so, it would still be an unanswerable question, how the idea of duty, the sense of oughtness, would ever be the result of dialectic evolution. As Calderwood asks, "How is a being whose life is the manifestation of the Universal Intelligence a fit subject for the injunction to obey moral law?" Such a being must be under the law of necessity: he cannot be under the law of morality. He does not freely determine himself according to his own nature; he is absolutely determined by the universal nature in which his, as all personality, is swallowed up. To say ought to such a being is as unmeaning as it would be to say ought to a stone. The latter is not more in bondage to physical necessity than the former is to spiritual necessity; and, as we have already observed, duty implies a free-agent, nay, is inconceivable as duty without one.

But this is not all. Even if self-realization were the equivalent of duty and even if the oughtness which is the unique characteristic of duty could be the result of dialectic evolution, a more serious difficulty would confront us. We should not be able to assign its proper place to the obligatory ideal, the ethical law. This is "an imperative of the life, an imperative of the reason." On that account it is essential to the life in which reason reigns. It is the essential basis of the activity of the perfect life. Consequently, the holier a man becomes the more does he live under the influence of the idea of duty. The more spontaneous his performance of it, the stronger is its power over him. Hence, God is oughtness personified. He is the Absolute Ought, because He is so holy that it is impossible for Him to do or to be wrong. This place, however, cannot be given to the ethical law, the obligatory

ideal, under an evolution theory dominated, as dialectic evolution is, by the notion of movement, and not by that of law. Under such a theory "the end of conflict or movement is transmuted into the end of life itself." Duty being equivalent to self-realization, when self shall have been realized, duty will be no more. As Pres. Patton has put it in a criticism of the germ of this view as it appears in Kant (*Pres. Rev.*, No. xxv, p. 148), "the climax of morality would be the abolition of morality." Thus this theory fails to interpret ethical law. It narrows it to the process of the evolution which is introduced to explain it. It conditions its reality on difficulty in fulfilling it. In a word, the last achievement of that which is intended to account for the objective obligatory ideal is its annihilation. When perfection of personality shall have been attained, the law of our perfection will bind us no longer.

Thus ends in absurdity the attempt to do away with an objective obligatory ideal by identifying it with the subjective rational demand for self-realization. Really it is an attempt to identify things which are essentially incapable of identification. The ideal or ethical is always rational, but it is also other than and higher than the rational. Though what ought to be is ever the logical, very often the logical is far from being what ought to be. In short, as *à priori* speculation cannot give us the actual world, so neither can it give us the ideal one. The syllogism is useful in the interpretation of both facts and duties, but it cannot generate or describe either.

3. There remains, then, the position taken at the beginning of this paper. In opposition to the Associationists and the Social Evolutionists, who would explain away the idea of obligation, and in opposition to the Dialectic Evolutionists, who assail the objectivity of the rule of obligation, we hold to an objective obligatory ideal. There is objective truth to which rational beings are under obligation to conform their characters and actions. That is, just as there is a real world which exists independently of us, though we belong to it: so there is an ideal world which we are bound to realize, which would bind us even if we became unconscious of the obligation, and in realizing which we shall develop the best implied in ourselves. Thus this position is the basis and the explanation of the possibility of those that have been refuted. It accounts for all that is true in them. Self-realization is a duty and "the greatest good of the greatest number" *ought* to be an end because we and the world are in *vital* relation to a standard which is without and above and, in this sense, *objective to* both us and the world. The truth of such an ideal is proved by the following considerations:

a. A presumption this way is at least suggested by the relationship just indicated between the position which we would vindicate and those which we have, as we believe, overthrown. These latter cannot be wholly false. They would scarcely have been embraced by so many, they would not have persisted so long, had there been no truth in them. That, therefore, they imply and, as we have seen above, depend on the view that we are defending would seem to make for it. Even error must rest on or be mixed with truth. May it not be that what we would establish is the truth necessarily involved in the theories that we have been controverting? That it seems to be certainly suggests a presumption to this effect.

b. This presumption is distinctly raised by the fact that the burden of proof is all on those who would deny an objective obligatory ideal. The doctrine of such an ideal as this doctrine has just been expounded meets the requirements of the case. Mr. Mill admits that the idea of duty is *now* distinct from the idea of happiness and that "the mind is not in a right state unless it love virtue as a thing desirable in itself" (*Dis.*, p. 53). The great aim of the theory of social evolution is to explain how it is that, though "our moral sense is nothing but the experience of utility organized and consolidated through all past generations," it yet discerns moral principles which appear to be and which, so far as the individual is concerned, are *à priori* (Letter of Mr. Spencer to Mr. Mill in Bain's *Mental and Moral Science*, 1868, p. 722). Even stronger is the utterance of dialectic evolution. For example, to quote Mr. F. H. Bradley, a distinguished representative of the Hegelian school. "What is clear at first sight is that to take virtue as a mere means to an ulterior end, is in dire antagonism to the voice of the moral consciousness . . . . to do good for its own sake is virtue" (*Ethical Studies*, pp. 56, 59). Thus all allow an objective obligatory ideal to be that to which consciousness testifies. This, however, is an admission that the theory which we are vindicating would be adequate. It would explain the phenomena to be explained. That is, if there be an objective obligatory ideal, it is easy to see why each one of us is conscious of it. It is just as easy as to understand why, if a real man is before you, you behold a man. In both cases, and in both equally, the knowledge is, according to the hypothesis, "the reflex of reality." You perceive a man because there is a man to be perceived, and you are conscious of an objective obligatory ideal because there is an ideal obligatory on man and because this ideal, in the sense already stated, is objective to him. Hence, this explanation, if true, would be satisfactory. Moreover, it is the only one that is so. We have carefully examined the other theories of oughtness, and

we have found them to be inadequate as well as inconsistent with themselves and unjust to the phenomena for which they would account. Surely, then, it still devolves on the advocates of these theories to show why the doctrine of an objective obligatory ideal is not the true one. When an hypothesis seems to explain the phenomena in question and when there is no other hypothesis at hand that is either valid or sufficient, the presumption is always in favor of the former. The law of parsimony so demands.

c. This presumption is even strengthened when we examine the objections that have been urged against it. These objections, though variously presented, can probably be reduced to two. The first is that of Schopenhauer. He claims (*Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik*, Leipsic, 1860), that the idea of duty should be eliminated from moral science; that it is a superficial and merely popular principle; that it is not logically conceivable; and that the reason for all this is that it involves the existence of an impossible free-will. Such argumentation, however, may be consistent for those who, like Schopenhauer, make unconscious will the principle of all things; but it would be most illogical for others. We have not yet inquired whether a free-will is possible or impossible: but we do know that when we consider a good action as good we feel that we ought to perform it, and that when we consider a bad action as bad we feel that we ought to abstain from it. This consciousness is generally admitted. As we have observed, it is often admitted most unreservedly by those who would explain away its oughtness. If now this ought, or the objective obligatory ideal that it signifies, necessarily implies the existence of a free-will, then this necessity is an argument for free-will: "but," as Janet well says (*Theory of Morals*, p. 140), "we cannot reason conversely, and reject a plainly evident truth for the sake of avoiding a consequence which is metaphysically disagreeable." We might do so no more than we might deny that we were men on the ground that that would imply that we must die.

The second and more serious objection is that there is no moral unity of the human race. This objection itself assumes two forms. It claims, in the first place, that savages are destitute of even the germ of morality. This claim, however, is based on ignorance of facts, or on their misinterpretation. As Janet has shown by an exhaustive review of the facts (*Theory of Morals*, Bk. iii, chap. iv), there is no people without the sense of right and wrong. This sense is often feebly developed and there is usually much diversity of opinion as to what is right and as to what is wrong: but the more searching investigation may be, the more clearly does it reveal the universality of the appreciation of this

distinction and of its objective character. That all men naturally believe in duty is as much a fact of science as that they believe in the supernatural. The other form of the objection under consideration is based on the just alluded to diversity of moral judgments among men and even among civilized men. This diversity must be admitted. It does not, however, involve the denial of an objective or even of a self-evident objective obligatory ideal. Perplexing though the diversity of judgment on moral questions often is, the extent and force of agreement is a marvel when we remember the constant activity of a self-regarding spirit, and the consequent rivalry of interests. As we have seen, all admit the distinction between right and wrong. Contradictory positions are never taken when the moral law is formally expressed. All agree that truthfulness, justice, and benevolence are right. Moral distinctions are not transposed so as to place virtues in the category of the morally wrong. Indeed, as Calderwood remarks in his admirable treatment of this subject (*Handbook of Moral Philosophy*, p. 75), "Diversity of opinion on moral subjects is much more concerned with what is wrong than with what is right." For example, men excuse deceit without condemning integrity. They may condone vice in themselves, but they denounce it in others. How are we to account for this agreement in the moral judgments of the race? Can we account for it so rationally as by assuming an objective obligatory ideal that is self-evident to all who study it? When men see to a large degree alike, we say that they all see the same thing. We explain the diversity of vision on the ground of difference of standpoint or of attention or of faculty: we never infer from this diversity, unless it be greater than the agreement, a difference of object. Were there not, however, this significant agreement in the moral judgments of men, the objection under consideration would still help rather than weaken the position of this paper. The various standards of right and wrong by their very multiplicity would seem to imply one true and objective one. The more false weights and measures there are, the more sure you may be that there is a genuine and authoritative set.

Thus the objections to an objective obligatory ideal are so empty that they can avail nothing against it. Indeed, that which appears at first to be the most formidable of them even strengthens the presumption in favor of it.

d. This presumption is made proof by the clearness and distinctiveness of our sense of oughtness, our idea of duty. That which it gives us is absolutely incapable of identification, at least in consciousness, with anything else. It comes before the mind as unique. This appears in our experience as individuals. Take,

for example, the case of ill-desert. One regrets being sick, but he does not blame himself for it. Yet sickness is equally opposed to one's own happiness, to the greatest good of society, and to self-realization. If, however, one becomes sick through intemperance or even through imprudence, then he does blame himself. Why? His sickness is no more prejudicial in itself to his own happiness, or to the welfare of the community, or to self-realization, than in the former instance. True, but he ought not to have been intemperate or even imprudent. This is all the explanation that can be given, it is all that needs to be given. The consciousness of broken *law* is what makes the difference between the two cases, and this consciousness is so clear and distinct that one has but to have it to recognize its uniqueness. This uniqueness appears as clearly and perhaps more impressively in history. On its pages the moral, that which implies oughtness, that which presupposes an objective obligatory ideal, stands out in striking and often awful individuality and originality. In the words of one of the deepest thinkers of the American pulpit of the present half-century, Rev. Thatcher Thayer, D.D., "Natural affections are very lovely, and are even the friends of moral; but they are not moral, since men are frequently very vicious yet very affectionate. No amount or variety of intellect constitutes a righteous man. The Italian Renaissance was as brilliant with genius as the sky with northern lights, but it was blood-red with crime. Logic cannot reason out right. Imagination cannot fancy goodness. Very sad to say, Lord Bacon was a swindler. The utmost skill in painting or sculpture not unfrequently goes with depraved lives. Sacred music sings movingly about goodness, but sacred music cannot sing goodness itself." No, oughtness is absolutely simple and unique. It is known by intuition and by intuition only, and we have no intuition clearer as we have none so impressive. We may not, therefore, deny the objectivity of the obligatory ideal that through moral intuition we behold. This would be as irrational as, in the opening paper of this series, we saw would be the denial of the reality of what we truly perceive. Genuine intuitions are equally and entirely trustworthy.

e. This proof that we are elaborating is much strengthened by the persistence of the idea of duty. Persistence of belief is, as we saw also in the first number of this series, the final test of that self-evidence and necessity which characterize a genuine intuition, and which we have clearly observed in the case of our conviction as to an objective obligatory ideal. It is, moreover, in this instance a peculiarly decisive test. This is so because everything is against its fulfillment. Naturally man is not friendly to the idea

of duty. He would give much to be emancipated from it. Yet he cannot silence its imperative. He cannot be educated to do so. He may live for his own pleasure, but even Epicurus could not always make him feel that this is right. He may hold that the greatest good of the greatest number is the sole principle of virtue, but the most astute utilitarian could not make him really believe that he would be justified in treating even one child unjustly, though it were supposed to be for the good of the whole community. He may take the realization of self as the acme and sum of duty; but even Hegel, though he might convince, could not persuade him that the most serious thing is not precisely this that the self to be realized is very far from being what ought to be realized. Thus the authority of duty still exists as unique, even when its uniqueness has been denied and rejected. We cannot help seeing its standard. We cannot bring ourselves practically to think it a delusion. Now this should not be so. As Janet says (*Theory of Morals*, p. 148), "the idea of duty should disappear like that of phlogiston." Can we explain why it does not, save on the theory that it rests on a genuine intuition?

f. That this intuition is such, and especially that the ideal which it beholds is objective, is confirmed by experience both individual and universal. This shows that the spiritual and physical worlds have been constituted and are being administered with reference to a standard. That is, as Butler puts it and proves in his incomparable *Analogy*, "we are under a moral government;" and even the irrational universe has a moral purpose. We have the evidence of the former statement in the fact that virtue tends to happiness. "I cannot solve the problem of evil:" said Prea. Woolsey, "but I do find that the holier life I lead the happier I am." The evidence of the latter statement is the fact that if men are to develop and even the physical world to improve, there must be what we call righteousness. General immorality means, sooner or later, general ruin. Now what do these tremendous facts indicate, if not, that we are under law; that this is objective rather than subjective; that it is above us as well as within us? These facts are just what we should expect, if there were above us and binding us a law with a system of rewards and punishments attached. They are precisely what could not be, if oughtness and expediency were the same or if self-realization were the equivalent of duty. Why is it that there are certain *fixed* principles of expediency? Why is it that we feel that true self-realization must follow certain *definite* lines? Why is it that in both history and individual experience there is evident a distinct power that makes for a distinct and *immutable* something which we call righte-

ousness? All this would be impossible, it could not even be conceived, but for a standard above expediency, objective to self, and grounded in the nature of things, only because expressing their true purpose. When the essentially mutable tends thus to realize the immutable there is implied an immutable standard, and this, of course, must be above and thus objective to the mutable. Could we have stronger confirmation of our proof than that both history and individual experience thus evince an objective obligatory ideal?

g. We reach demonstration in the relation of such an ideal to personality. This, as we saw in the last paper of our series, is "the reality which gives form to all other realities, which, indeed, gives us the very idea of reality." Now morality in an important sense performs the same office for personality. That is, as "all that I can conceive of as intuitive is conceived of after the type of my experience with myself," my experience as a person; so that which is deepest in my experience as a person, that which is most real, so to speak, in myself, is the feeling of responsibility to law, the consciousness of an objective obligatory ideal. This it is which imparts to personality its dignity, its true meaning, its richest content, and so, we may say, even its reality. What would personality or human life be worth but for its moral purpose and ideal? It would be higher, more complex, more wonderful, than other life; but would it be essentially different? A pig might reason, he might imagine, he might even think of himself as reasoning and imagining: but he would be still only a learned and reflective pig, were it not that to be conscious of yourself is to be conscious of yourself as under law. An objective obligatory ideal, therefore, is demonstrated when personality is admitted. This ideal imparts to personality its reality. Hence, our consciousness of it must be true.

III. *Free Agency.*—To this, the other base of morality, a few words—and they will have to be exceedingly few—must be given before we close this paper.

1. The Status Questionis.—Our inquiry does not concern the independence of the will. This may not be conceived as a separate entity, essentially distinct from the other faculties of the mind, and related to them only in so far as it directs and energizes them. Such a view, though popular, is radically false psychologically. Personality is one and indivisible. Its various faculties, intellectual, moral, etc., are not so many different powers; they are so many functions or modes of the same power. "A man cannot be independent of himself or any of his faculties of all the rest." Nor is the question as to what is called indifference of the will.

By this phrase is meant, that the will or faculty of choice and resolution, at the moment of decision, is self-poised among conflicting motives; that it decides one way or another, not because of the greater influence of one motive, but because it itself is indifferent or undetermined; that it is able to act in accordance with the weaker against the stronger motive, or even without any motive at all. This position, though taken by Cousin, Tappan, Hazard, and many thinkers of repute, is open to two fatal objections. In virtually holding, as it does, that the will's choice is undetermined and so uncaused, it denies the intuitive and so necessary judgment that every effect must have a cause. It also contradicts observation. "We find that the law of causality reigns among the wishes of the heart and the purposes of the mind, as it reigns in every other department of the soul." For example, in proportion as a mind is thoroughly honorable do we see that it chooses what is honorable and that thus character expresses itself in the will and so determines it. The administration of society may almost be said to be founded on this fact. Nor again is the inquiry as to the self-determination of the will. This is the view of many who do not deny the influence of motives, who even strongly emphasize it. Thus Prof. Samuel Harris (*The Philosophical Basis of Theism*, § 71), while insisting that our natural and rational sensibilities incite and impel the will to act, maintains that they do not determine it; in the last analysis, the will, however strongly influenced, determines itself. Thus Prof. James Seth, while making much of our feelings as constituting motives and expressing character, distinguishes between the character and the self or will; claims that, "while the Self *is* what in its character it *appears* to be, it yet is always *more* than any such empirical manifestation of it;" and holds that it is in "this *more*," and so in the self rather than in the character, that we have "the secret of the moral life" (*A Study of Ethical Principles*, p. 380). Thus Julius Müller (*The Christian Doctrine of Sin*, ii, p. 47), affirms that "freedom is power to *become*—to form one's own character—out of self." This position, however, is open to the same objections as those already noticed. It implies, if it does not teach, that the will is a separate faculty, and that as such it is outside of the domain of cause and effect. Really, though many, as Prof. Seth, for example, strenuously deny this, it involves Kant's error of a transcendental as distinguished from an empirical self.

Nor, on the other hand, is the question as to the power of the will or self over the character. That this power is both real and great, we freely admit. The choice of evil, and, still more, the resolution to do evil, do make one evil. That is, the self as will can

and does confirm the character or self as already determined. What we do not allow is that the character is the product rather than the expression of the self; and that, if the latter be, as we claim, the truth, the self can change its essential nature. Nor, once more, is the inquiry whether the self can review its feelings, judge between them as to which constitute right motives and which wrong ones, and then choose the right even though the wrong may seem to be much the stronger. Were it not thus, man would be incapable of deciding as he ought, and so could not be a moral being. What we do insist on is that, when he does decide in this way, there will be a sufficient reason for his decision, and that sufficient reason will be in the inclination of his character or self. If he chooses to do his duty, it will be because he is a man in whom reason and conscience are really more influential than feeling and sense, much more powerful though the latter may seem before decision to be. It is the event which shows which army is actually the stronger. This does not appear in the number or in the equipment or in the noise of the regiments.

In short, the only question for us is this, Is self-determination of the *person* a fact? This involves two inquiries: Are we the efficient causes of our own choices and acts: that is, agents rather than instruments? And is the final cause or sufficient reason of our choices and acts in ourselves; that is, are we determined by ourselves rather than by what is external to ourselves? In a word, are we free-agents?

2. That this is the only inquiry before us in this connection is clearly evinced by two considerations:

First, free-agency, as we have interpreted it, is all that is required for responsibility, and so for the moral life, in addition to knowledge of an objective obligatory ideal. A moment's reflection and an appeal to common sense should make this plain. A criminal would not be judged guilty of murder in the first degree, if he did not himself commit it; or if, though actually committing it himself, it was only as the compelled and unwilling instrument of some one else. Neither would you regard him guilty, if he was determined to the murder by a force outside of himself; by the will, for example, of some wicked hypnotist. In this case the question would be whether he was so hypnotized as really to cease to be self-determining. If he was, though he would be responsible for allowing himself to come under the influence of the hypnotist, he would not be held responsible for what he did after he had been hypnotized. If, however, the criminal was himself the agent in the commission of the murder, and if he did it with his own conscious consent; that is, if he himself was both the efficient and the final

cause of the decision to commit the murder, we do not seek further: the law says, and the conscience of mankind agrees, that he is under obligation to suffer punishment. Thus if he was constituted to know better, free-agency as we have explained it is the only additional condition of moral responsibility.

The other consideration is that liberty of indifference, and even the view of Müller, Seth, and Harris, in proportion as it approaches the former, are inconsistent with moral life. This, though it is, as we have emphasized, more than rational, is still essentially rational. The content of its characteristic demand is the highest form of the highest reason. A moral being must, therefore, be at least a rational being. Otherwise, oughtness would mean no more to him than it does to a dog. But a being who can decide against the stronger motive and even without any motive is not a rational being. On the contrary, he is an irrational being; for to decide without any motive is to decide without any reason. Nor does it avail to say, with writers like Prof. James Seth, that the self is always *more* than the character in which it appears to manifest itself, and that "the secret of the moral life is in this *more*." If this means that the secret of the moral life is in that which determines itself without reason, it simply means that there is no moral life because what is called the moral life is in its essence irrational. If, however, all that it means is that "the more" in which resides "the secret of the moral life" is inscrutable to us so that we cannot discern the motives or reasons influential in it, we have no objection to offer. We do not claim to understand all the motives or to appreciate in advance of the event the force of all the reasons in accordance with which we always and certainly determine ourselves. What we do claim is that we never consciously decide without a motive or reason; and that if we could do so, we should not be moral beings. That a man may decide according to mere irrational impulse as the beast does we do not question; but such a choice is not, in the case of the beast, any more than in that of the man, irrational in the sense of being without a reason. In both cases, the choice is according to the nature of the chooser. The man who makes such a choice has become like a beast in disposition. The vital difference between them is in the way of making the choice. The beast does it spontaneously; the man does it intelligently as well as spontaneously. But this, of course, implies a sufficient reason for the choice. If we must have this, even in mere spontaneous choice, much more must we have it in choice which is both spontaneous and intelligent.

3. The theories opposed to this doctrine of free-agency or self-determination of the person may be reduced to the following three:

Fatalism.—This is the belief that events, personal as well as physical, are determined and connected by a blind force in such a way that, whatever you may do, a certain thing must happen. Such a view is, of course, the flat denial of both the elements of free-agency. One cannot be the efficient cause of his own choices and decisions; for the very point of the hypothesis is that the blind force of fate is stronger than any special causes. Neither can one have in himself the sufficient reason for his volitions: for there is no sufficient reason for anything except the blind force of fate; and this is not a reason, since another point of the hypothesis is that fate is blind. This theory, however, to go no further, is contradicted by the fact that the world in which we live and of which we form a part is a cosmos; that is, a world which evinces reason both in its constitution and in its development. Otherwise, science would be impossible. Indeed, the fact of science is the absolute refutation of fatalism.

Materialism.—This admits the first element of free-agency. It allows that a person, or what it conceives to be one, is the efficient cause of his own choices, resolutions, and actions. It denies, however, the second element of free-agency. We do not determine ourselves according to our own nature, but we are determined altogether by the chain of essentially physical causes in which and of which each of us is one. Thus, as really as on the hypothesis of fatalism, we are under the law of necessity; mechanical rather than blind, it is true, but just as real and external a necessity. This is the view of writers like Bain, Maudsley, and Münsterberg. The general position of this school is set forth in the following quotation from a recent publication, *Evolutionary Ethics and Animal Psychology*, by E. P. Evans: "If we could trace all the complex incitements and impulses which lead the assassin to lift his arm and strike the fatal blow, we should, doubtless, find the necessity of the action as absolute and inevitable as the movement by which the decapitated frog raises its leg to scratch an irritative drop of nitric acid from its side." Thus the human will would be reduced to mechanism pure and simple. But the objections to this view are insuperable. Can that be a part of the mechanism of nature which discovers, explains, and employs that mechanism? Because the human person is in these and other ways above nature, while he may be affected, he cannot be determined, by it. Again, the mechanism of the physical world is known only to consciousness. Now that we determine ourselves is an admitted fact of consciousness, and one of the clearest of them. How, then, may we say with Bain that the consciousness of freedom is only a delusion? If we invalidate consciousness in the one case, we invalidate it in the other.

Pantheism.—This saves the second element of free-agency, but denies the first. It allows self-determination: but, whether materialistic and geometric, like the pantheism of Spinoza; or spiritualistic and ideal, like the pantheism of Hegel—it is fatal to the view that you and I are the efficient causes of our choices, resolutions, and actions. Strictly speaking, on either of these theories, or on those that approach them, as Malebranche's theory of "occasional causes," Edwards' doctrine of continuous creation, and Emmons' "exercise scheme," there is no efficiency save in the Absolute: this is the cause of all. Such a position, however, in any of its forms, is exposed to the fatal objection, to refer to but one of many, that it also contradicts a fundamental fact of consciousness. If we are conscious of anything, we are conscious, not that our volitions are made for us, but that they are created by us. Indeed, it is from ourselves as exerting power and originating action in willing that we get our idea of power and such a conception as we have of creation.

4. It only remains, then, for us to vindicate free-agency: or the theory that we are, not the instrumental, but the efficient causes, of our own acts, resolutions, and even choices; and that in all this we are finally determined, not by anything outside of ourselves, but by our own nature. We really choose, we choose as we really please to choose, and we please to choose as we ourselves really are. This is the position to be established, and its establishment would seem to be complete on the following among other grounds:

a. As has been already remarked, it is involved in the obligatory ideal whose objective reality, as proved in the former part of this paper, we may and should now take for granted. Such an ideal is possible only for a free-agent; and so the fact of such an ideal carries with it the truth of free-agency, and would do so, even were there no other considerations to be urged in its support.

b. There are, however, many such. For example, a presumption in favor of free-agency is raised by the fact that the burden of proof now falls on those who would deny it. The hypothesis that man is a free-agent would meet all the necessities of the case, if it were true. As we have seen, it would justify our consciousness of responsibility. It would explain also our consciousness of free self-determination. This consciousness is precisely what we should expect that we should have, if we were self-determining beings. The hypothesis that we are such is, therefore, the one demanded by the facts. Moreover, it is the only one that does fit the facts. The other theories all, as we must now have inferred, leave at least the consciousness of freedom unexplained. The nearest that they

come to an explanation is when they say with Spinoza that we have forgotten or do not know the causes of our decisions and on this account judge them to be free. This, however, is to explain what is distinctly positive in consciousness by a mere negation, and so is no explanation. That we have forgotten the cause of something does not show why we know ourselves to be the cause. Surely, then, it devolves on the holders of these theories to disprove free-agency, and this raises a decided presumption in its favor. The law of parsimony so requires.

c. This presumption is strengthened by the very difficulties by which, at first sight, the theory of free-agency seems to be embarrassed. There is what we may call the practical difficulty. This arises from "moral statistics." These appear to prove that human actions are not the products of free-will, but of a natural law. For example, tables have been prepared which seem to show that "in any given number of men from year to year a certain definite and constant percentage of crimes, and even of crimes of a particular kind, may be reckoned on." Such statistics, however, really point toward the position that we would establish. At any rate, they are clearly inconsistent with the hypothesis that human actions are the products of natural law only. They are not constant enough for that. They vary perceptibly while natural laws are invariable. Moreover, these approximately constant numbers can be obtained only by taking in a wide range. If among ten millions of men there is annually one offender in three thousand, it is not the case that in every actual group of three thousand there is one offender. Yet if it were a law of natural necessity that operated, its applicability as law would tell in regard to all parts. "The law of the combination of O_2 with C in carbonic acid proves as true in regard to a gramme of carbonic acid as in regard to a kilogramme." Yet, on the other hand, these "moral statistics" are too nearly constant for us to suppose that they express no law. What, then, is indicated, if not a law other than natural; a spiritual force which, though above natural law, is under law to itself; a person who, though within limits determining external nature, is always and altogether determined by his own nature? More serious than this is the metaphysical difficulty. The power of will and the universal reign of causation are contradictory. Hence, logically, to admit the power of the will means to deny the universal reign of causation and thus to surrender metaphysical completeness in our scheme of the universe. Yet even Kant, who felt this difficulty as keenly and stated it as sharply as it has ever been felt and stated, would not succumb to it. He insisted, as do Lotze and the Neo-Kantians, on "recognizing this theoretically

indemonstrable freedom as 'a postulate of the practical reason.'" We would venture to show with McCosh (*The Divine Government*, p. 280), "a more excellent way." The contradiction to which Kant referred does not lie in the principles of reason, but only in certain false *à priori* representations of them. That is, the power of the will and the universal reign of causation may be contraries, but they need not be contradictories. To prove them to be the latter, it would be necessary to show freedom and non-causation to be the same attribute. But "this is the very point in dispute, and cannot be settled by the principle of contradiction itself; nor indeed by any mere analytic or logical principle, but by synthetic evidence which cannot possibly be had." In a word, the power of will and the universal reign of causation are ultimate facts attested by primary principles in our constitution. That we cannot trace the connection between them is, therefore, no reason why they should not both be true. Nay, it strengthens the already stated presumption that they are. It is a characteristic of ultimate facts that they are independent. If a connection could be discovered between them, it would show that they were not ultimate, but met in a farther unity.

d. That they may even be seen not to be contradictories would seem to follow from the fact that many thinkers, the most keenly logical who have based their systems of the universe on the universality of causation, have, nevertheless, had not the least difficulty in holding to free-agency and have even been among its most zealous teachers. In support of this statement it is sufficient to name John Calvin, John Owen, and Jonathan Edwards. "If," says Calvin (Henry's *Life of Calvin*, i. p. 497), "force be opposed to freedom, I acknowledge and will always affirm, that there is a free-will, a will determining itself, and proclaim every man who thinks otherwise a heretic. Let the will be called free in this sense, that is, because it is not constrained or impelled irresistibly from without, but determines itself by itself." And Owen says (*Dissertation on Divine Justice*, chap. i, sec. 26), "to act freely is the very nature of the will: it must *necessarily* act *freely*."

e. The solution of our problem is in this statement of Owen. The human will, because the activity of a person or spirit, cannot but be free. Its freedom is of its essence. If it were not self-determining and self-acting, it would not be spiritual. Hence, T. H. Green, though a thinker of a school very unlike Owen's, has well said (*Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 93), "the question as to the freedom of moral agents is not the question commonly debated, with much ambiguity of terms, between 'determinists' and 'indeterminists;' not the question whether there is or is not a

possibility of unmotived willing; but the question whether motives, of that kind by which it is the characteristic of moral or human action to be determined, are of properly natural origin or can be rightly regarded as natural phenomena." That they may not be so regarded is clear. As a matter of fact it is not what is external to us that moves us to choice and action. The saloon is no temptation to a man of pure appetites: it is an invincible temptation to a man of thoroughly depraved appetites. Thus it is not the external saloon but the internal appetite that makes the temptation: and so it is that the man, though he be the slave of drink, is free: he determines himself by himself; he himself chooses to drink, and he so chooses because of his own appetite. So long as he is a man he cannot do otherwise. It is the necessity of his nature thus to determine himself by himself and so to be under the law of freedom, just as it is the necessity of the stone's nature to be determined in its course by what is outside of itself and thus to be under the law of necessity. Causation operates equally in both cases. It operates differently, however, in both, because of the radical difference between them. In the one case it is physical and, therefore, must be necessary; in the other it is rational and, therefore, must be free.

f. Finally, as an obligatory ideal is, as we have seen, the reality of personality; so in an even deeper sense is this true of free-agency. The meaning, the dignity, of humanity appears, not so much in the fact that we are under law, as in the fact that we determine ourselves strictly according to ourselves whether to obey it or not to obey it. It is this tremendous fact of free-agency and consequent responsibility which, as Prof. James Seth says (*A Study of Ethical Principles*, p. 349), is the grand characteristic of our life, and forbids its resolution into the life either of nature or of God! If, therefore, we accept the truth of personality, if we believe in ourselves; we must grant free-agency. It is personality's soul.

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